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2. Reform of the Statutory Definition ................. 581
Investments made in the form of cash value life insurance have re-
ceived preferential treatment under the income tax laws since 1913.1
Most significantly, a policyholder does not include the interest credited
under these contracts in current income. 2 If the life insurance contract
remains in effect until the insured's death, the beneficiaries generally ex-
clude from gross income the death benefits paid under the contract, in-
cluding the previously untaxed interest.
3
Although the favorable tax treatment of life insurance is of long stand-
ing, the Internal Revenue Code did not contain a comprehensive statu-
I The exclusion from gross income under § 101(a) for amounts paid due to the death of the
insured originated in the Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. The
exclusion has been reenacted in each succeeding act. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39
Stat. 756, 758; War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1200, 40 Stat. 300, 329; Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(1), 42
Stat. 227, 238; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213(b)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 267; Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 213(b)(1), 44 Stat. 9, 24; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(b)(1), 45 Stat. 791,
797; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 22(b)(1), 47 Stat. 169, 178; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 22(b)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 687; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b)(1), 49 Stat. 1648, 1657;
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b)(1), 52 Stat. 447, 458; IRC (1939), ch. 2, § 22(b)(1), 53
Stat. 1, 10; IRC § 101(a), 68A Stat. 3, 26.
Section 72(e) governs the tax treatment of surrenders of life insurance contracts. This sec-
tion also traces its origins to the Income Tax Act of 1913. Under that act, all amounts re-
ceived upon the surrender of a life insurance contract were excluded from income. Income
Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. This provision was reenacted in succeeding
acts. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065. Section 213(b)(2) of
the Revenue Act of 1926 limited this exclusion to the aggregate amount of premiums or other
consideration paid for the policy. This limitation was reenacted in subsequent acts and contin-
ues to apply to amounts received upon the surrender of life insurance contracts. IRC
§ 72(e)(5). See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22(b)(2), 48 Stat. 680, 687; IRC (1939), ch. 2,
§ 22(b)(2), 53 Stat. 1, 10; IRC § 72(e) (5), 68A Stat. 3, 22.
2 See IRC § 72(e). The precise statutory basis for this exclusion is obscure. See Hahn &
Adney, The New Federal Tax Definition of "Life Insurance Contract," 38 J. Am. Soe'y
C.L.U. 40 n.4 (Nov. 1984); Manno, The Federal Income Taxation of Life Insurance, Annuities
and Individual Retirement Accounts After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 60 St. John's L. Rev.
674, 690 n.71 (1986). The exclusion has been questioned for some time. See, e.g., Paul, Ero-
sion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 Tax L. Rev. 203, 210 (1956); Vickrey, Insurance
Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 Yale L.J. 554, 563 (1943). If the contract terminates prior
to the death of the insured, a portion of the interest theretofore credited under the contract
may be includable in income at that time. See notes 48-51, 59-61 and the accompanying text.
3 IRC § 101(a)(1). The proceeds of the contract are not totally excluded from income if the
contract is transferred for valuable consideration. See IRC § 101(a)(2); Gallagher, A Primer
on Section 101-Federal Income Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds, 49 Temp. LQ. 831,
837-45 (1976). Amounts in the nature of interest paid to a beneficiary allocable to any post-
death period are includable in gross income. IRC § 101(c), (d). A provision excluding from
income up to $1,000 of post-death interest paid on amounts held by the insurance company to
the surviving spouse of the insured was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No.
99-514, § 1001(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2387 [hereinafter sometimes cited as the 1986 Act].
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tory definition of life insurance until the enactment of § 7702 in 1984.4
Before then, Helvering v. LeGierse5 expressed the common-law tax defini-
tion of life insurance. In LeGierse, the Supreme Court held that a con-
tract qualifies as life insurance only if it involves both risk shifting and
risk distribution.6 The Court's formulation required only that the con-
tract contain some insurance risk; the magnitude of this risk was not
material. 7 This definition ultimately proved unacceptable to Congress
because it permitted the development and marketing of "investment-ori-
ented products that maximize the advantages of the deferral provided in
the Code." 8 Section 7702 was the response. This provision denies the
tax benefits of life insurance to more investment-oriented contracts than
"traditional" life insurance products. 9 Contracts that satisfy § 7702's
definition continue to enjoy the traditional favorable tax treatment, but,
for those that do not, investment income credited is taxed currently.10
Debate concerning the proper tax treatment of life insurance invest-
ments has not abated. Notwithstanding the enactment of § 7702 in 1984,
the preferential tax treatment of life insurance investments remained a
prominent target of tax reform proposals. In 1985, President Reagan
advocated full current taxation of interest credited under life insurance
contracts.'I By eliminating numerous tax preferences and imposing limi-
tations on most other tax sheltered investments, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 caused increased attention to be focused on the unchanged treat-
ment of life insurance investments.' 2 In 1988, Congress enacted several
modifications to the tax treatment of life insurance investments and or-
dered the Treasury Department and the General Accounting Office to
study whether preferential treatment remains justified.'
3
4 H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., Vol. 1, 144 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House
Report]; S. Rep. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1, at 571 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Senate
Report].
5 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
6 Id. at 539. See also Rev. Rul. 65-67, 1965-1 C.B. 56.
7 See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 40-41.
8 1983 House Report, note 4, at 102; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 523; see also K. Black &
H. Skipper, Life Insurance 47-51, 68-76, 80-99 (1lth ed. 1987); Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 41-
43 (providing an overview of the development of life insurance products).
9 1983 House Report, note 4, at 102; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 523.
10 See IRC § 7702(g); see also notes 84-89 and the accompanying text.
11 The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity 254-
57 (1985); see also 2 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Eco-
nomic Growth 258-61 (1984). Congress failed to enact this proposal.
12 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Taxation of Single Premium Life Insurance 1
(1987); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Description of Possible Options to Increase Reve-
nues 223-24 (Comm. Print 1987); Insurance Industry Legislative Symposium, 1 Ins. Tax Rev.
1, 1-12 (March-April 1987); see also notes 226-27 and the accompanying text.
13 The Technical Corrections and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 [hereinafter some-
times referred to as the 1988 Technical Corrections Act], § 5012 alters the tax treatment of
loans and other amounts received under "modified endowment contracts." In most circum-
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This article analyzes and evaluates the preferential tax treatment of
investment income earned under life insurance contracts satisfying the
statutory definition of life insurance.' 4 Part I focuses on two tax policy
questions. The first is whether justification exists for the preferential tax
treatment of interest credited under cash value life insurance policies.
Assuming adequate justification, the second question examined is
whether § 7702 establishes appropriate limits on the range of life insur-
ance contracts that qualify for preferential tax treatment.
Before addressing these questions, Part I provides an overview of the
economic components of life insurance contracts. For many readers, the
complexity of these arrangements operates as a barrier to analysis.15
This overview provides the basic analytic tools to enable a novice to pro-
ceed further. Following this discussion, Part I discusses the existing tax
treatment accorded the owners of life insurance policies. Part I then ex-
amines the general actuarial limitations contained in § 7702's definition
of life insurance. Part I concludes with an analysis of the current tax
treatment of interest credited under cash value life insurance contracts
and the tax policy decisions reflected in the general limitations incorpo-
rated in the statutory definition.
Part II of this article examines and evaluates the extraordinarily tech-
nical and arcane provisions of § 770216 that are designed to prevent
avoidance of its general actuarial limitations. First, Part II considers the
stances, a 10% penalty tax would apply to amounts included in income as a result of distnbu-
tions from these contracts. Id. at § 5012(b). For contracts not classified as modified
endowment contracts, the taxation of life insurance investments are, unchanged. This article
does not discuss the definition of modified endowment contracts contained in IRC § 7702A.
In addition to changing the distribution rules applicable to modified endowment contracts,
the 1988 Technical Corrections Act ordered the Treasury Department and the General Ac-
counting Office to study the "policy justification for, and the practical implications of, present-
law treatment of the earnings on the cash surrender value of life insurance and annuity con-
tracts in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1986." 1988 Technical Corrections Act § 5014(a).
Several other proposals for reform have been suggested. Congressmen Stark and Gradison
proposed more sweeping changes in this area. See HR. 3441, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
Cong. Rec. H8289-90 (Oct. 7, 1987). Under H.R. 3441, most pre-death distributions from life
insurance contracts would be taxed in the same fashion as distributions from annuity con-
tracts. The General Accounting Office suggested several alternatives that focused on policy
loans from single premium life insurance contracts. See Taxation of Single Premium Life In-
surance, note 12, at 30-34.
14 This article does not examine the exclusion of mortality gains from income under
§ 101(a). For a life insurance contract, the mortality gain represents the portion of the death
benefit that exceeds the sum of the policyholder's investment in the policy and the net amount
of interest credited under the policy during the insured's life. Although mortality gains under
life insurance contracts are excluded from gross income, mortality gains received in connection
with annuity contracts are subject to tax. IRC § 72(b)(2).
Is See Vickrey, note 2, at 560 n.14.
16 A commentator has noted that the language of the Internal Revenue Code governing life
insurance products "sometimes appears to have been co-authored by James Joyce and Casey
Stengel." Manno, note 2, at 674.
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provisions of § 7702 that limit the actuarial assumptions used upon the
issuance of a policy. Part II then explores the difficulties that arise when
modifications to a life insurance contract occur after the contract is is-
sued. Section 7702's limitations are based on the original terms specified
in the life insurance contract. The adjustment rules seek to maintain the
general constraints on investment orientation in light of changed con-
tractual terms. Finally, Part III contains conclusions and suggestions for
legislative change.
I. TAXATION OF CASH VALUE LIFE INSURANCE FOLLOWING THE
ENACTMENT OF SECTION 7702
A. A Primer on Life Insurance Economics
Individuals are often concerned that the loss of income resulting from
their death may leave their families with inadequate financial resources
to maintain an acceptable standard of living. Through the purchase of a
life insurance contract, an individual shifts this financial risk to a life
insurance company. If the insured dies while the contract is in effect, the
policy's beneficiaries receive a specified dollar amount. This payment of
a specified death benefit to a beneficiary constitutes one of the defining
characteristics of life insurance.17 Following the insured's death, invest-
ment of the contractual death benefit may generate income to replace a
portion of the income previously generated by the insured's efforts. 8
A life insurance company charges an amount called the premium to
compensate it for assuming this economic risk.' 9 The premium reflects
the costs that the life insurance company anticipates it will incur as a
result of assuming the risks in question. These expenses include the cost
of current insurance protection, which in turn depends on the likelihood
that the insured risk will occur.20 In general, the cost of current insur-
17 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 13.
18 Id. at 201-21. Life insurance is purchased for a variety of purposes besides protecting
one's family. For example, a creditor may insist that a debtor maintain a policy of life insur-
ance with a death benefit sufficient to satisfy the amount of indebtedness. Id. at 264-65. In
addition, a business may purchase insurance on the life of a shareholder to provide a source of
funds to purchase stock owned at the time of the shareholder's death. Id. at 265-71.
19 Richey, Life Insurance: The Investment of Your Life (How to Pick What is Best for the
Client), 41 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax'n 33-1, 33-55 (1983).
20 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 17-18. Although the a priori likelihood that any
particular individual will die during a given year is impossible to determine, the expected mor-
tality rate of a large group is much more predictible. Id. at 14. Insurers use the actual mortal-
ity experience of large populations to construct mortality tables. Id. at 313-17. A mortality
table indicates the probability that an individual of a given age will die during the next year.
In computing premiums, a life insurance company may modify a standard mortality table to
reflect mortality differences between its customers and the larger population. Id. at 317. For
example, the premiums for nonsmokers who exercise regularly should reflect their favorable
mortality experience. The company's expected cost of insurance protection equals the death
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ance protection represents a small percentage of the death benefit because
the likelihood that an individual will die during a particular year is rela-
tively small.21 The cost of current insurance protection, however, is not
the sole factor that affects premium rates. Other factors include the ben-
efits (other than the death benefit) promised under the contract and the
income that the life insurance company expects to earn through the in-
vestment of the premium dollars received. 22
1. Term Life Insurance
Term life insurance provides current insurance protection for a limited
time.23 As with all forms of life insurance, the insurance company pays
the specified death benefit if the insured dies during the period of cover-
age. If the insured outlives the policy term, however, the insured and the
designated beneficiaries have no further economic claims against the life
insurance company. Term life insurance that is renewable yearly is the
most common form of term life insurance currently sold.
24
Although the premium charged for a term policy is based primarily on
the probability of the insured's death during the period of coverage, the
life insurance company earns investment income from the time that it
receives the premium until it pays any death benefits to policy benefi-
ciaries.25 To the extent that the anticipated investment earnings offset
benefit specified in the policy multiplied by the likelihood of the insured's death during the
year in question, as determined under the applicable mortality table. Id. at 18.
21 Id. According to the 1980 Commissioners' Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, there is
less than a 10% likelihood that an individual aged 80 will die during the next year; for an
individual aged 50, the likelihood is less than 1%. Id.
22 Id. at 16-18. Premiums typically include a "load" factor that reflects the life insurance
company's operating expenses and anticipated profits. Richey, note 19, at 33-48. For purposes
of illustrating the economics of life insurance contracts, loading charges are ignored as an
unnecessary complication. The loading charges are considered, however, in the discussion of
the appropriate tax treatment of the policyholder. See notes 59-63 and the accompanying text.
Loading charges also affect § 7702's limitations on premiums paid. See IRC
§ 7702(c)(3)(B)Ci).
23 Richey, note 19, at 33-60.
24 K Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 54. Yearly-renewable term life insurance policies guar-
antee that the insured may renew the policy even if the insured's health has deteriorated to the
point that insurance is otherwise unobtainable. Id. at 17. Although this guarantee provides a
very limited form of insurance protection against changes in one's health, this article treats
yearly-renewable term insurance as pure term life insurance. The presence of the renewal
feature increases the cost of the policy.
25 Id. at 18; see also Neubig & Steuerle, The Taxation of Income Flowing Through Finan-
cial Institutions, U. S. Treasury Dep't Office of Tax Analysis Paper 52, at 4-5 (Sept. 1983).
Although an insurance company's sources of investment income are varied-real estate mort-
gages, equity securities, bonds, and other financial instraments-this article generally refers to
the insurer's earnings as "interest."
There is no explicit mechanism to provide for the crediting of interest in most term life
insurance policies. Interest may be reflected, however, in the price charged for the term insur-
ance. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 18.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
498 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:
the cost of current insurance protection in determining the term premi-
ums charged, the purchaser receives the same economic benefit as if in-
terest were paid by the life insurance company. It is difficult to isolate
the amount of interest applied for the purchaser's benefit because neither
the cost of current insurance protection nor the amount of interest is
known.26 Given this practical problem, as well as the likelihood that the
interest credited is modest in amount, it is reasonable to view one-year
term life insurance as having no savings component.
27
The linkage between the probability of the insured's death and the pre-
mium charged causes term insurance premiums to increase as the age of
the insured increases. 28 For many years, the prospect of constantly rising
premiums limited sales of term life insurance.29 Following the 1950's,
however, term insurance has gained a larger share of the life insurance
market,30 although this trend may have been reversed in the 1980's.31
26 In arithmetical terms, the term premium equals: (1) the cost of insurance protection, plus
(2) loading charges, less (3) the amount of interest implicitly credited. Unless the values of
three variables are known, the fourth variable is indeterminate. The only known value is the
term premium. Absent information concerning the magnitude of the cost of insurance protec-
tion and the loading charges, the interest credited cannot be isolated.
27 See Neubig & Steuerle, note 25, at 5; Goode, Policyholders' Interest Income From Life
Insurance Under the Income Tax, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 33, 36-37 (1962). The amount of interest
credited depends on the size of the premium and the period during which the the premiums are
invested. For one-year term policies, the insurance company has the use of the premiums for
less than one year because death benefits are paid throughout the year. Moreover, term premi-
ums tend to be modest. For example, a $100,000 one-year term policy for a 35-year-old person
is likely to cost less than $300. See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 54. For such a contract,
the interest credited will not exceed the return realized when a modest amount (i.e., less than
$300) is invested for less than one year. If the term of the policy extends for several years, the
interest credited may become significant. See Irenas, Life Insurance Interest Income Under
the Federal Income Tax, 21 Tax L. Rev. 297, 304 (1966).
28 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 18; Irenas, note 27, at 299.
29 See Irenas, note 27, at 299 & n.1l.
30 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 51-52. See also American Council on Life Insurance,
1986 Life Insurance Factbook 13 [hereinafter Life Insurance Factbook].
31 Term contracts accounted for 60% of the aggregate coverage under newly issued life
insurance contracts in 1982, but only 38% in 1985. Life Insurance Factbook at 13. The cause
of this decline in market share is unclear. One factor may have been the increased sales of
universal life insurance which, in 1985, accounted for approximately 40% of new individual
life insurance purchases. Id. at 12, 13. One possibility is that the increased volume of nonterm
contracts can be traced, in large part, to the replacement of a substantial number of existing
cash value life insurance policies with universal life policies. This replacement scenario would
explain the discrepancy between the substantial decline in term insurance's market share and
the much more modest decline in the portion of life insurance in force consisting of term
contracts. From 1981 to 1985, this share declined from 38.5% to 37.0%. Id. at 27.
The use of universal life insurance as a substitute for existing cash value contracts would not
be surprising. Universal life insurance was developed in the late 1970's to overcome features
that reduced the marketability of other forms of cash value life insurance. See Comment,
TEFRA's Conversion of Universal Life Insurance Into the Flexible Premium Life Insurance
Contract, 3 J.L. & Com. 325 (1983); Comment, Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Products
After the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 1 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 237, 245-48 (1985). The differences
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2. Cash Value Life Insurance Policies
The second major type of life insurance is "cash value" life insurance,
so called because, in addition to providing a specified death benefit upon
the death of the insured, these policies create a cash value during the
insured's life.32 The cash value is the amount that the policyowner re-
ceives if the policy is cancelled. 33 The accumulation of cash value reflects
the existence of a savings feature in this form of insurance.
34
The prototypical form of cash value life insurance is the level-pre-
mium, "whole" life insurance policy. 35 In this type of policy, a fixed
premium is charged annually for the remainder of the insured's life. The
premium remains constant notwithstanding the increasing likelihood of
death. During the early years of the contract, the premium paid exceeds
the cost of current insurance protection. 36 The life insurance company
invests this excess which, together with any investment income earned,
can be used for two purposes. First, it can supply the funds to pay bene-
fits under the contract in later years. 37 Second, the accumulated balance
serves as the basis for computing the policy's cash value.3
8
between traditional and universal life insurance are discussed in notes 136-41 and the accom-
panying text.
32 Cash value life insurance includes a variety of life insurance products including "whole"
life insurance, single premium life insurance, universal life insurance, and variable life insur-
ance. Although there are important differences among these life insurance products, the eco-
nomic significance of the cash values is the same for these types of policies.
33 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 355-64. Cash value is also called the surrender
value of the contract. Upon the surrender of a policy, the life insurance company must pay to
the policyholder an amount no less than the minimum amount mandated under the applicable
nonforfeiture law. The cash value, however, may exceed these mandated minimums. Id. at
362.
34 See 2 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth 258 (1984); Vickrey, note 2, at 560-61; Goode, note 27, at 34-37; Irenas, note 27, at
299-304; McLure, The Income Tax Treatment of Interest Earned on Savings in Life Insurance,
3 The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs-A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the
Joint Economic Committee 370, 374 (1972). Defenders of the existing tax treatment of life
insurance investments assert that compartmentalization of cash value life insurance into sav-
ings and insurance components "is based on a faulty concept of level premium life insurance.
[I]t is a product that provides lifetime insurance protection at a level premium, thereby avoid-
ing sharp premium increases as one gets older." See Schweiker, Guest Editorial: Proposal to
Tax Life Insurance Would Damage the Financial Security of Millions of Americans, 39 J. Am.
Soe'y C.L.U. 11 (Sept. 1985).
35 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 23; Irenas, note 27, at 299.
36 K. Black & IL Skipper, note 8, at 23.
37 Id. at 19. In many instances, the amount accumulated equals the life insurance com-
pany's reserve liability for the policy. Id. at 345-46. A life insurance reserve represents an
actuarial present value estimate of the company's liability under a policy. This estimate de-
pends primarily on assumptions concerning three variables: (1) the cost of current insurance
protection; (2) the rate of interest credited; and (3) the method used to amortize expenses
incurred under the policy. Id. at 349-53.
38 Id. at 355-64.
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To illustrate the generation of cash value under a level-premium con-
tract, consider a simplified hypothetical contract with a death benefit of
$100,000 issued to a 35-year-old individual. The annual premium for
this contract is $1,279. 39 During the first year, the premium of $1,279 is
applied to pay the cost of current insurance protection, which is $208.40
The remaining $1,071 earns interest at a 4% rate, or $47, during the first
year,41 thereby building the cash value to $1,117.42 The $47 of interest
credited is commonly called "the inside interest build-up" of a life insur-
ance policy.
In the second year, payment of the annual premium increases the cash
value. As in the first year, the charge for current insurance protection
reduces the cash value. The insurance company's net amount at risk,
however, is no longer the full $100,000 death benefit.43 The cash value of
$1,117 reduces the net amount at risk to $98,883. Consequently, the
mortality charge imposed under the contract is based on the net amount
at risk of $98,883. Similarly, in subsequent years, the policy's cash value
increases, while the amount of current insurance protection declines.
44
39 This example incorporates the methodology developed by the Treasury Department for
analyzing life insurance investments. See Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Companies, Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-14, 27 (1983) (statement of John E. Chapoton, Ass't Secretary,
Dep't of Treasury) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings]. The actuarial assumptions used in this exam-
ple are as follows: interest is credited at a 4% rate; and mortality charges are based on the 1980
Commissioners' Standard Ordinary mortality table. To simplify the discussion, no load is
added to the premium, i.e., the premium is not increased to reflect expenses or profits. Simi-
larly, no surrender charge is imposed under this policy.
40 This amount represents the insurance company's charge for assuming the insurance risk.
Table I in the Appendix illustrates the generation of cash value under this contract. For each
year that the contract remains in force, Table 1 indicates the premium paid, the cost of current
insurance protection under the contract, the interest credited, and the cash value of the con-
tract as of the end of the year. These calculations assume that the mortality charges are im-
posed in the middle of each policy year.
41 In this example, interest is credited at a 4% rate. Under the terms of a traditional level-
premium policy, interest is not credited explicitly. One can determine the implicit rate of
interest if the premium level, the mortality charges imposed, and the cash values over the life
of the contract are all known. When neither the interest rate nor mortality charges are sepa-
rately stated, however, it is not possible to determine the implicit interest rate. See J. Belth,
Life Insurance: A Consumer's Handbook 50-53 (1985); cf. Tobias, The Invisible Banker 259
(1982) (stating that ascertaining both the interest rate and the mortality charge is as difficult as
determining the separate cost of the macaroni and the cheese when they are bought for a single
price of $1.39).
During the late 1970's and early 1980's life insurance companies began to credit interest at
higher rates. See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 77-79. More recently, life insurance com-
panies have developed contracts which explicitly credit interest to the policyholder. Id. at 68-
74; see also note 110.
42 The cash value as of the end of any year = opening cash value + premium - cost of
current insurance protection + interest credited.
43 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 25.
44 Although the current insurance protection declines, the mortality charges may increase
due to the increasing probability of death as the insured ages.
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This level-premium contract illustrates the basic components of all
cash value life insurance policies: the premium, the charges imposed for
current insurance protection, the interest credited, and the cash value.
The precise relationship among these components depends, however, on
the level of current insurance charges, the rate at which interest is
credited, and the pattern and magnitude of the premium payments. For
example, decreases in the charges for current insurance protection cause
the cash value (and the interest credited thereon) to increase. Similarly,
an increase in the rate of interest credited causes the cash value to in-
crease at a more rapid rate, thereby reducing the amount of, and charges
for, current insurance protection at a more rapid rate.
Examination of a $100,000 single-premium life insurance contract is-
sued to a 35-year-old individual illustrates the complex interaction
among the economic components of cash value life insurance.45 The sin-
gle premium for this contract is $25,188; no additional premiums are
payable. The death benefit remains at $100,000. In comparison to the
level-premium contract discussed previously, in every year the single-pre-
mium contract generates higher levels of cash value and credits more
interest. The larger cash values reduce the amount and the cost of cur-
rent insurance protection.
The differences between the level-premium contract and the single-pre-
mium contract (both having a $100,000 death benefit) during the first




Yr 1: Premium $1,279 $25,188
- Cost of Insurance Protection (208) (158)
+ Interest Earned 47 1,004
= Closing Cash Value 1,117 26,034
Yr 2: Current Insurance Protection 98,883 73,966
The cash value generated in a life insurance contract has many of the
attributes of a financial asset.46 While the cash value remains with the
life insurance company, it is credited with interest. In addition, the poli-
cyholder can obtain the cash value either by terminating the policy or, if
the policyholder desires to keep the contract in effect, by borrowing the
cash value from the insurance company.47 Notwithstanding the similari-
45 See Appendix, Table 2.
46 See J. Belth, note 41, at 56-58.
47 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 56-58, 119-22. The borrowing of a contract's cash
value creates a formal obligation to repay the amount borrowed, plus interest. There are sev-
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ties between the cash value of a life insurance contract and other financial
instruments, there is one distinguishing characteristic of cash value life
insurance: The cash value pays the costs of current insurance protection.
B. Current Tax Treatment of the Policyholder
The investment income credited to the cash value of life insurance con-
tracts receives unusually benevolent treatment under the income tax
laws. As discussed above, the increase in the cash value of a life insur-
ance contract consists, in part, of interest or other investment returns
that the life insurance company credits to the policy's cash value.48 The
tax treatment of this interest credited differs from the tax treatment of
other forms of interest in three significant respects. First, taxation of the
interest is deferred. Second, the income measurement rules cause a por-
tion of the interest credited to escape taxation. Third, § 101(a) generally
excludes the remaining interest from gross income if the policy remains
in force until the death of the insured. Each of these benefits is discussed
below.
eral alternative means available to the policyholder to satisfy this debt. For example, the poli-
cyholder may cancel the life insurance contract during the insured's life, in which case the
contract's surrender value is applied to the unpaid liability. Moreover, if the loan remains
outstanding at the time of the insured's death, the loan balance offsets a portion of the death
benefit otherwise payable to the contract's beneficiaries. Id. at 119-20.
The life insurance contract treats the policy loan as a bona fide loan, rather than a with-
drawal of the contract's cash value. For this reason, the life insurance company credits inter-
est on the full cash value rather than the unborrowed sum remaining with the company.
Similarly, interest is payable to the life insurance company on the full amount of the policy
loan. Life insurance contracts issued prior to the late 1970's generally specified a fixed (and
modest) rate of interest payable on a policy loan. Contracts issued more recently link the
interest rate payable on loans to the interest rate applied to the contract's cash value.
4S See notes 32-45 and the accompanying text. In the cash value life insurance contracts
discussed previously, interest was credited to the cash value at a 4% rate. See note 39. An
interest earning fund, however, is not the only type of investment available under cash value
life insurance. Through the use of either a variable life or a variable universal life insurance
policy, a policyholder can acquire indirect investments in stocks, bonds, money market funds,
and real estate. Premiums for these forms of life insurance exceed the cost of the current
insurance protection and the load charges during the early years of the policy. The remaining
portion is invested in a separate investment account similar to a mutual fund. The cash value
of these policies reflects the investment performance of the underlying fund assets. See K.
Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 68-71, 96-97.
The amount credited to the cash value of a variable life insurance policy reflects the income
earned by, and changes in the value of, the underlying fund assets. See id. at 68-69; IRC
§ 817(d). Whether the income credited to the cash value constitutes interest, dividends, real-
ized gains, rents, or some other form of income depends on the assets of the fund. For pur-
poses of this article, the term "interest credited" includes any investment return that is
credited to the cash value of a life insurance contract.
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1. Tax Deferral Benefits
A primary tax benefit resulting from the ownership of cash value life
insurance relates to the timing of taxation: While the policyholder allows
the cash value to accumulate, no portion of the interest credited to the
cash value is included in gross income.49 Further deferral results from
the operation of the "stacking rule" applicable to life insurance contracts
other than "modified endowment contracts." 50 This stacking rule char-
acterizes a cash distribution from a life insurance contract either as a
nontaxable return of the policyholder's capital or as taxable interest
credited. Under the general life insurance stacking rules, a policyholder
who withdraws cash (other than from a modified endowment contract)
excludes from income the amounts received until the aggregate amount
received exceeds the policyholder's investment in the contract. 51 As a
result, taxation of the interest credited under a cash value life insurance
contract is deferred until the policyholder converts a substantial portion
of the cash value into cash.
A policyholder can extend the period of deferral, and receive cash in
excess of his investment, by borrowing the cash value of the policy from
49 See note 2. Even if a contract is characterized as a "modified endowment contract"
under § 7702A, interest credited is not taxable until a distribution occurs. Although a life
insurance company includes in its gross income all investment income earned, it is allowed an
offisetting deduction for the amount credited to the cash value. See IRC §§ 803, 807(b), (d).
Consequently, the life insurance company is not taxed on the investment income credited in
lieu of current taxation of the policyholder.
50 IRC § 72(e)(1)(A), (e)(5). Section 72(e) applies to amounts received under annuity, life
insurance, or endowment contracts that are not received as annuities. The general stacking
rule under this section states that distributions are includable in income to the extent that the
cash value exceeds the policyholders investment in the contract. IRC §§ 72(e)(2), (3). A
special stacking rule applicable to life insurance contracts, however, allows the policyholder to
exclude distributions from gross income until the policyholder receives an amount equal to the
cumulative premiums theretofore paid. IRC § 72(e)(5)(A), (C)(6). The policyholder includes
in income all additional amounts received. Id. The 1988 Technical Corrections Act added
§ 72(e)(10), which applies the "income out first" annuity stacking rules to life insurance con-
tracts characterized under § 7702A as "modified endowment contracts."
To a limited extent, the annuity stacking rules also apply to cash distributed from a life
insurance contract incident to a reduction in benefits occuring during the 15-year period fol-
lowing issuance of the contract. IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B); see notes 380-91 and the accompanying
text. Similarly, boot received incident to an exchange of life insurance contracts is subject to
stacking rules that are similar to the annuity stacking rules. See notes 57-58 and the accompa-
nying text.
The annuity stacking rules of § 72(e)(1)(A) also apply to life insurance contracts with re-
spect to which, under Treasury regulations, "the amount at risk ... is sufficiently minimal."
IRC § 72(e)(5)(C), S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1982). The Treasury has not
issued regulations under this provision. The extent to which the Treasury's regulatory author-
ity in this area survives the enactments of § 7702 and § 72(e)(10) is unclear.
51 IRC § 72(e)(5)(A), (C). But see § 72(e)(10), which treats cash distributions from modi-
fied endowment contracts as income to the extent that the contract's predistribution cash value
exceeds the polieyholder's investment in the contract.
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the life insurance company.5 2 Loans secured by life insurance contracts
(other than modified endowment contracts) are not treated as distribu-
tions.53 Although interest is payable on most policy loans, the policy-
holder incurs minimal after-tax costs in connection with this type of
indebtedness because the cash value used as the "collateral" continues to
earn interest. The policyholder's pretax "cost" of borrowing equals the
difference between the interest payable on the loan and the interest
credited to the allocable amount of cash value. This difference, typically,
is small.54 If interest paid on the policy loan is deductible, borrowing
may produce an after-tax profit for the policyholder.5 5 Thus, if the pol-
52 A policyholder is generally entitled to borrow a substantial portion of the cash value of a
policy without the approval of the insurance company. Although interest is payable on the
amount borrowed, the failure to pay interest will not result in the policyholder's default. In-
stead, the unpaid interest is added to the principal of the loan unless the total indebtedness
equals or exceeds the cash value of the policy. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 139-41. The
life insurance company will recover any balance the policyholder owes on the loan from the
death benefits if the loan remains outstanding on the insured's death, or from the cash value if
the policy is terminated during the insured's life. J. Belth, note 41, at 119-20.
53 See Drake v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1271 (D.N.C. 1984); Minnis v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 1049 (1979). Loans under, or secured by, an annuity, a modified endowment contract
or a qualified employer plan are treated as taxable distributions. IRC § 72(e)(4)(A), (e)(10),
(p).
54 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 79, 139-40. Some life insurance contracts provide
"no net cost" policy loans. The interest rate charged on a no net cost loan equals the rate of
interest credited to the cash value.
55 See C. Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation 57-72 (1985). Although the taxpayer pays
interest on the indebtedness incurred, the interest credited to the cash value of the policy is not
taxable currently. Where the tax saving attributable to the interest deduction exceeds the dif-
ference between the interest paid and the increase in the cash value, the cost of borrowing is
negative. Therefore, the taxpayer enjoys an after-tax profit.
The deductibility of interest paid on a policy loan is determined first according to the general
rules applicable to interest. See Salley v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 896, 903 (1971), aff'd, 464
F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1972). Although interest payments are generally deductible (IRC § 163(a)),
several limitations may result in the disallowance of the deduction. For noncorporate policy-
holders, the deduction for interest paid is subject to the limitations imposed on investment
interest and personal interest. IRC § 163 (d), (h); see also Manno, note 2, at 677-81 (discuss-
ing the effect of the § 163(h) limitations on policy loans).
Additional limitations apply to interest paid on loans related to certain life insurance con-
tracts. IRC §§ 264(a)(2)-(4). The interest deduction is disallowed if the loan is incurred or
continued in connection with a single premium policy. IRC § 264(a)(2), (b). The disallowance
also applies to interest "paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or
carry" a life insurance contract. IRC § 264(a)(3). For policies that are not treated as single
premium policies, the disallowance provision applies only if two further conditions are satis-
fied. First, the indebtedness must arise pursuant to a plan of purchase that contemplates the
systematic borrowing of increases in the contract's cash value. IRC § 264(a) (3). Second, the
indebtedness must not be of a type included in the safe harbors of § 264(c).
For certain taxpayers engaged in a trade or business, an additional limitation may apply.
No deduction is allowed for interest paid on loans in excess of $50,000 per insured individual
under contracts insuring the lives of officers, employees, or any individual who is financially
interested in any trade or business of the taxpayer. IRC § 264(a)(4).
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icy loan is treated as a bona fide indebtedness, 56 the loan proceeds are not
characterized as an amount "received" for purposes of the stacking rules
contained in § 72(e). Consequently, policy loans extend the tax deferred
status of interest credited to cash value at little cost to the policyholder.
The combined effect of the income deferral allowed under § 72(e) and the
availability of policy loans often results in the interest credited under
cash value life insurance (other than modified endowment contracts) es-
caping taxation until the policy terminates.
Nonrecognition of gain realized in a like-kind exchange subject to
§ 1035 provides another mechanism that may extend the period of tax
deferral. A policyholder may become dissatisfied with an existing life
insurance contract, most commonly because he believes that a new policy
will provide the same benefits at less cost.5" When a policyholder ex-
changes a cash value life insurance policy for a new policy, no amount is
included in income unless "boot" is received.
58
2. Understatement of Income
Owners of cash value life insurance enjoy a second lifetime tax benefit:
Taxable income, when realized, systematically understates the amount of
interest income credited under the policy. As discussed above, the cost
of current insurance protection and the loading charges are subtracted
from the interest credited in computing changes in the policy's cash
value.5 9 If a policyholder surrenders a contract, the amount includable
in income equals only the excess of the amount received (the cash value
of the policy) over the investment in the contract.6° The interest credited
under the contract exceeds the amount included in the policyholder's in-
come by the cumulative amount charged for loading and current insur-
ance costs. In effect, the policyholder deducts the cost of current
insurance protection 6' which is otherwise a nondeductible personal ex-
pense of the policyholder.
62
56 See Mose & Garrison Siskin Memorial Found. v. United States, 790 F.2d 480, 482-83
(6th Cir. 1986) (treating policy loans as indebtedness and not as advances of amounts other-
wise payable in the future); Salley v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 896, 903 (1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d
479 (5th Cir. 1972) (same). See also Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (treating
policy loans as secured nonrecourse indebtedness for purposes of the interest deduction).
None of these cases considered no net cost policy loans.
57 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 180-82.
58 IRC §§ 1035, 1031; see generally Dropick, Life Insurance Exchanges Under Section
1035: Think Twice Before You Surrender, 17 Conn. L Rev. 525 (1985).
59 See notes 39-42 and the accompanying text.
60 IRC § 72(e)(5).
61 See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 38 (statement of Ass't Secretary Chapoton); Irenas, note
27, at 312.
62 See Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1) (characterizing premiums paid for life insurance as a personal
expense). In some circumstances, the cost of insurance protection may be an ordinary and
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Similarly, to the extent that loading charges are allocable either to the
provision of insurance protection or to investment management services,
the policyholder may enjoy a similar benefit. This benefit is placed in
perspective by examining the tax consequences that would result if the
policyholder were to pay a smaller premium, invest the difference, and
pay the investment earnings to the insurance company in lieu of the load-
ing charges. The investment earnings would be included in the policy-
holder's gross income. In most instances, however, no offsetting
deduction would be allowed for the payment to the insurer.63 Understat-
ing the income realized on the surrender of a life insurance contract effec-
tively allows the policyholder to deduct these expenses against the
interest credited to the contract's cash value.
3. Forgiveness of Tax Upon the Death of the Insured
The third tax benefit accorded owners of cash value life insurance is
that the interest income not taxed previously is exempted from taxation
upon the death of the insured. The death benefit consists of both the
cash value of the policy as of the insured's death and the net amount at
risk under the policy. In general, amounts payable on account of the
insured's death, including that portion representing the accumulated
cash value, are excluded from income.64
C. Section 7702 General Actuarial Limitations
1. Section 7702: An Overview
Section 7702 was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.65 It
contains the Code's first comprehensive statutory definition of life insur-
ance.66 Two related developments sparked congressional interest in this
definition. First, the tax status of certain novel designs of cash value life
necessary expense of the policyholder. For example, amounts paid for insurance required to
obtain a business loan is a business expense. No deduction is allowed, however, for life insur-
ance premiums paid in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business if the taxpayer is a
direct or indirect beneficiary of the contract. See IRC § 264(a)(1); Reg. § 1.264-1.
63 See IRC §§ 67, 262.
64 IRC § 101(a)(1); see note 3 (discussing the scope of the exclusion under § 101). The
exclusion of death benefits from income is limited in instances where the policy is transferred
for value. Few contracts are subject to this transfer for value rule. Irenas, note 27, at 309-10.
65 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 221(a), 98 Stat. 494, 767 [hereinafter
sometimes cited as the 1984 Act].
66 1983 House Report, note 4, at 144; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 571. IRC § 101(f), as
added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 266(a),
96 Stat. 324, 547, established criteria that determine when § 101 excludes from gross income
death benefits paid to beneficiaries of flexible premium life insurance contracts issued prior to
January 1, 1985. The provisions of § 101(f) served as the foundation for the more comprehen-
sive definition of life insurance contained in § 7702. 1983 House Report, note 4, at 145; 1984
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insurance contracts, including universal life insurance, 67 needed resolu-
tion.68 Second, life insurance companies marketed new products that
maximized the investment features of life insurance while minimizing the
amount of current insurance protection.6 9 Congress defined life insur-
ance in § 7702 in response to these concerns. 70 This definition eliminated
uncertainty as to the tax status of various life insurance products while
denying life insurance status to some that were considered overly invest-
ment oriented.
Although Congress recognized the preferential tax treatment accorded
life insuranee, 71 it did not alter any of the basic rules governing this form
of investment. The thrust of the legislation was to distinguish what Con-
gress termed "traditional" uses of life insurance from "investment-ori-
ented products." 72 Uses of life insurance which satisfy the requirements
of § 7702 continue to receive preferential tax treatment.
Section 7702 adopts two alternative limitations to identify overly in-
vestment-oriented contracts. These limitations are the cash value ac-
cumulation test73 and the guideline premium limitation.74 These
limitations, which permit investment orientation comparable to that al-
lowed under the single-premium contract design discussed above, repre-
Senate Report, note 4, at 572; see also Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 41-42 (discussing the back-
ground and application of IRC § 101(f)).
67 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 80, 85-93. As discussed in notes 136-41, the most
significant innovations incorporated in universal life insurance contracts are: (1) the greater
flexibility given the policyholder to choose the amount and timing of the premium payments;
(2) the crediting of more competitive rates of interest; and (3) the increased disclosure to the
policyholder of costs and benefits under the contract. Id. In 1985, sales of universal life insur-
ance accounted for almost 40% of life insurance purchases. See Life Insurance Factbook, note
30, at 13, 29.
68 See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 42-43. Although IRC § 101(f) clarified the status of flexi-
ble premium policies issued prior to 1984, the status of flexible premium contracts issued after
1983 remained unsettled. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L No.
97-248, § 266(a), 96 Stat. 324, 547.
69 See D. Manzier, R. Buechner & I. Goodfellow, Why Universal Life 130 (1982) (discuss-
ing early universal life insurance policies that required, at most, a net amount at risk of
$10,000); 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 16, 29, 88-89, 156 (discussing increasing death benefit
policies and other investment-oriented life insurance contracts).
70 See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 102; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 523.
71 1983 House Report, note 4, at 101-02; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 522-23.
72 1983 House Report, note 4, at 101-02; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 522-23. The Treas-
ury Department testimony on the taxation of life insurance reflected a similar ambivalence
between retaining the historic tax treatment of life insurance while taxing comparable invest-
ments in the same manner. Although the Treasury Department supported the enactment of a
more restrictive definition of life insurance, it did not advocate the current taxation of interest
credited on life insurance policies. See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 16, 37, 521-22 (testimony of
Ass't Secretary Chapoton).
73 IRC § 7702(b).
74 IRC § 7702(c).
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sent two paradigms of life insurance policy design.75 If a policy is no
more investment oriented than one of these models, it is treated as life
insurance for tax purposes. 76 This line of demarcation is reflected in the
statutory requirement that a life insurance contract must satisfy either
the cash value accumulation test or the guideline premium limitation
throughout the entire life of the contract. 77
Each paradigm employs actuarial limitations to maintain a balance be-
tween the amount of current insurance protection and the cash value of
the contract. The use of complex actuarially based limitations78 followed
from the decision that all traditional level-premium cash value life insur-
ance contracts would receive life insurance status.79 To assure compara-
ble treatment of policies issued to insured individuals of different ages
and health, actuarial limitations were needed.
This initial decision to create actuarially based limitations gave rise to
a serious concern that use of actuarial "gimmicks" and other tax-ori-
ented strategies might enable excessively investment-oriented contracts
to qualify as life insurance. 80 Section 7702, therefore, incorporates ex-
plicit, and complicated, safeguards to preclude the use of actuarial tech-
niques designed to frustrate the statutory purpose.
8'
The primary economic difference between the two models of accepta-
ble life insurance design involves the maximum cash value allowed for a
given amount of current insurance protection at different stages of the
life of a contract. Compared to the levels allowed under the guideline
premium model, the "cash value accumulation" model permits relatively
more cash value to accumulate during the initial years of the contract.
In subsequent years, however, the magnitude of the cash value relative to
the death benefit increases at a relatively slow rate.82 The guideline pre-
mium model, on the other hand, initially imposes tighter limits on the
75 IRC § 7702(a). The "cash value accumulation" paradigm is a policy that has, at all
times, a cash value equal to the net single premium described in § 7702(b)(1). The "guideline
premium" model is a policy in which the premiums paid equal the guideline premium limita-
tion at all times.
76 IRC § 7702(a).
77 1983 House Report, note 4, at 145; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 572. Because the
relative restrictiveness of the two models changes over the life of the contract, allowing compli-
ance with the tests on a "pick and choose" basis would increase the permissible investment
orientation.
78 One commentator criticized the actuarial limitations as "beyond the comprehension of
the average tax practitioner or revenue agent." Skillman, The Impact of TEFRA and the 1984
Act on the "Inside Build-up" Under Life Insurance Products, 43 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax'n 40-
1, 40-24 (1985).
79 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 573.
80 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 651 (Comm. Print 1984) [herein-
after 1984 General Explanation].
81 See IRC § 7702(b)(2), (c)(3)(B), (4), (e), (f)(7). These limitations are discussed in Part II.
82 See notes 168-69 and the accompanying text.
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maximum allowable cash value than exist under the cash value accumu-
lation model but allows the cash value to increase more quickly.83
Life insurance contracts that do not satisfy the detailed statutory re-
quirements of § 7702 lose their tax preferred status. Section 7702 treats
the cash value of a nonqualifying contract as a fully taxable investment
fund.8 Consequently, the policyholder includes in gross income the "in-
come on the contract," 85 which for any year, equals the sum of (1) the
increase in the net surrender value 6 during the year and (2) the cost of
insurance protection provided during the year, reduced by (3) the premi-
ums paid during the year.87 This approximates the amount of investment
income credited under the policy.88 Any amount paid due to the in-
sured's death in excess of the cash value is treated as proceeds of a term
life insurance policy and is therefore excluded from income.8 9
2. Cash Value Accumulation Test
If a life insurance contract satisfies the cash value accumulation test,
§ 7702 treats it as a life insurance contract for tax purposes. A contract
satisfies this test if, under the terms of the contract, the contract's cash
83 Ic
84 H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1074-76 (1984).
85 IRC § 7702(g)(1)(A).
86 IRe § 7702(f)(2)(B).
87 IRC § 7702(g)(1)(B). If the contract previously satisfied the requirements of § 7702 but
ceased to meet the requirements in the current taxable year, then the increase in cash value and
the cost of term insurance for all prior years is treated as ordinary income in the current year
as well. IRC § 7702(g)(1)(C). In the case of failed contracts, life insurance companies are
subject to certain reporting and withholding requirements under § 3405. See 1983 House Re-
port, note 4, at 149-50.
88 Differences between the interest credited under the contract and the amount included in
gross income may arise from two sources: First, for purposes of computing the income on the
contract, the cost of insurance protection is the lesser of the mortality charges specified in the
contract and the cost computed on the basis of uniform premiums prescribed by regulations.
IRC § 7702(g)(1)(D). To the extent that the uniform premiums ignore factors that justify
higher mortality charges for the particular insured individual, the income on the contract un-
derstates the interest credited. Second, expense charges imposed under the contract are al-
lowed to offset the interest credited in computing the income on the contract. Understating
the interest credited in this manner effectively allows the policyholder to deduct these other-
wise nondeductible expenses against the interest credited to the contract's cash value. See
notes 59-63 and the accompanying text.
89 IRC §§ 101, 7702(g)(2). The amount payable upon the insured's death that represents
the contract's cash value is not treated as paid under a life insurance contract. Although the
exclusion from income under § 101 does not apply to this amount, the taxpayer's basis in the
cash value should approximate its current value.
It is unclear whether the income on the contract for the year of the insured's death is includ-
able in gross income. Section 7702(g)(2) treats as life insurance only the excess of the amount
paid upon the insured's death over the net surrender value of the contract. Any increase in the
net surrender value of the contract during the taxable year of the insured's death will not be
excluded from income unless the net surrender value is computed as of the beginning of the
taxable year.
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value can never exceed the current "tax net single premium." 90 For any
specified age of the insured, the net single premium is defined as the
amount needed, in present value terms, to generate the cash values and
pay the mortality charges for the death benefit specified in the contract.91
If a contract's cash value equals the tax net single premium, the policy
contains a fund sufficient, when credited with interest at a specified rate,
to pay for all future charges and obligations under the contract.92 The
cash value accumulation test, therefore, denies life insurance status to
contracts that, by their terms, permit accumulation of any additional
cash value.
The traditional participating cash value life insurance contract, which
specifies a fixed pattern of premium payments and a death benefit deter-
minable based on the accumulated cash value, is the model for the cash
value accumulation test.93 The life insurance company computes premi-
ums for such a policy on the assumptions that interest will be credited at
assumed rates, and that certain additional charges will be imposed. In a
participating policy, the insurance company may also pay policyholder
dividends. Policyholder dividends may represent the crediting of interest
at a rate in excess of the assumed rates. They may also represent reduc-
tions in the charges for either current insurance protection or administra-
tive expenses below the levels reflected in the policy premium. 94 The
90 IRC § 7702(b)(1). The term "net single premium" has a specific meaning under
§ 7702(b)(1) that differs from its usual actuarial definition. To reduce confusion, the term "tax
net single premium" used herein refers to the net single premium computed in compliance
with the requirements of § 7702.
Differences between the tax net single premium and the actuarial net single premium may
arise from the use of statutorily mandated interest rate assumptions (see IRC § 7702(b)(2)(A))
or mortality assumptions (see IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(i)) that differ from the assumptions used in
computing the actuarial net single premium. See notes 112-21 and the accompanying text.
Moreover, the tax net single premium may reflect application of the computational rules con-
tained in § 7702(e) that apply solely for purposes of § 7702.
91 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 19. The net single premium changes as the insured
ages. The cash value accumulation test looks at the entire life of the contract: The contract
must not allow the cash value to exceed the net single premium for the current age of the
insured. For purposes of § 7702 the actuarial assumptions used in computing the applicable
net single premiums are fixed when the contract is issued. See notes 112-18 and the accompa-
nying text.
92 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 19. If the actuarial assumptions used to compute the
net single premium are flawed, the cash value may exceed or understate the amount required
to fund the future benefits under the contract.
93 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 573.
94 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 151-53. The owner of a life insurance contract wears
several hats vis-a-vis the insurance company: as a creditor, a customer, and, possibly an owner.
To the extent that policyholder dividends consist of additional interest paid on indebtedness,
they should be taxed in the same manner as other interest credited under the contract. See
notes 171-227 and the accompanying text (discussing the justification for the current tax treat-
ment of interest credited under life insurance contracts). Amounts representing premium re-
bates paid to the policyholder in the capacity as customer are properly excluded from income
as an adjustment to the contract's purchase price. A third possibility reflects the position of
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policyholder may elect to have the policyholder dividends used, as a sin-
gle premium, to purchase additional amounts of insurance, or "paid-up
additions."95 Although the application of policyholder dividends to
purchase paid-up additions increases both the contract's cash value and
death benefit, under the traditional participating policy the cash value is
constrained so that it never exceeds the net single premium for the in-
creased death benefit.
a. Meaning and Significance of Assumed Interest Rates
and Mortality Charges
To compute a net single premium, it is necessary to know: (1) the in-
sured's age, (2) the benefits provided under the life insurance contract,
(3) the charges imposed each year for current insurance protection; and
(4) the rate at which interest is credited. 96 Ascertaining the insured's age
and the contractual benefits generally is a simple factual matter.97 The
more difficult task is to determine the actual mortality charges and rate
of interest. Frequently, these amounts are not absolutely fixed in the life
insurance contract. Consequently, actuarial assumptions are made con-
cerning the charges imposed for current insurance protection and the
rate at which interest is credited.98
For purposes of computing the tax net single premium, § 7702 limits
the range of actuarial assumptions99 to prevent the life insurance corn-
the policyholders of a mutual company as its owners. To the extent that policyholder divi-
dends constitute a distribution of corporate profits, it is arguable that they should be taxed in
the same manner as dividends from other business entities. See 1984 General Explanation,
note 80, at 612. Difficult questions are likely to arise if attempts are made to allocate policy-
holder dividends among these sources. Similar conceptual and measurement difficulties arise
in connection with the characterization of policyholder dividends for purposes of computing
the tax liability of mutual life insurance companies. See M. Graetz, Life Insurance Company
Taxation-the Mutual vs. Stock Differential (1986).
95 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 153. A policyholder can also elect to receive the
policyholder, dividend in the form of cash or certain cash equivalents. Id. Under principles of
constructive receipt, the policyholder's right to receive a cash payment would be sufficient to
justify taxing reinvested policyholder dividends.
96 Id. at 331.
97 Certain contractual benefits, however, are disregarded for purposes of § 7702. See IRC
§§ 7702(e), (f)(4), (5); see also notes 255-312 and the accompanying text (discussing the treat-
ment of additional benefits and the computational rules).
98 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 331-35. The actuarial assumptions used depend on the
purpose for which the net single premium is computed. For purposes of state regulation, the
actuarial assumptions specified in the contract are generally used. Section 7702 may require
use of different actuarial assumptions in computing the tax net single premium.
The tax net single premium computation disregards expense charges. See IRC § 7702(b)(2).
Under a traditional single premium contract, the loading expenses charged are subtracted from
the gross premium paid. Where no additional charges are imposed, the net single premium
should not reflect any expense charges.
99 See IRC § 7702(b)(2)(A), (c)(3)(B).
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pany from inflating the tax net single premium and, correspondingly, the
permissible investment orientation of the contract. 1°° To illustrate the
effect of different actuarial assumptions on the net single premium, con-
sider a contract insuring the life of a 35-year-old individual for $100,000.
The net single premium for this contract is $42,013 if it is assumed that
interest is credited at a rate of 21/2% and mortality charges are based on
the 1958 Commissioners' Standard Ordinary (CSO) mortality table.' 0'
The net single premium for the contract is reduced to $13,951 if the as-
sumed interest rate equals 6% and the 1980 CSO mortality table is
used. 102
Although the assumptions chosen concerning interest rates and mor-
tality charges greatly affect the size of net single premiums, these as-
sumptions have less impact on the policyholder. As with the proverbial
accounting records of a closely held business, three distinct interest rates
(and schedules of charges) are maintained in connection with a life insur-
ance contract. These are: (1) The assumed interest rate and schedule of
charges used to determine the actuarial net single premium; (2) the con-
tractually guaranteed rate and schedule of charges; and (3) the rates of
interest actually credited and the charges actually imposed on the policy-
holder. Distinct functions are served by each interest rate and schedule
of charges, with the third being of greatest significance to the
policyholder.
The assumed interest rate and mortality charges are primarily used in
computing the life insurance company's reserve liabilities to measure the
company's solvency.10 3 Except to the extent that they are also used in
computing the tax net single premium, these amounts have no impact on
policyholders. °4 Actuarial assumptions that increase the tax net single
premium benefit a policyholder who is seeking the maximum degree of
100 In the extreme case, a contract that assumes that no interest is credited would always
have a net single premium equal to the death benefit under the contract. If the cash value of
this contract were equal to the net single premium, no current insurance protection would be
provided.
101 S. Huebner & K. Black, Life Insurance 356 (10th ed. 1982). The values contained in the
1958 CSO Table are based on the mortality experience of the early 1950's. In developing the
CSO table, actual mortality rates are increased to provide a margin of safety for purposes of
measuring the solvency of the life insurance company. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 313-
20. Although the 1980 CSO mortality table is used increasingly, life insurance companies may
continue to use the 1958 CSO mortality table until 1989, at which time use of the 1980 CSO
table becomes mandatory. Id. at 319.
Clearly, these mortality tables fail to reflect societal and medical developments that have
taken place in recent years. Although the contract's tax net single premiums are based on
these tables, the life insurance company may base their premiums on more current mortality
experience. Id. at 18, 319.
102 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 349.
103 See id. at 346; see also IRC § 807.
104 Section 7702 may mandate the use of different assumptions. See notes 112-24 and 150-
61 and the accompanying text.
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investment orientation. Under the cash value accumulation test, the cash
value cannot exceed the tax net single premium.' 5 Any increase in the
tax net single premium allows a correspondingly larger cash value ac-
cumulation, and requires a smaller amount of current insurance protec-
tion as part of the package containing the tax preferred investment. The
combined effect is that the policyholder's investment return, net of mor-
tality charges, increases. 1 06 For this reason, an investment-oriented poli-
cyholder prefers that the contract assume a very low assumed interest
rate and very high assumed mortality charges.
The contractually guaranteed interest rate and schedule of mortality
charges serve an entirely different function.' 0 7 Many life insurance con-
tracts guarantee that the rate of interest credited will not fall below a
specified rate and that the charges for current insurance protection will
not exceed specified maximums. These guaranteed amounts frequently
differ significantly from current market interest rates and mortality
charges. Use of the nonmarket rate guarantees reflects concerns arising
from the fact that a cash value life insurance contract may remain in
effect for decades. The rate of interest guaranteed in the contract applies
to both the current cash value and to the cash value attributable to future
premium payments. The issuance of contracts that guarantee the credit-
ing of interest at a very low rate protects the life insurance company from
possible losses if market interest rates substantially decline. Similarly,
the guaranteed level of mortality charges protects the life insurance com-
pany from adverse changes in the mortality experience of the
population.1
08
105 See notes 90-92 and the accompanying text.
106 To illustrate, consider two life insurance contracts using the actuarial assumptions sped-
fled in the examples in the text accompanying notes 101-02. Contract 1 insures the life of a 35-
year-old individual for $100,000. The net single premium for this contract is S42,013 if the
assumed interest rate is 21/2% and the assumed mortality charges are those specified in the
1958 CSO mortality table. If these assumptions could be used in computing the tax net single
premium (but see § 7702(b)(2), (c)(3)) the maximum cash value would equal S42,013, and the
minimum current insurance protection would equal $57,987. Assuming that the policyholder
paid a premium sufficient to generate the maximum cash value and that the actual mortality
charges were based on the 1980 CSO mortality table, the actual first year mortality charges
would be $122.
Under Contract 2, the assumed interest rate equals 6% and the 1980 CSO mortality table is
used. Because the net single premium for a contract with a S100,000 death benefit is only
$13,951, a policyholder seeking the same initial cash value as under Contract 1 ($42,013) must
increase the death benefit to approximately $300,000. The current insurance protection in-
creases to approximately $258,000, with actual mortality charges increasing to $544. Conse-
quently, the investment return, net of mortality charges, is reduced by $422.
107 Life insurance companies are not required to specify guaranteed interest rates and mor-
tality charges. In the absence of explicit guarantees, minimum surrender values are computed
in accordance with state nonforfeiture laws. K. Black & L Skipper, note 8, at 358. Life
insurance companies may provide guarantees more favorable to the policyholder than those
required under the nonforfeiture laws to increase the sales appeal of their products.
108 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 408-10.
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The rate at which interest is credited and the actual charges for cur-
rent insurance protection often differ significantly from both the actuarial
assumed and the guaranteed rates.'0 9 Because they compete with other
financial institutions that pay interest at market rates, life insurance com-
panies have credited interest at rates more closely reflecting market con-
ditions.' 10 Similar, albeit less intense, competitive pressures limit the
charges for current insurance protection imposed under cash value life
insurance policies. Term life insurance premiums, which tend to reflect
current mortality experience,"' act as a competitive force that limits the
charges for current insurance protection under cash value life insurance
policies.
b. Limits on Interest Rate and Mortality Assumptions Under the Cash
Value Accumulation Test
As discussed above, the tax net single premium for a life insurance
contract is computed using assumptions about interest rates and mortal-
ity charges." 2 Because the maximum cash value allowed under the cash
value accumulation test equals the tax net single premium, the choice of
the interest rate used in making this computation assumes great impor-
tance. To maintain a meaningful balance between investment and cur-
rent insurance protection, § 7702 prohibits the use of unduly low interest
rates in computing the tax net single premium. For contracts subject to
the cash value accumulation test, the minimum rate of interest is 4%,I13
1o9 See id. at 71, 77-79, 85-88.
110 See 51 Consumer Reports 448-50 (1986) (stating that the rate of return on cash value life
insurance increased markedly between 1980 and 1986, reflecting high market rates of interest);
see also K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 96. Different mechanisms are used to credit interest
at rates in excess of the assumed rate. Traditionally, life insurance companies marketed two
types of policies: participating and nonparticipating. Under a traditional participating policy,
the policyholder receives an annual policyholder dividend. This dividend reflects, in part, the
interest that the life insurance company earned with the policyholder's funds. See note 94. In
a traditional nonparticipating life insurance policy, interest is credited at the rate guaranteed in
the contract. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 27. For this reason, the stated rate of interest
is of greatest significance in this type of policy.
In recent years, the differences between participating and nonparticipating policies have be-
come less distinct. Although technically nonparticipating, most universal life insurance poli-
cies credit interest at rates in excess of the assumed rate explicitly, rather than as a component
of a policyholder dividend. Id. at 28. Similarly, the cash value of a variable life insurance
policy is determined by reference to the value of shares in an underlying mutual fund. The
value of these shares reflects the fund's investment income. Id. at 68-69. Other contemporary
nonparticipating policy designs credit interest at rates that more closely reflect market
conditions.
"' See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 54-55.
112 See notes 96-102 and the accompanying text.
"3 IRC 7702(b)(2)(A). For life insurance contracts that require at least 20 nondecreasing
annual payments issued pursuant to a plan of insurance filed prior to September 28, 1983, the
tax net single premium may be computed using a 3% interest rate. IRC § 7702(i). Because
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unless higher rates are guaranteed at the time the contract is issued.'" 4
The choice of mortality charges used in computing the tax net single
premium may have a similar effect on the maximum permissible cash
values. In general, an increase in the assumed mortality charges pro-
duces a larger tax net single premium.1 5 Prior to the enactment of the
1988 Technical Corrections Act, § 7702 did not expressly limit the maxi-
mum permissible mortality charges. 16 The mortality charges used in
computing the tax net single premium were those specified in the con-
tract or, if none were specified, those used in determining statutory
reserves for the contract.1 7 The 1988 Technical Corrections Act speci-
fies that only "reasonable" mortality charges are taken into account in
making these calculations.""
The framers of § 7702 anticipated that market forces would discourage
life insurance companies from specifying excessive mortality charges in
life insurance contracts." 9 Unfortunately, it is doubtful that market
forces provide adequate safeguards. First, consumers are unlikely, or un-
able, to compare the relative mortality charges specified in different life
insurance contracts.'20 Second, the mortality charges used in computing
the tax net single premium are the contractually specified maximums. To
few plans of insurance fied before 1984 incorporated the 1980 CSO mortality table, this transi-
tion rule will become moot due to the requirement that plans of insurance incorporate the 1980
CSO mortality table by 1989. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 360.
"14 IRC § 7702(b)(2)(A). If the guaranteed interest rate exceeds 4%, the tax net single
premium is computed using the higher rate with respect to the period during which the guar-
antee applies. Higher interest rates are typically guaranteed only for the first year that the
policy is in effect. One commentator suggested that regulations should allow life insurance
companies to disregard guarantees lasting only one policy year. See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at
44. The Joint Committee on Taxation indicated, however, that life insurance companies can-
not disregard short-term guarantees in computing the tax net single premium and the guideline
single premium. 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 649. These short-term guarantees can
be disregarded in computing the guideline level premiums. Id.
The only guaranteed rates of interest reflected in the tax net single premium are those rates
guaranteed when the contract is issued. Subsequent interest rate guarantees are disregarded
even if the guarantees result from the application of contractual provisions indexing the inter-
est rates to changes in specified market rates. Id. at 648.
"15 See K. Black & L Skipper, note 8, at 349 (Table 20-1). The effect of increased mortality
on other computations, such as the net level premium, is less clear. Id. at 349-50.
116 See IRC § 7702(b)(2)(B), (c)(3)(B)(i), amended by 1988 Technical Corrections Act
§ 5011.
117 Id.
"1 Section 7702(c)(3)(B)Q) further provides that, unless permitted by regulation, the
charges cannot exceed the mortality charges specified in the prevailing commisoners' stan-
dard table applicable when the contract is issued. Until regulations are issued under this pro-
vision, however, life insurance companies may use mortality charges "which do not differ
materially from the charges actually expected to be imposed by the company (taking into
account any relevant characteristics of the insured of which the company is aware" 1988 Tech-
nical Corrections Act § 5011(c)(2).
"9 See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 53 n.56.
120 See Consumer Reports, note 110, at 450-54 (discussing the practical difficulties involved
in obtaining information necessary to compare the costs of different life insurance contracts).
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the extent that consumers compare costs, they need to focus on the ac-
tual charges, rather than these theoretical maximums.
1 21
Because market forces did not limit the stated mortality charges, the
absence of explicit statutory limits created the possibility that invest-
ment-oriented life insurance contracts would specify extremely high mor-
tality charges. 122 For contracts issued prior to the effective date of the
changes contained in the 1988 Technical Corrections Act,123 use of ex-
cessive mortality charges for purposes of computing the tax net single
premium is subject to challenge on several grounds. First, if the high
charges were not bona fide, the tax net single premium should reflect the
bona fide charges. For example, if the company assured the policyhold-
ers, either formally or informally, that the actual mortality charges
would be lower, then the lower amounts are the charges specified in the
contract. 124 Similarly, lower mortality charges are implicitly stated in
the contract if guaranteed cash values reflect lower charges than are
stated in the contract.1 25 These lower rates are the charges taken into
account in computing the tax net single premium.
For contracts entered into on or after October 21, 1988, use of unrea-
sonable mortality charges in computing the tax net single premium or the
guideline premiums is expressly prohibited. 126 The legislative history an-
ticipates that regulations will set forth standards for determining the rea-
121 Id.
122 A recent study revealed that 20% of single premium life insurance contracts specified
mortality charges that were at least twice as large as the mortality charges included in the
applicable commissioners' standard ordinary table. U.S. General Accounting Office, Tax Pol-
icy Mortality Charges on Single Premium Life Insurance Should Be Restricted (1988). This
study also illustrates how the specification of higher mortality charges increases the tax net
single premium and the guideline single premiums. Id. at 5.
In the mathematically extreme case, the annual mortality charges would equal the product
of the assumed rate of interest multiplied by the cash value as of the beginning of the year. The
actuarial net single premium for this contract would equal the initial death benefit specified
under the contract. To illustrate, assume that the contract specifies a $100,000 death benefit
and cash values at all times equal $95,000. The annual mortality charge is the product of the
assumed rate of interest (4%) multiplied by the initial cash value ($95,000), or $3,800. Be-
cause the interest earned on the initial cash value at the assumed rate of 4% precisely offsets
the mortality charges, the cash value will never increase. The actuarial net single premium for
this contract is the amount needed, in present value terms, to generate the cash values and pay
the mortality charges for the death benefit specified in the contract. Consequently, the net
single premium will exceed $95,000. For a more rigorous mathematical exposition on the
computation of net single premiums, see K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 331-36.
123 Section 7702(c)(3)(B)(i) specifies that only reasonable mortality charges are taken into
account in computing the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums, and applies to
contracts entered into on or after October 21, 1988. 1988 Technical Corrections Act
§ 5011(d).
124 See 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 648-49.
125 Id. at 649.
126 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(i). In addition, the mortality charges generally cannot exceed the
charges specified in the applicable prevailing commissioners' standard table. Id. Until regula-
tions are issued under § 7702(c)(3)(B)(i), however, mortality charges that do not differ materi-
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sonableness of mortality charges with respect to substandard risks.'2 7 In
drafting these regulations, the Treasury Department should only permit
the use of mortality charges in excess of those specified in the applicable
commissioners' standard table in unusual circumstances. Because these
tables reflect the mortality of the entire population increased to provide a
"mortality cushion," 12 the mortality experience of a life insurance com-
pany with respect to its policyholders is likely to be no worse than the
implicit mortality experience reflected in this table.1 29 Even in those cir-
cumstances where there exists a bona fide underwriting basis for higher
mortality charges, the regulations should further require the company to
demonstrate that the mortality charges were not excessive in light of cur-
rent mortality experience with comparable groups of substandard
insureds.
3. Guideline Premium/Cash Value Corridor Test
The second alternative test that a contract may satisfy to qualify as life
insurance for tax purposes is the guideline premium/cash value corridor
test,130 which imposes two requirements: First, the cumulative dollar
amount of premiums actually paid under the contract can never exceed
the guideline premium limitation. 131 Second, the ratio of the death bene-
fit to the cash value of the policy cannot, at any time, fall below specified
percentages. 132 The minimum amount of current insurance protection
for a given death benefit constitutes the cash value corridor.
As discussed above, the cash value accumulation test and the guideline
premium limitation test reflect different conceptual models of life insur-
ance. 33 The cash value accumulation test mimics a traditional partici-
pating cash value policy under which interest credited in excess of the
guaranteed rates purchases paid-up additions.' 34 In comparison, the
guideline premium test reflects the distinguishing characteristics of the
universal life insurance policy design. 135 Before examining the differ-
ally from the amounts that the company expects to charge can be used. 1988 Technical
Corrections Act § 5011(c)(2).
127 II.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1988).
128 K Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 317.
129 See Sternhill & Shur, Probability, Mortality and Money Concepts, Life and Health In-
surance Handbook 121, 128-30 (D. Gregg & V. Lucas eds. 1973).
130 IRC § 7702(a)(2).
131 IRC § 7702(a)(2)(A), (c).
132 IRC § 7702(a)(2)(B), (d).
133 See notes 73-77 and the accompanying text.
134 See notes 93-95 and the accompanying text.
135 See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 43. Certain nontraditional features of universal life insur-
ance appear in other life insurance products. See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 68-74, 81-
82. The textual emphasis on the universal life insurance policy design reflects its large and
growing share of life insurance product sales. Although not marketed until 1979, sales of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1988] LIFE INSURANCE
TAX LAW REVIEW
ences between the two tests, it is helpful to understand the differences
between the traditional and the universal models of life insurance.
Universal life insurance was developed in the late 1970's to overcome
several shortcomings of traditional cash value life insurance that reduced
its marketability. 136 First, traditional cash value contracts are rigid in
structure. Under these contracts, a purchaser pays a specified premium
at predetermined intervals. In addition, the policyholder cannot change
the contract's death benefit after the contract is issued. Second, the eco-
nomic relationships implicit in the contract were incomprehensible to
most consumers. Although the insurance company credits interest and
imposes charges for the current insurance protection provided,1 37 these
amounts were not disclosed to the policyholder. Third, during the late
1970's and early 1980's, the rate of interest credited was low in compari-
son to the rates available from competing investments.
138
Universal life insurance was designed to overcome each of these short-
comings. 139 First, it allows a far greater degree of flexibility than is per-
mitted under traditional cash value contracts. Initially, a universal life
policyholder determines the size of the initial premium and the initial
death benefit. The timing and size of subsequent premium payments are
within the complete discretion of the policyholder. In addition, the in-
sured may increase or decrease the death benefit as the need for insur-
ance changes. Second, universal life discloses the economic relationships,
interest rates, and charges that are implicit in traditional contract de-
signs: Premium payments are added to the contract's cash value which,
in turn, is reduced by charges for current insurance protection. The re-
maining cash value earns interest. Insurance protection continues until
the cash value is depleted. A universal life policyholder receives periodic
statements summarizing these developments. Third, interest rates and
charges for current insurance protection under universal life contracts
are more likely to reflect current market conditions.140
For purposes of understanding the guideline premium limitation, in-
creased policyholder flexibility is the most significant feature of the uni-
versal life insurance policy design. The policyholder can decide both
universal life insurance accounted for almost 40% of life insurance sales in 1985. Life Insur-
ance Factbook, note 30, at 13, 27-28.
136 See Comment, TEFRA's Conversion of Universal Life Insurance Into the Flexible Pre-
mium Life Insurance Contract, note 31; Comment, Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Prod-
ucts After the Tax Reform Act of 1984, note 31, at 245-48.
137 See notes 32-46 and the accompanying text.
138 See Comment, TEFRA's Conversion of Universal Life Insurance Into the Flexible Pre-
mium Life Insurance Contract, note 31, at 327.
139 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 83-99 (discussing the origins and design of univer-
sal life insurance).
140 Id. at 91-93; Comment, TEFRA's Conversion of Universal Life Insurance Into the Flex-
ible Premium Life Insurance Contract, note 31, at 328-30.
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when to pay a premium and how much to pay. 141 The guideline pre-
mium test provides the flexibility purportedly needed to accommodate
the universal life insurance policy design.142
a. Guideline Premium Limitation
Under the guideline premium limitation, the cumulative premiums
paid under a life insurance contract cannot exceed the "guideline pre-
mium limitation,"' 43 which is intended to roughly approximate the cu-
mulative amount of premiums payable under a policy subject to the cash
value accumulation test. Although the cash value accumulation test does
not explicitly limit the premiums paid, it does so implicitly by barring
premiums that would cause the cash value to exceed the current tax net
single premium. The premium payment schedule is immaterial. Conse-
quently, the policyholder can pay a single premium or level annual pre-
miums. 14 4 A flexible premium schedule results automatically from the
use of the net single premium as the limitation in the cash value accumu-
lation test.
The guideline premium limitation incorporates a similar degree of flex-
ibility through its express limitations on premiums paid. No fixed pre-
mium limitation would allow policyholders the choice of paying either a
single premium sufficient to fund the benefits under the contract or a
series of premium payments that approximates the less rapid pace of the
level premium contract.145 Section 7702 accommodates both premium
141 See note 67; see also S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 352 (1982). Most universal
life insurance contracts also allow the policyholder to increase the death benefit provided with-
out purchasing a new contract. Limitations on the amount of the increase generally apply
unless evidence of the insured's insurability is demonstrated. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at
88.
142 See Hahn & Adney, note 2, at 43; Skillman, note 78, at 40-17.
143 IRC § 7702(c)(1). In determining compliance with the guideline program limitation, a
premium payment that otherwise would cause the contract to fail the guideline premium limi-
tation is disregarded if the premium payment is returned by the insurance company to the
policyholder within 60 days following the end of the contract year. IRC § 7702(f)(l)(B). Be-
cause § 7702 allows the refund of excessive premiums after the close of the contract year,
precise actuarial computations are required only at the end of each contract year.
To prevent this rule of administrative convenience from increasing the possible investment
orientation of a contract, the life insurance company is required to pay interest on the amount
refunded. IRC § 7702(f)(1)(B). Because the required payment of interest on the excessive
premiums is included in the policyholder's income (IRC § 7702(f)(1)(C)), it is treated in a
manner similar to other taxable forms of interest.
144 See notes 32-45 and the accompanying text (discussing the components of a level pre-
mium and a single premium life insurance contract). Under the contracts illustrated therein,
the policyholder may pay either a single premium of $25,188 or level annual premiums of
$1,279. As long as the cash value cannot exceed the tax net single premium, any other pre-
mium payment schedule can be used.
145 To accommodate the single premium, a fixed premium limitation must be at least as
large as the single premium. Use of a fixed premium limitation equal to the single premium,
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payment schedules by defining the guideline premium limitation as the
greater of the guideline single premium and the sum of the guideline level
premiums. 146 The guideline single premium is the amount needed to pay
for the future benefits provided under the contract if only a single pre-
mium is paid. 147 The guideline level premium represents the annual pre-
mium needed if premiums are paid each year until the insured reaches 95
years of age. 148 The sum of the guideline level premiums equals the
guideline level premium multiplied by the number of years that the con-
tract has been in effect. 149
The guideline single premium and the guideline level premium are
computed using actuarial principles. These guideline premiums estimate
the amounts needed to generate the cash value and to pay the mortality
and expense charges imposed under the life insurance contract. The stat-
ute restricts the choice of actuarial assumptions used in computing the
guideline premiums to ensure that they do not frustrate the goal of the
limitation. 150
The first actuarial limitation establishes the minimum rate at which
interest is assumed to be credited under the contract. As discussed
above, a lower assumed interest rate increases the amount needed upon
issuance to pay for the benefits provided under the contract.15' For the
investment-oriented policyholder, permitting the payment of larger pre-
miums allows more cash value to be accumulated. Because the larger
cash value is both credited with additional interest and reduces the
however, will not accommodate the level annual premium payment schedule. Although the
premium for a single premium policy always exceeds the level annual premium for a policy
with otherwise identical terms, the cumulative amount paid as level premiums ultimately ex-
ceeds the single premium. For example, under the policies illustrated in Appendix Tables I
and II, the single premium of $25,188 is far in excess of the annual premium of $1,279. If the
premium limitation were to equal the single premium of $25,188, payment of 20 annual premi-
ums would violate the limitation because the cumulative premiums paid would total $25,580.
The need for the additional premiums under the level premium contract is attributable to
two factors: First, in each year, more interest is credited under the single premium contract
because of its greater cash values. Second, in each year, the single premium contract's mortal-
ity charges are less because of its smaller current insurance protection. Ultimately, additional
premiums are needed under the level premium contract both to pay the higher mortality
charges and to compensate for the lesser amount of interest earned.
146 IRC § 7702(c)(2).
147 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(A). Because the guideline premium limitation restricts the gross pre-
miums payable by the policyholder, expense charges specified in the contract are reflected in
the guideline premium computations. IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(ii).
148 IRC § 7702(c)(4).
149 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 371-73 (Comm.
Print 1982) [hereinafter 1982 General Explanation].
150 IRC § 7702(c)(3), (4). Similar restrictions apply to the computation of the tax net single
premium. See IRC § 7702 (b)(2); notes 112-18 and the accompanying text.
1SI See notes 99-102 and the accompanying text (discussing the significance of the assumed
rate of interest).
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amount of current insurance protection, the final result is a more invest-
ment-oriented contract
The interest rate assumed in computing the guideline single premium
is the greater of 6% or the rate (or rates) guaranteed at the time that the
contract is issued. 152 This assumed rate of interest is significantly higher
than the 4% rate used in computing the tax net single premium under
the cash value accumulation test.15 3 Because of the highei assumed rate
of interest, the guideline single premium is usually smaller than the tax
net single premium.154 As a result, the maximum cash values generated
during the initial years155 of otherwise identical policies are generally
lower for contracts tested under the guideline premium test than they are
under the cash value accumulation test.156
The rate of interest used in computing the guideline level premium is
4%, rather than the 6% rate used in computing the guideline single pre-
mium.1 57 Because identical interest rates are used in computing the
guideline level premium and the tax net single premium, the same premi-
ums could be charged under otherwise identical level-premium policies
regardless of the test used to determine compliance with § 7702. These
otherwise identical policies also produce the same cash value during the
initial years of the policies.
Additional actuarial assumptions concerning mortality and expense
charges are reflected in both the guideline single premium and the guide-
152 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(iii); see note 114 (discussing the meaning of interest rates guaranteed
upon the issuance of the contract).
153 IRC § 7702(b)(2)(A). Any higher rate (or rates) of interest guaranteed upon issuance of
the contract is also used in computing the tax net single premium. Id.; see also note 114.
154 Expense charges imposed under a contract are reflected in the guideline single premium
(see IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(ii)) but not in the tax net single premium (see IRC § 7702(b)(2)).
Where expense charges are substantial, the guideline single premium could exceed the tax net
single premium for the same contract.
155 Use of the term "initial years" is intentionally imprecise. The actual time period de-
pends on several factors, including the age of the insured when the contract is issued and the
rates at which interest is actually credited. For example, higher interest rates shorten the
period during which cash values are more restricted under the guideline premium limitation.
156 There are two possible explanations for the higher assumed interest rate used to compute
the guideline single premium. First, the more restrictive limitation resulting from the 6%
interest rate assumption may be offset by the less restrictive cash value corridor. See notes
162-68 and the accompanying text. Comparable restrictions on investment orientation under
the cash value accumulation test and guideline premium/cash value corridor test can be
achieved without using identical assumed interest rates.
Second, it is arguable that the 6% rate is a more reasonable estimate of the market interest
rates anticipated over the life of a contract. Many existing plans of insurance, including many
that are less investment oriented than a single premium contract using the 6% assumption,
would not have satisfied the requirements of § 7702 if a 61% rate had been used for all pur-
poses. In light of the decision to treat traditional level-premium contracts as life insurance
under § 7702, use of a lower interest rate was required.
157 IRC § 7702(c)(4).
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line level premium.158 Because of the possibility that inflated charges
may artificially increase a contract's investment orientation,15 9 the guide-
line premiums are based on reasonable mortality and expense charges.160
The anticipated regulations concerning the reasonableness of mortality
charges, discussed in connection with the cash value accumulation test,
are equally applicable to the guideline premium limitation.1 61
b. Cash Value Corridor
The second requirement of the guideline premium/cash value corridor
test is that the contract fall within the cash value corridor.1 62 This re-
quirement operates as a backstop to the guideline premium: It requires
that a contract always maintain a minimal balance between current in-
surance protection and cash value. 163 For example, consider a contract
insuring the life of a 35-year-old. As long as the insured is not older than
40 years of age, the cash value corridor requires that the life insurance
contract provide a death benefit of at least 250% of the contract's current
cash value.164 Thus, if the contract's current cash value equals $10,000,
the death benefit at that time cannot be less than $25,000. As the insured
ages, the minimum death benefit for a given cash value declines: 165 At
age 50, the the minimum death benefit is only 185% of the contract's
current cash value.
166
A requirement analogous to the cash value corridor is implicit in the
cash value accumulation test. There, however, the relative size of the
158 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(i), (ii).
159 See notes 100-02 and the accompanying text.
160 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(i), (ii). See also notes 126-29 and the accompanying text. Even if
the expense charges are reasonable, they can only be taken into account in computing the
guideline premiums if, based on the company's experience with similar contracts, they are
"reasonably expected to be actually paid." IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(ii).
161 See notes 126-29 and the accompanying text.
162 IRC § 7702(a)(2)(B).
163 1983 House Report, note 4, at 147 (1983); 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 574; see also
Chiechi & Adney, An Analysis of the Effects of the Life Insurance and Annuity Provisions of
TEFRA, 57 J. Tax'n 338, 341 (1982).
Even where a contract complies with the guideline premium limitation, its cash value may
grow too large relative to the death benefit provided under the contract for various reasons.
First, the actual experience under the contract may differ substantially from what was assumed
in computing the guideline premiums. For example, the rate of interest actually credited may
exceed the 4 or 6% rate reflected in the guideline premium computation. Similarly, the actual
charges for mortality and expenses may be less than the amounts specified in the contract.
Second, the guideline premiums will reflect certain charges for "qualified additional bene-
fits." See IRC § 7702(f)(5)(B); notes 255-66 and the accompanying text. The resulting in-
crease in the guideline premiums may permit the cash value to increase to levels deemed
inappropriate. Qualified additional benefits are disregarded under the cash value corridor.
164 IRC § 7702(d).
165 IRC § 7702(d)(2).
166 Id.
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death benefit and cash value is determined as a byproduct of the net sin-
gle premium concept. The cash value corridor, in contrast, explicitly
specifies fixed ratios that policies must maintain for policyholders of dif-
ferent ages.167 In general, these ratios are less than the ratios that result
from the application of the tax net single premium requirement of the
cash value accumulation test. 168 Consequently, under the guideline pre-
mium test, the cash value is generally permitted to increase to a larger
percentage of the current death benefit than is permitted under the cash
value accumulation test.
It is not possible to determine on a generalized basis whether the cash
value accumulation test or the guideline premium test permits a greater
degree of investment orientation. 169 In part, this comparison depends on
the interplay of numerous factors, including the age of the insured at the
time that the contract is issued and the rates of interest actually credited
to the policyholder. To the extent that the rates of interest actually
credited exceed 6%, the smaller single premium permitted under the
guideline premium test will have less impact on the ultimate investment
return to the policyholder. In these circumstances, the smaller amount
of current insurance protection required to satisfy the cash value corridor
may result in a contract that produces a*greater investment return than
would be produced under the cash value accumulation test. If interest
rates are more modest, however, the higher single premium permitted for
contracts subject to the cash value accumulation test is likely to produce
a higher rate of return than the most dues investment-oriented policy
that is subject to the guideline premium test.
D. Tax Policy Analysis of Policyholder Tax Treatment and Section
7702's General Limitations
The preferential tax treatment traditionally accorded income credited
under a cash value life insurance contract was not substantially altered in
either the Tax Reform Act of 1984 or the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Sec-
tion 7702 only denies these tax benefits to certain contracts that are
overly investment oriented. 170 In evaluating whether the existing tax
treatment of investments made in the form of cash value life insurance is
167 Id.
i6 See DesRochers, The Definition of Life Insurance Under Section 7702 of the Internal
Revenue Code 65-66 (unpublished manuscript); Skillman, note 78, at 40-19 through 40-20.
The presence of "qualified additional benefits" in a contract increases the contract's tax net
single premium. See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146-47; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 574.
If the charges for the qualified additional benefits are sufficiently large, the cash value accumu-
lation test will allow lower death benefit/cash value ratios than are permitted under the cash
value corridor.
169 See 1983 House Hearings, note 39, at 573-74 (statement of Hartzel Z. Leb-d).
170 See notes 71-72 and the accompanying text.
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justified, the following tax policy questions are considered. First, does
justification exist for the current tax treatment of interest credited under
cash value life insurance? Second, does § 7702 establish appropriate lim-
its on the range of life insurance contracts that qualify for the preferential
tax treatment?
1. An Evaluation of the Current Tax Treatment of Interest Credited
Under Cash Value Life Insurance
It is impossible to reconcile the tax treatment of investments made in
the form of cash value life insurance with the treatment of other financial
investments. The interest or other investment income 71 credited to life
insurance contracts is not taxed until (and unless) cash or other property
is distributed to the policyholder prior to the death of the insured. 172 For
this purpose, a loan from the life insurance company secured by a con-
tract's cash value generally is not treated as a distribution.173 Moreover,
no limitations are imposed on the amount that a policyholder can invest
in a life insurance contract.
1 74
Interest income generally is included in income currently. 75 The most
significant exceptions to this general rule involve interest on state and
local bonds 176 and interest income credited to qualified pension plans,
171 The same tax treatment applies to owners of both variable life insurance contracts and
nonvariable life insurance contracts. See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 145; 1984 Senate Re-
port, note 4, at 572. In effect, the owner of a variable life insurance contract invests the con-
tract's cash value in assets such as money market funds, bond funds, common stock funds, or
real estate funds. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 68.
One tax benefit is available solely to owners of variable life insurance contracts. Section
1035 states that no gain is recognized if a taxpayer exchanges one life insurance contract for a
second life insurance contract. To the extent that indirect investments are made in stocks or
bonds through the purchase of a variable life insurance contract, the policyholder is able to
exchange investments without recognizing gain. Cf. Rev. Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 C.B. 11. An
exchange of stocks, bonds, or notes owned directly by the policyholder, however, does not
qualify as a like-kind exchange. Consequently, the owner of these types of assets recognizes
gain upon an exchange. IRC § 1031(a)(2)(C).
172 See notes 49-51 and the accompanying text.
173 See notes 53, 56 and the accompanying text.
174 See IRC §§ 219(b), 415.
175 IRC § 61(a)(4). Interest income is not limited to amounts actually received by a tax-
payer. Amounts that substitute for interest payments, such as the accrual of original issue
discount, are treated as interest income according to the principles of economic accrual. See
IRC §§ 483, 1271-1275. From an economic perspective, market discount is indistinguishable
from original issue discount. 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 255. Amortization of market
discount, however, is not treated as interest income under the provisions applicable to original
issue discount. Id. Congress determined that the administrative complications that would be
produced by subjecting market discount to those provisions outweighed the recognized theo-
retical correctness of doing so. Id.
176 See IRC § 103. Interest paid on tax-exempt private activity bonds issued after August 7,
1986 is an item of tax preference (IRC § 57(a)(5)), but interest credited under a cash value life
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individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and deferred annuities.' 77
Although qualified pension plans and IRAs receive extremely favorable
treatment under the Code, 78 restrictions limit the amount that an indi-
vidual can invest in these tax favored savings vehicles.' 79 In addition,
loans from pension plans, individual retirement accounts, or annuities (or
loans secured by these assets) are generally treated as taxable distribu-
tions and result in the immediate taxation of tax deferred amounts.1 °
Many commentators question the justification for treating interest
credited under a life insurance contract differently from other forms of
income from savings.181 Several arguments have been advanced, how-
ever, in defense of this favorable treatment. These arguments are dis-
cussed and evaluated below.
a. Would Current Taxation of Interest Credited Under a Life
Insurance Contract Constitute a Tax on Unrealized
Appreciation?
The first argument raised in support of the existing tax treatment of
life insurance is that an increase in the cash value of a life insurance
contract represents unrealized appreciation: "taxing a policyholder cur-
rently on the increase in the cash value of a life insurance policy would be
like taxing a homeowner each year on the appreciation in value of the
home even though the home has not been sold."' 82 Consequently, it is
insurance contract is not. For taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax, life insurance
contracts are taxed more favorably than tax-exempt private activity bonds.
177 For purposes of this article, the term "deferred annuities" is limited to arrangements not
part of a qualified pension plan.
178 See IRC §§ 402(a), 408(d)-(e), 501(a); Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies:
Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 Tax L Rev. 433, 445-
46 (1987). In addition to deferring the taxation of interest credited under a pension plan, an
employee excludes from income the employer contribution to a pension plan. The net eco-
nomic effect of these two consequences may be more favorable than taxing the amount contrib-
uted on the employee's behalf and then exempting from taxation the investment income
earned.
179 See IRC § 219(b) (providing limitations on the maximum deduction allowed for contri-
butions to an Individual Retirement Account); IRC § 415 (providing limitations on benefits
and contributions under qualified plans). To obtain qualified pension plan status, additional
requirements relating to coverage, vestings, and benefits must be satisfied. See Altman, note
178, at 456-500.
IS0 IRC § 72(e)(4)(A), (p). A loan under (or secured by) a modified endowment contract is
also treated as a taxable distribution. IRC § 72(e)(10).
181 See Brannon, Taxation of Inside Buildup on Life Insurance Policies-Interim Report or
Post-mortem, 32 Tax Notes 735 (1986); Goode, note 27, at 45-52; Irenas, note 27, at 312-17;
McLure, note 34, at 392-95; Vickery, note 2, at 560-63; Paul, note 2, at 210, 222. Cf. Graetz,
The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policy, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 902-04
(1987).
182 Tax Reform Proposals-XXII, Hearings Before The Senate Committee on Finance, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1985) (statement of the American Council of Life Insurance) [hereinafter
1985 Senate Hearings].
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argued, the interest credited should not be subject to tax until the gain is
realized. 1
8 3
There are two possible responses to this argument. First, Professor
Shakow has suggested that the taxation of unrealized appreciation would
improve the efficiency, equity, and simplicity of the income tax.
18 4
Under this accrual system of taxation, interest credited under cash value
life insurance contracts would be taxed currently. 8 5 It is not clear, how-
ever, that the taxation of unrealized appreciation on a piecemeal basis is
equally beneficial.
Even assuming retention of the general realization requirement, it is
questionable whether an increase in a life insurance contract's cash value
represents the type of appreciation taxed only upon realization. Treating
an increase in cash value as unrealized appreciation ignores the distinc-
tion between changes in the value of an asset caused by market forces,
which are not taxed until realized through disposition, and those reflect-
ing current compensation for the use of the asset which are currently
realized and taxed in accordance with the taxpayer's method of account-
ing. In many situations, property owners are taxed on investment in-
come that is not received. Partners in a partnership and shareholders of
S corporations are taxed currently on their shares of income earned and
retained by the business entity.18 6 Interest accruing on debt instruments
having original issue discount, including a certificate of deposit issued by
a bank, is included in income despite the absence of a sale of the
instrument. 8 7
In each of these examples, the property values reflect income earned
but not received by property owners. Current taxation of the property
183 See 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 272-76 (statement of W.H. Cox); id. at 392-97
(statement of the American Council on Life Insurance); Schweiker, note 34; see also Brannon,
note 181, at 736; Irenas, note 27, at 314-17; McLure, note 34, at 394-95.
Questions have been raised concerning the constitutionality of current taxation of unrealized
gain. See Brannon, note 181, at 736; Rapp, Some Recent Developments in the Concept of
Taxable Income, 11 Tax L. Rev. 329, 340 (1955). The consensus among commentators, how-
ever, is that taxation of unrealized gains would withstand a constitutional challenge. M.
Graetz, Federal Income Taxation 177 (1985); W. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation
124 (1985); Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 779 (1941), excerpted in Surrey, McDaniel, Ault & Koppel-
man, Federal Income Taxation 120 (1986).
184 See Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1114 (1986).
185 Id. at 1137-38.
186 See IRC §§ 702, 1366. Owners of other business entities are not taxed currently on the
entity's current earnings; the business entity is taxed, however, on its income. See IRC §§ 11,
641. The failure to tax the owners of these taxable entities provides minimal support for not
taxing the interest credited to cash values because life insurance companies are not taxed on
investment income credited to their policyholders. See note 49.
187 See IRC § 1272; Brannon, note 181, at 736. Short-term obligations are excluded from
the scope of the original issue discount provisions. IRC § 1272(a)(2)(C).
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owners in these instances, however, is not premised on the doctrine of
constructive receipt.138 The income is includable irrespective of the tax-
payer's ability to command the receipt of cash. For example, limited
partners and owners of minority interests in corporations and partner-
ships often lack either the legal power or the effective ability to convert
the income into cash without selling the property.
The cash value of a life insurance contract, like the properties dis-
cussed above, is an asset that generates income. A life insurance com-
pany's crediting of interest constitutes compensation for its use of the
policy's cash value. 189 The cash value reflects the interest credited, just
as the values of the partnership interest, the S corporation stock, and the
debt instrument with original issue discount also reflect income that has
not been severed from the underlying asset. Because income derived
from these other forms of property is taxed despite the lack of receipt,
actual or constructive, the realization doctrine, standing alone, does not
justify treating the owners of cash value life insurance contracts in a dif-
ferent manner.
It has also been argued that the substantial penalties resulting from
surrender of a life insurance contract make it unfair to tax the interest
credited prior to actual receipt. 19° In particular, a policyholder surren-
dering an existing contract who needs continuing insurance protection
must prove insurability and may pay higher premiums. The asserted
magnitude of this penalty is subject to question. Because premium levels
188 See Reg. § 1.451-2 (discussing the elements of constructive receipt).
189 See notes 35-47 and the accompanying text. The supporters of the current tax treatment
assert that cash value life insurance "is a way of providing lifetime protection for families
against the risk of death at a fixed cost." See 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 394; see also
id. at 345 (statement of Fred A. Deering). Although level premium life insurance serves this
purpose, life insurance incorporates many of the features of a financial asset. See notes 46-47
and the accompanying text.
Excluding the interest credited under cash value life insurance from income might be appro-
priate if the life insurance company were overtaxed on its income. See generally Halperin,
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale W. 506, 519-24 (1986).
There is no evidence that life insurance companies are overtaxed. See 1983 House Report,
note 4, at 99-101; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 520-22.
The increase in the cash value of a variable life insurance contract represents the income
earned by the underlying pool of assets. See Galian & Baylor, Federal Taxation Aspects of
Variable Life Insurance, 8 U.S.F. L. Rev. 523, 523-25 (1974). Concerns about realization are
legitimate to the extent that changes in the cash value of a variable life insurance contract
represent unrealized changes in the value of the underlying pool of assets. See The President's
Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity, note 11, at 256.
190 See 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 394-97. The requirement that a policyholder
surrender the contract to obtain the cash value may explain why, under current law, the owner
is not in constructive receipt of the interest credited. A taxpayer is in constructive receipt of
income available "without substantial restrictions or limitations." Reg. § 1.451-I. A require-
ment that the policyholder surrender a life insurance contract constitutes a substantial restric-
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generally have declined in recent years, 91 replacement of an existing
contract may prove advantageous. Moreover, insurance companies often
base their premiums on the assumption that an insured's health will dete-
riorate significantly over time. 192 Consequently, assuming that the net
amount at risk is the same under the old and the new contracts, a new
medical examination may result in a premium reduction, rather than an
increase.
b. Is the Current Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Necessary to
Encourage Financial Security?
A second argument in support of the current tax treatment of cash
value life insurance is that an incentive is needed to encourage taxpayers
to provide for their families' financial security.193 Though laudable, the
objective of protecting one's family against financial adversity does not,
of itself, justify preferential tax treatment. 194 Beyond laudability, two
further criteria must be satisfied: (1) Favorable tax treatment must in-
duce changes in taxpayer behavior that significantly advance the per-
ceived social goal; and (2) the behavior likely to be changed must be
sufficiently important to justify the revenue loss. 195 The goal of promot-
ing financial security satisfies neither of these requirements.
The preferential tax treatment of investment income earned under a
cash value life insurance contract is likely to induce taxpayers to invest
more resources in this financial product. How does the purchase of cash
value life insurance protect an individual against financial adversity?
Cash value life insurance can enhance an individual's financial security
by protecting against the loss of two distinct income streams. First, the
contractual death benefit provides funds to replace the insured's salary in
case of death before retirement. Second, the cash value provides funds
that can replace a taxpayer's salary following retirement. The analysis of
the current taxation of cash value life insurance requires separate consid-
eration of each function.
Life Insurance as a Source of Post-death Income Replacement: The
unique risk shifting function of life insurance relates primarily to the
post-death replacement of the insured's income. A parent, for example,
may be concerned that the loss of her income would leave her dependents
without adequate means of support.
tion or limitation, so that the policyholder is not in constructive receipt of the interest as
credited. Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055, 1062-63 (1963).
191 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 49-50, 77-79.
192 Id. at 318.
193 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 411-12; Brannon, note 181, at 736-37; Goode, note
27, at 48-49; McLure, note 34, at 392.
194 Goode, note 27, at 48.
195 See S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 112-13 (1985).
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An individual often earns both investment income and income from
personal efforts. Because the insured's investment assets remain in exist-
ence following her death, cash value life insurance is not needed to re-
place the insured's investment income. Admittedly, the buildup of the
contract's cash value increases the individual's wealth which may gener-
ate post-death investment income for an insured's dependents. Saving in
the form of a life insurance contract's cash value, however, does not dif-
fer from other forms of savings in this regard. Consequently, preferential
tax treatment to induce saving through the internal buildup of policy
values is not justified.
The portion of the death benefit that consists of term insurance protec-
tion provides a fund that can generate investment income to replace the
insured's income from personal efforts. The existence of this type of fund
undeniably enhances the financial security of the insured's family. Un-
fortunately, existing tax incentives, perversely, are likely to induce unde-
sirable changes in taxpayer behavior. To the extent that the tax law
induces a switch from term insurance to cash value life insurance, the
taxpayer is likely to obtain less insurance protection. The premium
charged for a level-premium cash value life insurance contract is much
larger than the initial premium for a term contract with an identical
death benefit. 196 Unless the taxpayer greatly increases the portion of her
budget allocated to life insurance, the amount of insurance protection
will decline.
Paradoxically, the current tax treatment also provides the greatest tax
benefit to taxpayers whose insurance needs are modest: those who can
most easily afford to obtain their current insurance protection in con-
junction with a savings program.197 Taxpayers with substantial wealth,
who can afford to purchase large amounts of single premium insurance,
enjoy the largest tax benefits. Yet, the accumulated wealth of these tax-
196 See Y. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 54, 65 (illustrating annual term insurance premi-
us ranging between $1.37 and $3.19 per $1,000 death benefit, and level premiums for a cash
value contract ranging from $12.02 to S23.69 per S1,000 death benefit). Although term insur-
ance premiums increase in subsequent years, the annual cost of term insurance will not exceed
the level premium for the cash value contract for many years. See id. at 314-15 (illustrating
that the yearly probability of dying, according to the 1980 Commissioners' Standard Ordinary
Mortality Table increases from .21% at age 35 to .67% at age 50 and to 1.61% at age 65); see
also Consumer Reports, note 110, at 448 (reporting that the term insurance premium would
not exceed the whole life level premium for more than 25 years).
The relatively lower premiums charged in later years under level premium contracts make it
more likely that taxpayers will maintain their insurance protection for longer periods. It
should be noted, however, that a taxpayer's insurance needs decline as one's children become
financially independent. Given the disincentives discussed in the text, and the extended period
during which cash value premiums exceed term premiums, the extent of the increased cover-
age is likely to be of minor consequence.
197 See notes 32-42 and the accompanying text. The savings component of a premium may
reflect either new savings on the part of the policyholder or a transfer of existing wealth from
one type of investment to another.
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payers makes it more likely that their families could maintain their stan-
dard of living without life insurance protection.
198
Less, if any, incentive is provided, however, for taxpayers with little
wealth. For those taxpayers for whom single-premium policies are too
expensive, but who can afford to purchase a level-premium cash value
contract, the tax benefits are less generous, but are still substantial. For
taxpayers who cannot afford to pay the higher premiums charged under
a cash value contract, financial protection is available only in the form of
term life insurance, 199 the cost of which, however, is not generally de-
ductible.2°° Because of the irrational inverse relationship between the
need for insurance protection and the distribution of tax benefits, existing
tax incentives to provide financial security should receive a low national
budgetary priority.
Life Insurance as a Source of Retirement Income: Cash value life in-
surance purportedly enhances an individual's financial security by pro-
viding a source of post-retirement income. The same is true, however, of
a savings account, taxable bonds, or any other savings vehicle. The in-
come from these alternative savings vehicles generally is fully taxable on
a current basis, and the savings feature of cash value life insurance pro-
vides no distinguishing characteristic that justifies more favorable tax
treatment.
The perceived need to encourage savings for retirement also underlies
the preferential tax treatment of qualified pension plans and IRAs. 20 1
The tax benefits available to participants in qualified pension plans en-
courage employees to seek deferred, rather than current, compensation
to enhance their retirement security. These benefits are denied, however,
198 One life insurance company executive testified concerning the limited role that income
replacement plays in the purchase of single premium life insurance. He described a 1975 vin-
tage sales brochure as follows:
Life insurance is only mentioned two places in the brochure, and odds are, if it could
legally have been eliminated from the discussion, it would have been. The words "death
benefit" appear nowhere. Advertising life insurance as a savings plan is nothing new....
Our recent discussions with sellers illustrate that good old fashioneed reasons to buy life
insurance are still the same today as they have been in the past.... [R]etirement, long-
term health care and estate planning are still primary goals.
Single premium Life Insurance, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (statement of Gordon N.
Oakes).
199 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 58. Similarly, the cost of term insurance protec-
tion provided under a qualified pension plan is taxable to an employee to the extent attributa-
ble to employer contributions to the plan. Reg. § 1.72-16(b).
200 But see § 79, which excludes from the gross income of an employee the cost of the first
$50,000 of employer provided group term life insurance. The fact that the amount of cover-
age, the cost of which is excluded from income under § 79, has not increased since 1964 indi-
cates that Congress is skeptical about the need to provide tax incentives to encourage the
purchase of life insurance.
201 See Altman, note 178, at 435-38.
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if a plan ignores the retirement concerns of low and moderate income
workers.202 Large amounts set aside for retirement do not receive such
favorable tax treatment if qualified pension plans provide benefits mainly
for the owners and senior executives of the plan sponsor.203 Because the
retirement security goals underlying the highly favored tax treatment of
qualified plans are directed toward the employees as a group, rather than
toward individual employees, they furnish minimal support for the dis-
tinctly favorable tax treatment of individual purchasers of cash value life
insurance.
The tax treatment of IRAs also bespeaks limited congressional toler-
ance for tax incentives to encourage individuals to save for their own
retirement. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 imposed substantial limitations
on IRAs: The annual contribution cannot exceed $2,000,20 and many
taxpayers who are covered by a pension plan cannot deduct IRA contri-
butions at all.20 5 To permit unlimited individual investment in cash
value life insurance undercuts these limitations on IRA investments. 206
These limitations indicate that the possible use of a life insurance con-
tract's cash value as a source of post-retirement income does not justify
the current favorable tax treatment of cash value life insurance.207
Deferred annuities are also taxed preferentially. Interest income
credited under deferred annuities is not taxed currently,20 a policy that
Congress rationalized in 1982 on the ground that deferred annuities fur-
202 Id. at 454-56. These requirements have been criticized as not providing adequate pen-
sion benefits for a sufficiently broad range of employees. Id. at 500-08.
203 See IRC §§ 401(a)(5) (as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986), 416. Se also Staff
of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 671, 683, 688, 694 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 General Explanation].
204 IRC §§ 219(b); 408(o).
205 IRC § 219(g).
26 For taxpayers whose IRA contributions are nondeductible, the IRA limitations are ir-
reconcilable with the taxation of life insurance investments. Both the IRA contribution and
the life insurance premium payments are nondeductible and the owners are not taxed currently
on their investment earnings. Yet, the contributions to the IRA are limited, whereas the dollar
amount of premium payments is not.
207 It has also been argued that the present tax treatment of cash value life insurance should
be retained because it encourages taxpayers to increase their rate of savings. See H. Aaron,
The Peculiar Problem of Taxing Life Insurance Companies 2-4 (1983). As an empirical mat-
ter, it is questionable whether the existing tax treatment of cash value life insurance has in-
creased aggregate savings in the United States. It is more likely that the existing tax treatment
diverted savings from other forms of savings toward cash value life insurance. See McLure,
note 34, at 387-88. Moreover, the lack of a "general social acceptance" of the need for savings
incentives in the Internal Revenue Code noted by McLure has not changed. See id. at 392; see
also 1986 Act § l101(a)(1) (limiting the amount deductible by active participants in certain
pension plans for contributions made to individual retirement accounts).
208 See 1982 General Explanation, note 149, at 360. If the period of deferral is sufficient, the
economic benefits of deferral more than offset the impact of the 10% withdrawal penalty. See
Coppage & French, IRAs: Break-Even Analysis After Tax Reform, 42 Tax Notes 215 (1989).
For taxpayers approaching retirement, the likely absence of any withdrawal penalty increases
the net benefit of deferral.
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ther "long-term investment and retirement goals. ' ' 209 During its consid-
eration of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, Congress decided that
these policy goals were not sufficiently important either to warrant al-
lowing pension plan participants to invest in IRAs on a deductible ba-
sis,210 or to remove the $2,000 ceiling on IRA contributions, whether or
not deductible. The policy justification for the treatment of deferred
annuities has been called into question and provides, at best, only the
weakest support for the current taxation of life insurance.
211
Moreover, annuities are subject to numerous provisions designed to
ensure that the savings are used for retirement. For example, cash with-
drawals and loans from annuity contracts are treated first as taxable dis-
tributions and, in certain instances, are subject to a penalty tax.21 2 In
addition, the taxation of interest credited to a deferred annuity is not
forgiven upon the death of the annuitant.21 3 Thus, this interest will be
subject to taxation at some later date. The failure to subject life insur-
ance contracts to comparable provisions is inconsistent with its pur-
ported retirement security purpose.
In sum, tax policy concerns do not justify the current tax treatment of
cash value life insurance for three reasons. First, current law creates a
perverse set of incentives that may actually reduce the financial security
of our citizenry. Second, the tax incentives apply in an upside-down
manner: The greatest benefits inure to the wealthiest taxpayers who have
the least need for insurance protection; smaller, but still important, bene-
fits flow to those whose insurance needs are modest; and those whose
insurance needs are greatest receive no benefit at all. Third, in terms of
providing post-retirement income security, a life insurance contract's
cash value is indistinguishable from other forms of savings, the income
from which is taxed currently.
29 Id. at 361.
210 See 1986 General Explanation, note 203, at 625-26.
211 Admittedly, Congress refused to adopt President Reagan's proposal to tax currently any
increase in the cash value of a deferred annuity contract. See The President's Tax Proposals to
the Congress, note 11, at 259-60. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1986 Act, however,
suggests that Congress' balkiness was based on policy grounds. In 1988, Congress ordered the
Treasury Department and the General Accounting Office to study the policy justification for
preferential taxation of both cash value life insurance contracts and annuities in light of the
reforms made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 1988 Technical Corrections Act § 5014(a)(2).
Moreover, the mere fact of congressional continuation of tax preferred status for the owners
of deferred annuities does not in itself provide a policy rationale for that action or for the
current taxation of cash value life insurance. It means only that Congress has compounded the
problem by winking without objection at a second related set of tax rules that are as unjustifi-
able as the first. Here, as elsewhere, two wrongs don't make a right.
212 IRC § 72(e)(2), (4)(A), (q).
213 See IRC § 1014(b)(9)(A); Rev. Rul. 79-335, 1979-2 C.B. 292.
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c. Would Current Taxation Create Excessive Administrative Burdens?
A third argument raised in defense of the existing tax treatment ac-
corded life insurance is that taxing the interest as earned would create
unmanageable administrative burdens.214 This argument combines two
distinct issues. First, concern is expressed that life insurance companies
would be saddled with excessive administrative burdens if they were re-
quired to compute and report the amount of income credited to each life
insurance contract. 215 Although these concerns may have been valid in
the past, they have significantly less legitimacy today.216 Life insurance
companies issue reports in connection with universal life insurance con-
tracts that provide month-by-month breakdowns of premiums received,
charges imposed, interest credited, and policy cash values.217 In addi-
tion, life insurance companies must report the amount of income recog-
nized by a policyholder as a result of the surrender or exchange of a life
insurance contract.21 8 The industry's existing computerized record keep-
ing and reporting systems indicate that compliance with a current taxa-
tion regime is feasible.2
19
Second, commentators have disagreed about the measure of income
that is properly subject to tax. The commentators have proposed that
the policyholder's income reflect changes in either the cash surrender
value of the contract or the life insurance company's reserve liability
maintained with respect to the contract.220 This disagreement may re-
flect that, prior to 1948, cash values were linked directly to the reserve
liabilities established with respect to the contract. 221 At present, the
company's reserve liability represents a present value estimate of the
company's future liabilities, rather than the value of the policyholder's
asset.222 In addition, ease of computation makes the cash value a more
convenient measuring rod of the interest credited during any given
year.2
23
214 See Brannon, note 181 at 736; Goode, note 27, at 49-53; McLure, note 34, at 395-99.
215 See 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 412-13.
216 See McLure, note 34, at 396-97; Shakow, note 184, at 1138.
217 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 85-86.
218 IRC § 3405; Temp. Reg. § 35.3405-1 at E-8, F-24.
219 Use of transition rules could mitigate the administrative burdens of taxing interest
credited under cash value life insurance contracts. Alternatively, grandfathering of certain
older contracts of de minimi size could provide an alternative mechanism to reduce adminis-
trative burdens. See Temp. Reg. § 35.3405-1 at F-24.
2m See Vickrey, note 2, at 565-67.
221 See id. at 562 n.15; see also K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 358.
2n K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 358.
223 See Goode, note 27, at 50, McLure, note 34, at 397 n.87.
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d. Does the Existing Tax Treatment of Cash Value Life Insurance
Improve Vertical Equity?
The defenders of preferential tax treatment of cash value life insurance
argue, fourthly, that the benefits accrue to the middle class, thereby pro-
viding a degree of vertical equity for these taxpayers compared to the
wealthy. 224 Even if the current life insurance tax regime primarily bene-
fits the middle class, 225 it is not clear, following the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, that vertical equity is enhanced by retaining this tax
treatment. Enactment of provisions that limit the benefits of most tax
sheltered investments, 226 as well as the expanded scope of the alternative
minimum tax, limit the extent to which (or at least the ease with which)
the wealthy can substantially reduce their tax liabilities. Indeed, invest-
ments in cash value life insurance are currently promoted as one of the
last remaining tax favored investments.
227
2. Analysis and Evaluation of Life Insurance Distribution Rules
a. Stacking Rules and Policy Loans
The owner of a life insurance contract (other than a modified endow-
ment contract) may receive substantial amounts of cash without includ-
ing any amount in income. Cash distributions from such a life insurance
contract are excluded from gross income until the aggregate amount re-
ceived exceeds the policyholder's investment in the contract. 228 If cash is
received as a policy loan, no amount is includable in the policyholder's
224 See 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 406-09; McLure, note 34, at 392. This defense
has been characterized as "a sad commentary on the state of tax equity in the United States."
Id.
225 The data presented in support of this claim by the American Council on Life Insurance
focuses on the percentage of life insurance contracts purchased in 1983 by individuals with
income of $25,000 or less. 1985 Senate Hearings, note 182, at 406. No data is presented
showing the percentage of the tax savings enjoyed by taxpayers in different income classes.
In addition, the 1983 data does not reflect the subsequent explosive growth in the sale of
single premium life insurance contracts: From 1984 to 1986, premiums paid for single pre-
mium life insurance contracts increased from $1.0 billion to $4.4 billion. U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, Taxation of Single Premium Life Insurance 17 (1987). During the first 6
months of 1987, premiums paid for single premium contracts increased to $4.4 billion. In
1985, the average single premium paid was $31,000. Id.
226 See IRC §§ 55, 163(d), 469.
227 See, e.g., Rankin, Using Life Insurance as a Tax Shelter, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1987, § 3,
at 11; Quinn, The Tax Game in Insurance, Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1986, at 60; King & Farrell,
There's More Life in Life Insurance Thanks to Tax Reform, Business Week, Dec. 29, 1986, at
126. These articles focus on the benefits of single premium life insurance contracts. See also
McCormick, Life Insurance Products After The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Insurance Tax Re-
view, March-April 1987, at 13-16.
228 IRC § 72(e)(5). See also IRC § 72(e)(10) and notes 50-51 and the accompanying text
(discussing the stacking rules applicable to life insurance contracts and to modified endowment
contracts).
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income.229 Even accepting the argument that interest credited to the
cash value of a life insurance contract should not be taxed currently, it is
doubtful that deferral of taxation should continue after the policyholder
receives cash or another economic benefit under the contract.
Deferral of income permitted under other tax deferred savings vehicles
does not survive a taxpayer's receipt of cash. The stacking rules applica-
ble to preretirement distributions in connection with certain qualified
pension plans require that a taxpayer who receives a distribution must
include at least a portion of the amount received in income.230 More-
over, loans from pension plans and from IRAs are treated as distribu-
tions in many instances, as are loans under deferred annuity or modified
endowment contracts. 231 There is no apparent justification for treating
distributions of cash from a life insurance contract more favorably than
distributions from pension plans, IRAs, or deferred annuities. These sav-
ings vehicles are treated favorably under the income tax laws to en-
courage savings that will produce post-retirement income. Congress has
recognized that favorable tax treatment is no longer justified, however, if
the funds are used for purposes unrelated to retirement.2
32
In the case of cash value life insurance, the goal is to foster provision of
financial security for the insured's family in case of the insured's death.
Cash distributed under a life insurance contract, however, no longer pro-
vides financial security for the insured's beneficiaries. As with distribu-
tions from pension plans, IRAs, and deferred annuities, continued
deferral of taxation is no longer justified. Accordingly, amounts received
as policy loans should be treated as a distribution under the contract.
229 See notes 52-56 and the accompanying text. Loans from, or secured by, a modified
endowment contract are treated as taxable distributions rather than bona fide loans. See IRC
§ 72(e)(10).
230 See IRC § 72(e)(8). A pro rata portion of the distribution is treated as a tax-free return
of the taxpayer's investment in the contract (IRC § 72(e)(6)) with the remainder included in
the taxpayer's income. The allocation of the distribution between nontaxable and taxable
amounts will be in proportion to the ratio of the taxpayer's investment in the contract to the
value of the taxpayer's rights under the pension plan. S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
610 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 610 [hereinafter 1986 Senate Report].
231 Section 72(e)(4)(A) provides that any amount received as a loan under an annuity con-
tract, or received as a loan for which an annuity contract is pledged as security, is treated as a
distribution from the annuity contract. Section 72(e)(10) subjects modified endowment con-
tracts to the same distribution and loan characterization rules.
Similarly, an individual who uses an IRA as security for a loan is treated as having received
a distribution in the amount of the loan so secured. IRC § 408(e)(4). Similar, but less strict
rules apply to loans from qualified pension plans. IRC § 72(p).
In 1983, the Treasury Department suggested that limitations on the use of policy loans
under life insurance contracts be enacted using the rules governing loans from qualified em-
ployer plans as a model. See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 16-17. Neither the House of Repre-
sentatives nor the Senate acted favorably on the Treasury Department's suggested use of the
qualifed plan rules. Limitations on the deductibility of interest on life insurance policy loans,
however, were enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See note 55.
232 See 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 613; note 201 and the accompanying text.
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Similarly, the stacking rule used to determine whether the distribution is
treated as a tax-free return of the taxpayer's capital or as a taxable distri-
bution of the interest credited under the policy should be revised.
233
b. Effect of Mortality Charges on the Proper Measure of Income
A related question concerns the proper treatment of charges imposed
for current insurance protection under a life insurance contract. Under
present law, the maximum amount included in income is the excess of
the contractual cash value over the policyholder's investment in the con-
tract.234 Payment of the mortality charges reduces the cash value. As a
result, the amount included in income upon the surrender of a life insur-
ance contract understates the interest credited by the cumulative amount
of these charges.
235
Using the cash value to pay mortality charges is functionally
equivalent to making a cash distribution to a policyholder who then pays
the mortality charges directly. Absent special considerations, the in-kind
economic benefit provided to the policyholder should produce the same
tax consequences. Depending on the applicable stacking rules, the
deemed cash distribution would be treated either as income or as a return
of the policyholder's investment in the contract. Because the cost of life
insurance generally is a nondeductible personal expense for tax pur-
poses, 236 the deemed payment of the mortality charges would not pro-
duce an offsetting tax deduction. It is arguable whether use of this
substance over form analysis is appropriate in connection with the pay-
ment of mortality charges under a cash value life insurance contract. To
treat the payment of mortality charges as a deemed distribution is incon-
sistent with the presumed rationale for not taxing the interest credited
currently, i.e., that individuals should be encouraged to provide for the
233 The fact that the 1988 Technical Corrections Act enacted the suggested distribution
rules solely for modified endowment contracts does not demonstrate that Congress should not
extend these rules to all life insurance contracts. The modified endowment rules represent
Congress' response to the explosive growth in sales of single premium contracts marketed as
tax sheltered investment vehicles. See H.R. Rep. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 476-77
(1988). Congress evidenced its continuing concern in this area when it ordered the Treasury
Department and the General Accounting Office to study "the policy justification for, and the
practical implications of, the present-law treatment of the earnings of the cash surrender value
of life insurance contracts in light of the reforms made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986." 1988
Technical Corrections Act § 5014(a)(2).
234 See notes 59-62 and the accompanying text.
235 Id.
236 See Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1). In addition, no deduction is allowed for certain life insurance
premiums paid in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business if the taxpayer is a direct or
indirect beneficiary of the contract. See IRC § 264(a)(1); Reg. § 1.264-1.
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financial security of their families.237 Amounts expended for mortality
charges further the statutory goal.
3. Analysis and Evaluation of Section 7702's Limitations on
Investment-Oriented Life Insurance Contracts
a. Use of the Single Premium Model of Acceptable Investment
Orientation
During the early 1980's, life insurance companies marketed contracts
providing de minimis current insurance protection. Section 7702's defi-
nition of life insurance was designed to deny life insurance status to
overly investment-oriented products without affecting the preferential tax
treatment for most life insurance product designs marketed prior to the
1980's.238 To achieve this result, § 7702 uses the single premium con-
tract as the maximum limit of investment orientation. The threshold
question in evaluating § 7702 is whether its single premium model allows
excessive investment orientation. If so, the balance in § 7702 between
the investment and insurance components of life insurance should be
revised.
The reasonableness of the permitted degree of investment orientation
depends on the rationale for preferential treatment of life insurance. The
family protection rationale is the most plausible.2 9 If the tax benefits are
disproportionate to the cost of insurance protection provided, § 7702
permits excessive investment orientation.
The single premium contract examined earlier is representative of the
investment orientation of single premium life insurance contracts.24° As-
suming that interest is credited at a rate of only 4%,241 the interest
credited in each of the first 35 years that the contract is in force is more
than twice the level of the charges imposed for current insurance protec-
tion. During each of the first 20 years, more than $3 of interest is
credited for each dollar charged for current insurance protection.
If interest were credited at rates closer to market interest rates, the
relative amounts of interest credited, compared to the charges for current
insurance protection, would be even greater. For example, if interest is
credited at an 8% rate, during each of the first 20 years more than $6 of
interest would be credited for each dollar charged for current insurance
237 But see notes 182-213 and the accompanying text (evaluating whether the tax policy
arguments raised in defense of the existing tax treatment of cash value fife insurance withstand
scrutiny).
238 See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 573.
239 See notes 193-200 and the accompanying text.
240 See the text accompanying note 45; see also Appendix Table 2.
241 See note 39.
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protection; during the first 15 years the ratio would exceed 8-to-1.242 As
is apparent, a substantial investment element exists under a single pre-
mium contract.
In many instances, the tax revenue forgone due to the failure to tax the
interest credited under a single premium policy exceeds the cost that the
government would incur if it purchased the insurance protection and
provided it to the policyholder without charge.243 Assuming that inter-
est is credited at a rate of 8%, for a taxpayer in the 15% tax bracket, at
least $1.20 of tax revenue is forgone to provide term insurance protection
that costs $1. For a taxpayer in the 28% tax bracket, tax revenues of
$3.36 are forgone to produce term insurance protection that costs $1.
Even if interest is credited at only a 4% rate for a taxpayer in the 28%
marginal tax bracket, the tax revenue forgone exceeds the cost of current
insurance protection for more than 15 years.
Under the single premium contract, the tax revenue forgone is indispu-
tably disproportionate to the social benefit of encouraging term insurance
protection. The statutory definition of life insurance should require a
more reasonable balance between the expected amount of interest
credited and the cost of current insurance protection provided. Where
the income tax laws are used to encourage certain behavior, the tax in-
centive provision rarely produces tax savings that exceed the savings that
would be generated from deducting the cost of purchasing the tax fa-
vored activity.244 Applying this standard to the definition of life insur-
ance, the amount of interest credited that is not taxed should not exceed
the cost of current insurance protection provided. This balance could be
achieved by specifying, in tabular form, maximum ratios of cash value to
death benefit that would apply at all ages, such as those that approximate
the ratios under a level premium policy.
245
242 Reductions in the charges for current insurance protection would also increase the rela-
tive amount of interest credited under the contract.
243 This phenomenon is illustrated using the single premium contract discussed at note 45
and the accompanying text. See Appendix Table 2.
244 See, e.g., IRC §§ 21 (credit for dependent care limited to 30% of employment related
expenses), 106 (exclusion from employee's income of employer paid premiums for health in-
surance); see also S. Rep. No. 494, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1982) (explaining that the com-
bined tax benefits from the investment tax credit and cost recovery deductions under the
accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) were excessive because they exceeded the tax benefits
of expensing). But see IRC § 28 (providing a 50% credit for the costs of testing certain orphan
drugs).
245 See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 521-22. These ratios could be relaxed to allow a degree of
flexibility concerning the timing of premium payments, as is allowed under the typical univer-
sal life insurance policy.
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b. The Actuarial Requirements of Section 7702
Because § 7702 codified most existing life insurance policy designs, it
is necessarily based on actuarial principles. The result is an extremely
complex provision that can potentially be avoided by manipulating actu-
arial assumptions to increase the investment orientation of contracts.
Although § 7702 establishes limits, 24 the range of permissible actuarial
assumptions may nonetheless remain unduly generous.
For purposes of computing the tax net single premium and the guide-
line level premium, an interest rate as low as 4% may be used.247
Although it is difficult to determine an appropriate interest rate, it is
likely that this 4% rate significantly understates the interest that will be
credited to a contract's cash value and, correspondingly, tolerates exces-
sive maximum cash values (or premium payments).
The treatment of the actuarial assumptions concerning mortality and
expense charges in § 7702 is also flawed. Only "reasonable" charges are
used in computing the tax net single premium and the guideline premi-
uns.24 8 Even if the charges are reasonable, they may exceed the amounts
that the policyholder effectively pays. Although § 7702 requires that the
expense charges and, for certain contracts, mortality charges are reason-
ably expected to be imposed by the company,249 life insurance companies
may attempt to offset excessive charges with additional credits of invest-
ment income.
A second question concerns the use in § 7702 of alternative general
actuarial limitations. The two limitations are modeled on, and were in-
tended to accommodate, different life insurance policy designs. The cash
value accumulation test is patterned on the traditional participating cash
value life insurance contract.250 The guideline premium limitation/cash
value corridor reflects the universal life insurance policy design .25'
Use of the dual limitations creates disparities that are difficult to jus-
tify. At the outset of the contract, the use of the 4% interest rate as-
sumption allowed in computing the tax net single premium (rather than
the 6% minimum rate required in computing the guideline single pre-
mium) permits a greater infusion of cash into the policy than is allowed
under the guideline premium test. In later years, the guideline premium/
cash value corridor test allows the cash value to increase to a larger per-
centage of the current death benefit than is permitted under the cash
246 See notes 112-29 and 150-61 and the accompanying text; see also Part II.
247 IRC § 7702(b)(2)(A), (c)(4).
248 See IRC § 7702(c)(3)(b)(i) and (ii); notes 126-29 and 158-61 and the accompanying text.
249 IRC § 7702(c)(3)(B)(ii); 1988 Technical Corrections Act § 5011(c)(2).
250 See notes 93-95 and the accompanying text.
251 See note 135 and the accompanying text.




Whether the creation of these disparities is a serious shortcoming de-
pends on the benefits produced by the presence of the dual tests. The
need for two separate tests is not clear. The cash value accumulation test
carries out one of the congressional goals: Traditional cash value policy
designs can satisfy its requirements without modification. It has been
suggested that the cash value corridor creates a degree of flexibility
needed under universal life insurance contracts that is not available
under the cash value accumulation test. 253 In particular, it is claimed
that a cash value corridor that allows relatively small amounts of current
insurance protection is needed to protect life insurance companies
against the risk that existing policyholders in poor health would increase
the amount of current insurance protection at bargain prices. While this
fear represents a legitimate business concern for the life insurance com-
panies, it does not provide a compelling justification for the use of an
ineffective cash value corridor. Life insurance contracts, including uni-
versal life insurance, typically limit the extent to which the death benefit
can be increased without evidence that the insured's health is accepta-
ble.254 Such a limitation, rather than the virtual elimination of the insur-
ance features of the contract, is the more appropriate method to protect
against adverse selection.
II. ACTUARIAL SAFEGUARDS
A. Definition of Future Benefits
1. Statutory Definition of Future Benefits
The limitations contained in both the cash value accumulation test and
the guideline premium limitation test are calculated with reference to the
"future benefits under the contract. ' 25 5 Under both tests, the level of
future benefits determines the premiums that the policyholder is permit-
ted to pay.2 56 Consequently, the range of benefits included within the
definition of the term "future benefits" assumes great importance. Most
significantly, this definition limits the types of benefits that the insured
252 An additional disparity is that different adjustment rules apply under the two limitations
when the benefits provided under the life insurance contract are changed after the contract is
issued. See notes 322-27 and 334-42 and the accompanying text. These differences are ana-
lyzed in notes 328-33 and 343-68 and the accompanying text.
253 See note 142; see also 1983 House Hearings, note 39, at 569-74 (statement of Hartzel Z.
Lebed).
254 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 88.
255 IRC § 7702(b)(1), (c)(3)(A).
256 See notes 90-91 and 145-49 and the accompanying text.
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can purchase with the untaxed interest credited under a life insurance
contract.
The two basic future benefits under the contract2 7 are the death bene-
fit (the amount payable due to the insured's death)2 8 and the endowment
benefit (the amount payable if the insured survives until the policy termi-
nates).259 In addition to the basic death and endowment benefits, a pur-
chaser of a life insurance contract can obtain additional insurance
protection in the form of supplemental contracts, or "riders," for which
additional premiums are charged. 260 Among the most common addi-
tional benefits provided are: (1) disability waiver of premiums; (2) acci-
dental death benefit, or "double indemnity"; and (3) guaranteed
insurability. 261
Section 7702 characterizes insurance protection provided in supple-
mental contracts as an additional benefit.262 The effect on the tax net
single premium and the guideline premiums depends on whether the ad-
ditional benefit is "qualified." 263 Qualified additional benefits are guaran-
teed insurability, accidental death or disability, disability waiver benefits,
and family term coverage.264 Although these are not treated as future
benefits for purposes of computing the tax net single premium and the
guideline premium, 265 the charges for them specified in the contract are
treated as future benefits.266 As a result, the presence of a qualified addi-
tional benefit increases the maximum allowable cash value (or guideline
single premium) in an amount equal to the tax net single premium (or the
guideline single premium) for the qualified additional benefit.
The second category of additional benefits is a catchall that includes all
7 IRC § 7702(f)(4).
258 IRC § 7702(f)(3). The death benefit does not include any qualified additional benefit
payable due to the death of the insured. Id. An accidental death benefit is a qualified addi-
tional benefit. IRC § 7702(f)(5)((A)(ii). Consequently, the portion of the death benefit paya-
ble solely on account of the accidental nature of the insured's death is not a future benefit
under the contract. See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577;
see also notes 263-66 and the accompanying text (discussing the treatment of qualified addi-
tional benefits).
259 J. Belth, note 41, at 42.
260 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 113; J. Belth, note 41, at 29.
261 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 113-16; J. Belth, note 41, at 29-32. Guaranteed insura-
bility gives the insured the right to purchase additional amounts of insurance at specified dates
without providing evidence of insurability. K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 115.
262 IRC § 7702(f)(5).
263 IRC § 7702(f)(5)(A).
264 Id. Other benefits are treated as qualified additional benefits only to the extent provided
in regulations prescribed by the Treasury Department. IRC § 7702(f)(5)(A)(v). The discus-
sions of qualified additional benefits in the applicable committee reports do not discuss the
criteria to be used in exercising this regulatory authority. See 1983 House Report, note 4, at
146-47; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 574.
261 IRC § 7702(f)(5)(B).
266 Id.
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benefits other than qualified additional benefits. 267 Section 7702 sepa-
rates supplemental contracts containing nonqualified benefits from the
contract containing the basic benefits and the qualified additional bene-
fits. The cost of the nonqualified benefits is not treated as a future benefit
for purposes of the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums.
As a result, the presence of these benefits does not affect the maximum
amount of premiums payable under the contract. In addition, any
amount paid currently for these benefits is not treated as a premium pay-
ment for purposes of the'guideline premium limitation.268
2. Analysis of the Treatment of Additional Benefits
The creation of two categories of additional benefits represents legisla-
tive line drawing. Premiums paid for qualified additional benefits can
generate interest that receives the beneficial tax treatment accorded the
basic benefits under a life insurance contract, while the other additional
benefits do not. Thus, the distinction between qualified and nonqualified
additional benefits restricts the type of insurance that can be purchased
with untaxed interest earnings. Interest earnings pay for insurance bene-
fits only if prior premium payments allocable to the qualified benefit ex-
ceeded the current charge for that benefit. The excess is added to the
contract's cash value which, when credited with interest, may pay for the
cost of the additional benefits in subsequent years.
269
In evaluating this treatment of additional benefits, the threshold ques-
tion is whether the existing tax treatment of interest credited under a life
insurance contract is warranted. 270 Even assuming it is, further analysis
is needed because the rationale for that conclusion does not necessarily
extend to particular additional benefits.
271
The tax treatment of interest accumulated under a life insurance con-
tract differs radically from the general treatment of other forms of inter-
est income.272 For this reason, it is appropriate to limit the uses of
accumulated interest to those types of insurance that are closely related
267 The only additional benefit discussed in the committee reports that is not a qualified
additional benefit is "business term insurance." 1983 House Report, note 4, at 147; 1984 Sen-
ate Report, note 4, at 574.
268 IRC § 7702(f)(5)(C)(ii). Any amount that the policyholder pays prior to the period of
coverage for a nonqualified additional benefit is treated as a premium payment for the other
benefits under the policy.
269 See notes 35-45 and the accompanying text.
270 See notes 171-227 and the accompanying text (evaluating the tax policy justification for
the current treatment of interest credited under a cash value life insurance contract).
271 In addition to the qualified additional benefits listed in IRC § 7702(f)(5)(A)(i)-(iv), regu-
lations may classify other benefits as qualified additional benefits. IRC § 7702(f)(5)(A)(v). A
similar analysis to that contained in the text is appropriate in deciding whether to exercise this
regulatory authority.
272 See notes 175-80 and the accompanying text.
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to traditional life insurance protection. In addition, safeguards are neces-
sary to guarantee that the ability to prefund additional benefits will not
artificially increase the investment orientation of a policy beyond that
permitted under the actuarial limitations for the basic benefits. These
conditions are met if three criteria are satisfied.
First, t~e basic death benefits and the additional benefits in question
should be qualitatively similar. This similarity exists if a separate con-
tract containing only the additional benefit would enjoy the status of a
life insurance contract.273 Restricting qualified additional benefits in this
manner prevents untaxed interest credited under a life insurance contract
from being used to pay for a wide variety of personal expenses.
Applying this qualitative similarity requirement to the list of qualified
additional benefits yields inconsistent results. The family term coverage
and the accidental death benefits are qualitatively similar to the basic
death benefit. Under both of these types of supplemental contracts, the
policy beneficiary receives specified dollar payments upon the death of an
insured individual. 274 The disability waiver benefit and the accidental
disability benefit, however, appear qualitatively different from the basic
death benefit. Both of these supplementary contracts provide an eco-
nomic benefit when the insured becomes disabled, rather than when the
insured dies.275 Although benefits received under an individual disability
insurance policy are generally excluded from gross income,2 76 this exclu-
sion does not provide an adequate justification for treating disability in-
come insurance in the same manner as life insurance. The exclusion of
the benefit payment from gross income is only one of the favorable tax
attributes accorded life insurance.
277
Inclusion of the disability type benefits in the tax favored category of
qualified additional benefits reflects the custom of the life insurance mar-
ket more than reasoned tax policy analysis. Supplementary contracts
273 For purposes of analyzing whether a separate contract containing the additional benefit
is treated as a life insurance contract, it is assumed that either the cash value accumulation test
or the guideline premium/cash value corridor test is satisfied.
274 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 114, 116.
275 Under a disability waiver, the policyholder is relieved of the obligation to pay premiums
(or mortality charges under a universal life contract) if the insured becomes disabled. K. Black
& H. Skipper, note 8, at 113-14. The effect of this waiver on the policyholder is the same as if
two separate transactions had occurred. In the first transaction, the policyholder receives a
benefit payment under a disability insurance contract in an amount equal to the premium due
under the life insurance policy. Id. In the second transaction, the policyholder uses the benefit
received to pay the life insurance premium. Id. Similarly, under the accidental disability bene-
fit, a cash payment is made if the insured becomes disabled as a result of an accident. This type
of benefit is closer to pure disability insurance because the benefit payment is not construc-
tively paid back to the life insurance company.
276 See IRC § 104(a)(3).
277 See notes 49-64 and the accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of life insur-
ance policyholders).
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containing disability benefits were commonly sold in conjunction with
life insurance contracts prior to the enactment of § 7702.278 In addition,
treating these additional benefits as qualified additional benefits may have
a de mimimis effect on the guideline premium and the cash value ac-
cumulation limitations.279 Consequently, the treatment of these disabil-
ity related benefits may reflect the codification of an existing practice,
rather than a principled basis for future regulatory action.
The second recommended precondition to qualified additional benefit
status is that the charges reflected in the computation of the tax net sin-
gle premium and the guideline premiums fairly approximate the likely
charges that will be imposed. As with the mortality charges imposed for
the basic death benefit, reasonable charges specified in the contract are
used to compute the tax net single premium and the guideline premium
limitation.280 For contracts issued prior to October 21, 1988, no express
limitations are imposed on the charges specified in the contract for the
qualified additional benefits. As discussed above, use of excessive charges
in computing the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums
permits the investment of additional cash in the policy, thereby increas-
ing the investment orientation of the policy. 281 Possible challenges to
excessive charges are also applicable to the charges specified for the qual-
ified additional benefits.
282
Third, qualified additional benefit status should be denied in the ab-
sence of safeguards to eliminate any undue benefit if charges for future
additional benefits are reflected in computing the limitations, but the fu-
ture benefits are, in fact, not provided under the contract. The possibility
of undue benefit is illustrated through consideration of a contract that
includes term insurance coverage for an additional family member. Be-
cause family term coverage is a qualified additional benefit, the tax net
single premium includes the tax net single premiums for both the basic
benefits and the cost of term coverage for the family member. Similarly,
the guideline premiums include the guideline premiums for the cost of
the family term insurance. If, after the policy is in effect for one year, the
term coverage is canceled, then the tax net single premium (and the
guideline premiums) initially computed is excessive.
This problem arises in the context of both additional benefits and basic
benefits under the policy. In both cases, assumed patterns of future bene-
278 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 113.
279 The disability benefits typically pertain to total and permanent disability. K. Black & H.
Skipper, note 8, at 113-14.
280 1983 House Report, note 4, at 146; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 574. For contracts
issued after October 21, 1988, charges for qualified additional benefits are reflected in the tax
net single premium and the guideline premiums only if the charges are reasonable.
281 See notes 115-22 & 158-60 and the accompanying text.
282 See notes 122-25 and the accompanying text.
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fits that differ from the actual pattern of benefits provided may inflate the
initial tax net single premium and guideline premiums. The adjustment
provisions deal generally with this problem, 283 but, as discussed below,
they create an ineffective deterrent against strategies designed to increase
the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums.
B. Computational Rules
Unrestricted use of actuarial assumptions in computing the tax net sin-
gle premium and the guideline premiums might result in the avoidance of
meaningful limits on the investment orientation of life insurance con-
tracts. The limitation on the use of unduly low interest rate assumptions
illustrates Congress's concern in this area.284 Similarly, the statutory
"computational rules" 285 prevent actuarial gimmicks from upsetting the
intended balance between the investment and current insurance compo-
nents of life insurance contracts. 28 6
Under the first computational rule, the death benefit is deemed not to
increase.287 To illustrate the effect of this rule, consider a contract which
pays a death benefit of $100,000 if the insured dies within 5 years of the
issuance of the contract. After the initial 5-year period, the death benefit
increases automatically to $150,000. Under the first computational rule,
the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums are computed as
if the death benefit remained at $100,000.288 The increase in the death
benefit from $100,000 to $150,000, scheduled to occur after 5 years, is
ignored until the increase actually occurs, at which time the increase is
an adjustment.2
8 9
In the absence of this computational rule, the tax net single premium
and the guideline premiums would reflect the increasing death benefits
283 IRC § 7702(f)(7). The adjustment provisions that apply to situations where benefits are
eliminated are discussed and analyzed in notes 334-426 and the accompanying text.
24 See notes 112-18 and the accompanying text.
285 IRC § 7702(e).
286 See 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 651.
287 IRC § 7702(e)(1)(A). This computational rule also provides that any qualified addi-
tional benefit is deemed not to increase. Id. The qualified additional benefits are discussed in
notes 263-82 and the accompanying text.
288 The first computational rule does not prevent a life insurance company from issuing a
contract under which the death benefit increases in the manner described in the text. See 1984
General Explanation, note 80, at 651. The computational rules only govern whether the in-
creased benefits are reflected in the computation of the net single premium and the guideline
premiums. A contract in which the death benefit increases is treated as life insurance under
§ 7702 if the requirements of either test are satisfied. For example, a single premium contract
that restricts the premium to an amount significantly below the tax net single premium for the
scheduled increased death benefits satisfies the requirements of the cash value accumulation
test if the cash value of the policy can never exceed the tax net single premium for the current
death benefit.
289 See notes 324-27 and the accompanying text.
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specified in the policy.290 If the death benefits increase each year by a
percentage that is sufficiently close to the assumed interest rate used to
compute the tax net single premium, then the tax net single premium will
always approximate the death benefit under the contract. 291 Conse-
quently, the cash value of this policy could approximate the death bene-
fit, resulting in the virtual elimination of all current insurance protection.
The first computational rule maintains the intended balance between cur-
rent insurance protection and cash value.
Although the computational rules generally disregard increases in the
death benefit, one limited exception 292 allows life insurance companies to
market a "return of cash value" contract that qualifies for favorable tax
treatment. 293 Under a return of cash value contract, the death benefit
equals the sum of (1) a fixed dollar amount of current insurance protec-
tion, plus (2) the cash value of the policy immediately before the death of
the insured. This life insurance contract design was developed in re-
sponse to criticism that cash value life insurance deprives policy benefi-
ciaries of the policy's predeath cash value. This criticism is based on the
perception that the policy provides for both a fixed death benefit and a
cash value. When the beneficiaries receive only the death benefit upon
the insured's death, the cash value appears to disappear.
Because the amount of current insurance protection remains constant
under a return of cash value contract, the death benefit increases as the
cash value of the contract increases. The guideline premiums and the tax
net single premium computed for this type of contract do not usually
reflect these anticipated increases in the death benefit. Consequently, the
permissible premiums (or cash value) may be insufficient to generate the
contract's cash value and death benefits.294 The effect of the limited ex-
290 Both the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums are computed with refer-
ence to the future benefits under the contract. IRC § 7702(b)(1), (c)(3)(A). The future benefits
under the contract include the death benefits. IRC § 7702(f)(4).
291 See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 29. In the extreme case where the two rates are equal, the
net single premium equals the death benefit at all times. In this extreme case, the contract is
solely an investment; no current insurance protection is provided.
An increasing pattern of death benefits would not eliminate the current insurance compo-
nent of a contract tested under the guideline premium/cash value corridor test. Although the
guideline single premium will equal the death benefit if the death benefit increases 6% per year,
compliance with the requirements of the cash value corridor is also necessary. Under the cash
value corridor, specified amounts of current insurance protection are required at all times. See
notes 162-66 and the accompanying text.
292 IRC § 7702(e)(2).
293 See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 149; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577. This excep-
tion also applies to universal life insurance contracts under which policyholders can select
either a fixed death benefit or a death benefit that includes a return of cash value component.
See 1982 General Explanation, note 149, at 371-74.
294 See 1982 General Explanation, note 149, at 372-74 (providing an example in which the
guideline single premium for a nonincreasing death benefit contract is $17,219 and the guide-
line single premium for a return of cash value contract is $40,108).
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ception to the first computational rule is that life insurance companies
can charge adequate premiums under return of cash value contracts.
Under this exception, limited increases in the death benefit are reflected
in the actuarial computations required under the statute.295
Two provisions limit the extent to which these increases in the death
benefit are reflected in the actuarial computations. First, only increases
in the death benefit that are necessary to maintain a constant amount of
current insurance protection are taken into account.2 96 Second, these
limited increases are only reflected for contracts that follow the level an-
nual premium model of life insurance. This second limitation is imple-
mented separately under the cash value accumulation test and the
guideline premium test.297 Only the guideline level premium is allowed
to reflect limited increases in the death benefit 298 The first computa-
tional rule continues to apply without exception to the computation of
the guideline single premium. Under the cash value accumulation test,
the cash value of the policy cannot, at any time, exceed the net level
reserve2 99 for the benefits provided under the contract. 30° As with the
295 IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A), (B).
296 IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A). It is possible to take advantage of this rule even if the contract
provides for a pattern of future death benefit increases that differs from that produced in the
return of cash value policy design. If the death benefit increases no faster than cash value, then
the full amount of future death benefit increases is taken into account. IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A),
(B). If the death benefits increase more rapidly than under the return of cash value design,
then only the increase that occurs under the return of cash value contract is reflected in the
computation of the net level reserve (described in note 299) and the guideline level premiums.
297 IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A), (B).
298 IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A).
299 The term "net level reserve" is not defined in § 7702. In general, the net level reserve for
a contract equals the sum of the net level premiums paid, plus interest credited, reduced by the
mortality charges imposed under the contract. See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 346. The
size of this reserve depends on the actuarially determined net level premium for the contract.
The gross level premium is the amount that the policyholder must pay annually to pay for all
of the benefits under the contract. Id. at 341-43. The net level premium is simply the gross
level premium reduced by any commissions or other loading charges. In computing this net
amount, it is assumed that the policyholder will pay level annual premiums beginning at the
effective date of the contract and continuing until the insured reaches at least age 95. IRC
§ 7702(e)(2)(B).
The legislative history does not discuss how the net level premium is computed for purposes
of computing this net level reserve. To be consistent with the return of cash value limitation,
the net level premium should be computed on the basis of future death benefits that increase no
more rapidly than the projected increase in cash value. If the net level premium were allowed
to reflect all scheduled increases in the death benefit, then the net level reserve for a contract
could equal the current death benefit at all times. This would occur if the death benefit in-
creased each year in an amount equal to the sum of (1) the last year's cash value multiplied by
the assumed rate of interest; plus (2) the amount of the annual premium. Computing the net
level reserve in this manner is irreconcilable with the clearly stated intent of Congress in enact-
ing § 7702. See 1983 House Report, note 4, at 102; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 523. Treat-
ing this contract as life insurance also conflicts with the expected effect of IRC § 7702(e)(2)(B).
See 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 653 n.55.
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guideline single premium, the tax net single premium is computed with-
out taking into account any increase in the death benefit.
The remaining computational rules also limit the extent to which use
of certain actuarial assumptions will increase the investment orientation
of life insurance contracts. The second computational rule prevents a life
insurance company from increasing investment orientation by establish-
ing an early maturity date for the contract. 30' At maturity, the date on
which the cash value equals the specified death benefit, 302 the contract no
longer provides any current insurance protection. 30 3 The sooner a con-
tract matures, the greater the net single premium 304 and, consequently,
the greater the cash value allowed under the contract. Where the con-
tract contains an earlier maturity date, the tax net single premium and
the guideline premiums are computed on the fiction that the maturity
date occurs when the the insured reaches age 95.305 Use of this fictional
maturity date reduces the tax net single premium and the guideline
premiums.
Under the fourth computational rule, the endowment benefit 30 6 is
deemed not to exceed the smallest death benefit actually (or deemed)
payable under the contract. 30 7 This computational rule applies to policy
designs that incorporate an endowment benefit that is unduly large rela-
tive to the death benefit. For example, consider a contract with a death
benefit initially set at $1 million, but which declines after one year to
$300,000. If the insured survives until age 95, an endowment .benefit
equal to the original $1 million death benefit is paid. Without the fourth
computational rule, the guideline premium and the tax net single pre-
mium would reflect the amount necessary to generate a fund sufficient to
generate the $1 million endowment benefit. The cash value of the con-
tract during the intervening years could approximate the current death
benefit, in which case the current insurance protection would be mini-
300 IRC § 7702(e)(2)(B). This provision was added as a counterpart under the cash value
accumulation test to § 7702(e)(2)(A), which provides that limited increases in death benefits
are taken into account in computing the guideline level premiums. It appears that few, if any,
contracts that otherwise would not comply with the requirements of the cash value accumula-
tion test will satisfy these requirements as a result of this provision. See 1984 General Expla.
nation, note 80, at 653 n.55.
301 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 652.
302 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 61-62.
303 Id.
304 K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 349.
305 IRC § 7702(e)(1)(B). This computational rule also deems the maturity date to occur no
later than when the insured reaches age 100. Id.
306 The endowment benefit is the amount payable if the insured survives until the specified
termination date of the contract. J. Belth, note 41, at 42.
307 IRC § 7702(e)(1)(D).
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mal.30 8 The fourth computational rule restricts the endowment benefits
that are reflected in the computation of the guideline premiums and the
tax net single premium to the smallest death benefit provided under the
policy.
The third computational rule was enacted as a technical correction to
eliminate an unanticipated effect of the interaction of two other computa-
tional rules. Although Congress intended to deny life insurance status to
contracts that mature prior to age 95, it was anticipated that a contract
providing a limited endowment benefit at an earlier age could satisfy the
requirements of § 7702. 309 Unfortunately, under the fourth computa-
tional rule, the endowment benefit is deemed not to exceed the least
amount payable as a death benefit at any time under the contract.310 For
a contract that, by its terms, terminates before the insured is 95 years old,
the death benefit payable in post-termination years is zero. Thus, the
endowment benefit is deemed equal to zero at all times. The tax net sin-
gle premium and the guideline premium so computed would be insuffi-
cient to generate the limited endowment benefit.
The third computational rule accommodates contracts that provide a
limited endowment benefit.3 1 1 Under this rule, the death benefit is
deemed to continue until the deemed maturity date of the contract.
312
Consequently, the fourth computational rule will not restrict the endow-
ment benefit to zero. Notwithstanding the limited purpose of the third
computational rule, its literal terms apply too broadly: All scheduled
death benefit decreases are disregarded in computing the tax net single
premium and the guideline premiums. In an extreme case, a one-year
term life insurance policy is treated as a whole life policy for purposes of
computing the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums.
There is no justification for deeming the death benefit to continue for
purposes other than allowing limited endowments, and the third compu-
tational rule should be amended to correct this problem.
308 The extent to which this policy design could remove the current insurance protection
depends on whether it satisfies the cash value accumulation test or the guideline premium/cash
value corridor test. Without the fourth computational rule, no limits apply under the cash
value accumulation test. For contracts subject to the guideline premium/cash value corridor
test, continued compliance with the cash value corridor requires that the ratio of the death
benefit to the cash value never fall below the percentages specified in IRC § 7702(d). See notes
162-67 and the accompanying text.
309 See 1984 General Explanation, note 80, at 652. To illustrate the limited endowment
benefit, consider a single premium life insurance contract with a death benefit of S100,000
insuring the life of a 35-year-old. Assume further that if the insured is alive at age 65, the
contract terminates and the policyholder receives S30,000. The S30,000 payable upon the ter-
mination of the contract is the limited endowment benefit.
310 IRC § 7702(e)(1)(D).
311 See H.R. Rep. No. 426. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 965 (1985), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol.
2) 965 [hereinafter 1985 House Report]; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 986-87.
312 IRC § 7702(e)(1)(C).
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C. Analysis and Evaluation of the Adjustment Rules
A life insurance contract satisfies the requirements of § 7702 if the
cash value (or the premiums paid) is not excessive relative to the contrac-
tual benefits, given the age of the insured. The limitations imposed on
the cash value (and premiums) depend primarily on the magnitude of the
death benefit provided. 313 Reliance on limitations based on the contrac-
tual benefits specified when the contract is issued made it necessary to
devise a mechanism to cope with changes in the terms of the contract.
The mechanism used to adjust the limitations to changes in the contrac-
tual terms are the adjustment rules.
1. Need for an Adjustment Rule
Unless the actuarial limitations reflect changes in the contractual
terms implemented after the issuance of the contract, two problems may
occur. The first problem arises where the death benefit increases after the
contract is issued. In the absence of an adjustment rule, the guideline
premium limitation may prove unduly restrictive. 314 If the guideline pre-
miums are not increased, a policyholder will be unable to pay sufficient
premiums to fund the benefits under the contract. In future years, the
current premiums will increasingly pay for current insurance and ex-
pense charges.31
5
313 The guideline premium and the tax net single premium are computed with reference to
all future benefits under the contract. IRC § 7702(b)(1), (c)(3)(A). In addition to the death
benefit, future benefits include the endowment benefit and the charges for any qualified addi-
tional benefit. See notes 257-66 and the accompanying text. The endowment benefit reflected
in the guideline premiums and the tax net single premium cannot exceed the smallest death
benefit provided under the contract. IRC § 7702(e)(1)(D).
314 This problem arises only in connection with contracts subject to the guideline premium
test. For a contract subject to the cash value accumulation test, § 7702 relaxes the limitations
on cash value independently of the explicit adjustment rule. Following an increase in the
death benefit, the tax net single premium changes automatically to reflect the current death
benefit. See IRC § 7702(b)(2)(C). Because the tax net single premium increases, the cash
surrender value is also allowed to increase without violating the cash value accumulation test.
IRC § 7702(b)(1). In effect, the policyholder is permitted to pay a premium sufficient to in-
crease the contract's cash value in an amount at least equal to the tax net single premium for
the additional death benefit.
For contracts complying with the guideline premium limitation, serious problems may arise.
Guideline premiums are determined as of the issue date of the policy. IRC § 7702(c)(3)(C).
Premiums sufficient to pay all charges for a policy with a given death benefit are inadequate for
a policy with a much larger death benefit.
315 A policyholder is allowed to increase the death benefit under a universal life insurance
policy. See notes 139-41 and the accompanying text. An increase in the death benefit under
the contract causes the mortality charges under the contract to increase. If the increased mor-
tality charges exceed the current premium payments, the cash value of the policy is used to pay
the mortality charges. Eventually, the cash value is depleted, and the current premiums are
then used solely to pay the mortality charges. The speed at which the cash value is depleted in
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In the absence of an adjustment rule, a policyholder could purchase a
new life insurance contract, and thereby increase the total death benefits
payable under life insurance contracts. The limitations applicable to an
existing contract do not affect the new contract's limitations on either
cash value or premiums paid. Similarly, premiums paid in connection
with the new contract do not affect the preexisting contract's continued
compliance with its guideline premium limitation. Permitting a policy-
holder to pay additional premiums when benefits are increased without
requiring the purchase of a new contract permits a greater degree of flexi-
bility and may reduce the policyholder's out-of-pocket costs.
A second problem may arise in the absence of an adjustment rule: The
original limitations may become unduly liberal where a policyholder
reduces a contract's death benefit (or other benefit). Because the initial
death benefit exceeds the death benefits actually provided under the con-
tract, the initial guideline premium (or the maximum permitted cash
value) exceeds the amounts required to pay for those benefits. 316 As a
result, the cash value could accumulate more rapidly, thereby permitting
the policyholder to earn untaxed interest income in excess of the amount
that would have been earned if only the "needed" premiums were
paid.317
this manner depends on the magnitude of the increase in the death benefit and the insured's
age when the adjustment occurs.
In determining whether the premiums paid exceed the guideline premium limitation, pre-
mium payments limited to the minimum amount needed to keep the contract in effect through
the end of the contract year are disregarded. IRC § 7702(f)(6). These premiums are disre-
garded, however, only if the contract has no cash surrender value at the end of the contract
year. Id. This provision enables an individual who has become uninsurable to maintain insur-
ance protection that is either unavailable or much more expensive.
316 Both the tax net single premium and the guideline premium are the amounts required to
fund the future benefits under the contract, given certain assumptions concerning the rate of
interest credited, the mortality charges, and the expense charges imposed throughout the life of
the contract. See notes 90-92, 147-60 and the accompanying text. If future benefits are re-
duced, the post-adjustment mortality charges imposed will be less than were anticipated when
these-computations were originally made.
This result is illustrated through consideration of a single premium contract with an initial
death benefit of $100,000 issued to a 35-year-old individual. If the mortality charges are based
on the 1958 CSO Mortality Table and the expense charges equal 10% of the premiums paid
plus $3 per $1,000 of death benefits, the guideline single premium is S17,219. See 1982 Gen-
eral Explanation, note 149, at 370-71. If the death benefits were reduced immediately to
$60,000, only $10,331 (60% of $17,219) would be needed as the guideline single premium for
the benefits remaining under the contract.
317 Under the example discussed in note 316, the cash value corridor operates as'the only
constraint on the policyholder's ability to reduce the amount of current insurance protection.
In effect, reductions in the death benefit could transform the guideline premium test from a test
based primarily on actuarial assumptions to a test consisting solely of the cash value corridor.
This result would be inconsistent with the requirement that contracts satisfy both the guideline
premium limitation and the cash value corridor. It would also permit a more investment-
oriented contract than is allowed under either of the existing tests. See 1983 House Report,
note 4, at 147.
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2. Operation of the Adjustment Rule: Recomputed Limitations and
Required Distributions
In response to these two problems, the statute provides that "proper
adjustments" are required "if there is a change in the benefits under (or
in other terms of) the contract. ' 318 The threshold question in examining
this provision is whether an event has occured that triggers an adjust-
ment. Although the terms "benefits under the contract" and "other
terms of the contract" are not defined in the statute, the legislative his-
tory provides several illustrations of adjustment-triggering events.
a Events that Trigger an Adjustment
The determination of whether an adjustment is required depends on
whether the cash value accumulation test or the guideline premium test
governs the contract. For purposes of the cash value accumulation test,
a change in the size of the death benefit constitutes a change in the bene-
fits, whether resulting from application of a policyholder dividend to the
purchase of a paidup addition or from some other cause.
319
The legislative history indicates that adjustments are less likely for
contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation. For these con-
tracts, an increase in the death benefit is treated generally as an increase
in the benefits under the contract. Where the increase is attributable
solely to the growth in cash value of the contract, however, no adjust-
ment is made.320 In addition, an insurance-company-initiated increase in
benefits under contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation will
not trigger an adjustment.
32'
318 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(A).
319 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577. Adjustments are only made where the change in
benefits was not reflected in previous computations under the contract. Id. For example, a
policy might state that the initial death benefit is $100,000 and that the death benefit at all
times in the future will equal the sum of the current cash value plus $100,000. Although the
death benefit increases in future years, these increases were previously reflected in the compu-
tation of the guideline level premiums. See IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A); notes 292-300 and the ac-
companying text. No adjustment in the guideline level premium is appropriate when the
increases in the death benefit actually take place.
Certain scheduled increases in benefits that were previously disregarded in computing the
limitations, however, are treated as an adjustment when the increases take effect. 1983 House
Report, note 4, at 149; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577. All increases in the death benefit
are disregarded in the computation of the guideline single premium and the tax net single
premium. See notes 297-300 and the accompanying text. Consequently, an adjustment is re-
quired in computing these amounts when the death benefit actually increases.
320 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577. Arguably, no adjustment is required in these cir-
cumstances because the use of the 6% rate of interest in computing the guideline single pre-
mium, rather than the 4% rate used in the tax net single premium, reflects the possibility that
higher rates of interest would be credited.
321 Id. It is unclear whether company initiated changes should never trigger adjustments
for contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation. Because the payment of excess inter-
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The adjustment rule trigger is not limited to changes in the basic death
benefit. An adjustment is required to reflect any "change in the benefits
under (or in other terms of) the contract." 322 Consequently, an increase
or decrease in the endowment benefit or any qualified additional benefit
also triggers an adjustment.
323
b. Adjustments Following Increases in Benefits
(1) The Statutory Rules: Different rules apply to adjustments required
following increases and decreases in the benefits under a life insurance
contract. The adjustments required following an increase in benefits dif-
fer depending on whether the cash value accumulation test or the guide-
line premium limitation governs the contract in question.324 If benefits
increase under a contract subject to the cash value accumulation test, the
entire policy is treated as newly issued on the date of the change, and the
tax net single premium is recomputed at that time.325 The requirements
of the cash value accumulation test are satisfied if the post-adjustment
cash value does not exceed this recomputed tax net single premium.
For contracts subject to the guideline premium test, separate guideline
premiums are computed for the changed portion of the contract. 326 Dur-
est (interest paid at a rate in excess of the contractually guaranteed rate) does not trigger an
adjustment, no adjustment should result from a short-term company guarantee of a higher
interest rate. It is arguable, however, that increases in the permanent contractually guaranteed
rate of interest, or reductions in the mortality charges, should trigger an adjustment. At a
minimum, where the timing and magnitude of the changes are sufficient to call into question
the original contractual terms, an adjustment is appropriate.
322 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(A).
323 It is unclear whether an adjustment is required when a policyholder withdraws cash
from a contract under which the net amount at risk remains constant. Under such a contract,
the cash withdrawal reduces both the current death benefit and the endowment benefit. An
adjustment should be required unless the reduced level of benefits was previously reflected in
the computations of the tax net single premiums and the guideline premiums. If the tax net
single premium or the guideline premium would have been smaller if the post-withdrawal
endowment benefit had been provided at all prior times, then the change was not reflected in
the prior computations.
324 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577.
325 Id.
326 Id. See also 1982 General Explanation, note 149, at 370-71. The separate guideline
premiums reflect the current age of the insured, rather than the age of the insured at the time
that the contract was issued. 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note
230 at 989. This adjustment procedure is illustrated by examining the contract discussed in
note 316 which is issued to a 35-year-old individual. See 1982 General Explanation, note 149,
at 371-75 (providing the basis for this example). Under this contract, the death benefit is
$100,000, the guideline single premium is $17,219, and the guideline level premium is S1,590.
If the death benefit is increased to $150,000 when the insured reaches age 55, then the adjust-
ment rules require that guideline premiums be computed for a contract providing a S50,000
death benefit issued to a 55-year-old individual. For such a $50,000 contract, the guideline
single premium is $19,627 and the guideline level premium is $1,970.
The guideline premiums for the additional $50,000 death benefit for a 55-year-old insured
individual may appear disproportionately large compared to the initially computed guideline
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ing post-adjustment years, the guideline premiums for the original bene-
fits and those for the increased benefits are added together to determine
the post-adjustment guideline premium limitation.
3 27
(2) Analysis of the Adjustment Rules Applicable to Increases in Benefits:
Absent an adjustment rule, the limits on premiums payable may be inad-
equate to fund an increased level of benefits. 328 Because a policyholder
can purchase a new policy containing the additional benefits, § 7702
should accommodate the changes when they occur through a change in
the terms of an existing contract. In evaluating the adjustment rules ap-
plicable to increases in benefits, an appropriate criterion is whether the
additional premiums (or cash value) allowable are commensurate with
the additional benefits provided under the contract.
The adjustment-caused increase in the guideline premium limitation
depends on the relative magnitudes of the pre-adjustment guideline single
premium and the sum of the pre-adjustment guideline level premiums. If
the original guideline single premium is larger, then the adjustment-
caused increase in the guideline premium limitation equals the guideline
single premium for the additional benefits. If the sum of the original
guideline level premiums is larger, then the adjustment produces a
smaller increase in the guideline premium which, during the first post-
adjustment year, is at least as large as the guideline level premium.
329
Although the adjustment rules accommodate increases in future bene-
fits in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the logic of the guide-
line premium test, these rules are subject to two criticisms. First, the
guideline premium limitation increases even where the pre-adjustment
premiums. The difference in the guideline premiums computed at the two ages reflects the fact
that the premiums paid at an earlier age will earn interest for a longer period.
327 In the example discussed in note 326, the guideline single premium for all subsequent
years is the sum of the guideline single premiums for the original benefits and for the additional
death benefit. Consequently, after the death benefit is increased, the guideline single premium
is $36,846. This figure is the sum of the initial guideline single premium ($17,219) and the
guideline single premium for the additional $50,000 death benefit ($19,627).
For post-adjustment years, the sum of the guideline level premiums equals the sum of (1) the
original guideline level premium multiplied by the number of years that the contract has been
in force, plus (2) the guideline level premium for the adjustment, multiplied by the number of
post-adjustment years. Thus, in each post-adjustment year, the sum of the guideline level
premiums increases by $3,560. This figure is the sum of the original guideline level premium
($1,590) and the guideline level premium for the additional benefits ($1,970).
328 See notes 314-15 and the accompanying text. Because the guidelines premium test's
limitations are determined solely with reference to the benefits specified when the contract is
issued, this discussion focuses on the effect of the adjustment rules on contracts subject to the
guidelines premium limitation.
329 Where the pre-adjustment sum of the guideline level premiums exceeds the original
guideline single premium, the adjustment-caused increase in the guideline premium is the
greater of: (1) the sum of the post-adjustment guideline level premiums for the additional
benefits; and (2) the excess of (a) the guideline single premium for the additional benefits, over
(b) the amount by which the sum of the original guideline level premiums exceeded the origi-
nal guideline single premium.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 43:
cash value is sufficient to fund the post-adjustment future benefits. The
original guideline premiums were based on assumptions concerning the
rate of interest to be credited, and the mortality and expense charges to
be imposed, under the contract. 330 Increases in the cash value of the
contract resulting from differences between the assumed and the actual
level of charges imposed and rates of interest credited do not affect the
guideline premiums. If these increases are sufficienty large, the cash
value may exceed the amount necessary to fund the contract's future
benefits.331 If the cash value is too large at a time when future benefits
are increased, the increase in the guideline premium limitation allowed
under the adjustment rules is unwarranted.
The second criticism is that the adjustment rules do not create full
parity between a policyholder who increases benefits under an existing
contract and one who obtains the additional benefits under a new con-
tract. Situations may arise where the guideline premium limitation for a
single contract with increased benefits is less than the aggregate limita-
tions for separate contracts.332 This failure to achieve parity is not a seri-
ous shortcoming of the adjustment rules. To achieve parity, an
adjustment rule would have to specify that the post-adjustment guideline
premium limitation is never less than the aggregate limitation available
under separate contracts. It would have been difficult, however, to de-
sign such a rule without creating new possibilities for abuse.333 On bal-
ance, the failure of the adjustment rules to generate the precise
limitations that would result if separate contracts were acquired is less
330 See notes 147-60 and the accompanying text.
331 Under the guideline premium test, the cash value is allowed to increase without limita-
tion unless the cash value corridor would be violated. For any given death benefit, the maxi-
mum cash value permitted without violating the cash value corridor exceeds the amount
reasonably required to pay for the benefits provided under the policy. See note 168 and the
accompanying text.
332 Disparities arise in two sets of circumstances. First, disparities arise if both (1) the
guideline single premium for the additional benefits exceeds the sum of the guideline level
premiums for those benefits, and (2) the original guideline single premium is less than the sum
of the original guideline level premiums. If these conditions are present, the post-adjustment
guideline premium limitation for the single contract is less than the sum of the guideline pre-
mium limitations for the two separate contracts (one of which contains the original benefits,
and the other contract contains the additional benefits).
Second, disparities arise between contracts in which additional benefits are obtained as an
adjustment and contracts where the additional benefits are obtained in a separate new policy
subject to the cash value accumulation test. In this situation, as well, the adjustment rules
permit payment of a lesser amount of premiums than is permitted under the separate policies.
333 Under a parity rule, the guideline premium limitation would increase by an amount
equal to the full guideline single premium for the additional death benefit. This rule might
inflate the guideline premium limitation if the policyholder alternately decreased and then
increased future benefits. Although a decrease in benefits causes a reduction in the guideline
premium limitation, this reduction occurs over a number of years if the sum of the original
guideline level premiums exceeds the original guideline single premium. See note 342 and the
accompanying text (discussing the slow squeeze-out when benefits are reduced). The conse-
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serious than the problems that alternative rules would create. Because a
policyholder can achieve parity through the purchase of separate con-
tracts, concerns regarding potential abuses are properly given great
weight.
c. Adjustments Following Reductions in Benefits
(1) The Statutory Rules: Adjustments made following a reduction in
future benefits require a two step analysis. First, the remaining future
benefits under the contract are examined to determine if the contract
continues to satisfy the applicable test under § 7702(a). For contracts
subject to the cash value accumulation test, the cash value of the contract
is compared to the tax net single premium computed with respect to the
contract's remaining future benefits. If the cash value is less than the tax
net single premium, no further steps are required under the adjustment
rules. If the cash value exceeds the tax net single premium, however, a
cash distribution to the policyholder is required.334 This required distri-
bution equals the amount necessary to bring the contract into compliance
with the cash value accumulation test, that is, the excess of the contract's
cash value over the tax net single premium for the remaining benefits
under the contract.3
35
A similar, but more complex, procedure applies for contracts subject
to the guideline premium limitation test. Separate guideline premiums
are computed for the eliminated future benefits. 336 For post-adjustment
years, the guideline premiums equal the initial guideline premiums less
the guideline premiums computed for the eliminated benefits. 337 No fur-
quence of decreasing and then increasing the future benefits by identical amounts would be to
increase substantially the guideline premium limitation.
A policyholder could obtain the same increase in the aggregate guideline premium limitation
by reducing the death benefit under an existing contract, and simultaneously acquiring a new
contract with a death benefit equal to the death benefit eliminated from the first contract. The
reduction in benefits under the original contract, however, may cause the premiums paid to
exceed the new guideline premium limitation. In this case, a distribution of cash to the policy-
holder is required. Under IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B), a portion of this distribution is included in
gross income. See notes 380-91 and the accompanying text. Under a parity rule, the permissi-
ble level of premium payments is increased without requiring the inclusion of any amount in
gross income under IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B).
334 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 577-78; 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate
Report, note 230, at 989. Whether the amount distributed to the policyholder as a result of an
adjustment is treated as a tax-free return of the policyholder's basis in the insurance policy or
as a taxable distribution of the interest credited to the cash value is determined under
§ 7702(f)(7)(B). See notes 380-91 and the accompanying text.
335 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
336 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989. See also
notes 326-27 and the accompanying text (discussing the similar calculation required when
benefits are increased).
337 For post-adjustment years, the sum of the guideline level premiums equals (1) the origi-
nal guideline level premiums multiplied by the number of years that the contract has been in
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ther action is required if the total premiums paid do not exceed the post-
adjustment guideline premium limitation and if the cash value does not
exceed the maximum amount permitted under the cash value corridor.
338
A distribution of cash to the policyholder is required if either of these
conditions is not satisfied.
339
The distribution required when a contract does not satisfy both condi-
tions is the minimum amount necessary to bring the policy back into
compliance with the guideline premium test. This minimum amount
equals the greater of (1) the amount by which the premiums paid under
the contract exceed the post-adjustment guideline premium limitation,
34°
and (2) the excess of the contract's cash value over the post-adjustment
cash value corridor.3I
The size of the required distribution varies greatly where it is com-
puted with reference to the post-adjustment guideline premium limita-
tion. If the post-adjustment guideline single premium exceeds the post-
adjustment sum of the guideline level premiums, then the required distri-
bution is the amount necessary to reduce the premiums paid to the post-
adjustment guideline single premium. If the post-adjustment guideline
single premium is less than the post-adjustment sum of the guideline level
premiums, then the required distribution in the first post-adjustment year
is only the amount necessary to reduce the premiums paid to an amount
force, reduced by (2) the guideline level premium for the eliminated benefit multiplied by the
number of post-adjustment years. To illustrate, if the death benefit is reduced to $50,000
under the contract discussed in note 316, during each post-adjustment year, the sum of the
guideline level premiums will decline by $380. This is the amount by which the guideline level
premium for the eliminated benefit ($1,970) exceeds the original guideline level premium
(S1,590).
The post-adjustment guideline single premium equals the original guideline single premium
reduced by the guideline single premium for the eliminated benefit. In the contract discussed
above, this computation will result in a negative guideline single premium because the original
guideline single premium ($17,219) is less than the guideline single premium for the eliminated
benefit ($19,627).
The legislative history does not discuss the ramifications of a negative guideline premium
limitation. Continued compliance with the guideline premium/cash value corridor test re-
quires that the premiums paid not exceed the guideline premium limitation. It appears that a
distribution of cash to the policyholder cannot reduce the premiums paid below zero. See IRC
§ 7702(f)(1). If sufficient cash is distributed to reduce the premiums paid to zero, a contract
with a negative guideline premium limitation should not automatically be viewed as violating
the guideline premium limitation. For other purposes, allowing guideline premiums to become
negative prevents the artificial inflation of the guideline premium limitation by alternative in-
creases and decreases in the death benefit.
338 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
339 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
34 The term "premiums paid" is generally defined as the actual premiums paid, less all
amounts returned to the policyholder that were not included in the policyholder's income.
IRC § 7702(f)(1)(A). The cash distributed to the policyholder that is includable in gross in-
come under § 7702(f)(7)(B), however, also reduces the premiums paid for purposes of § 7702.
1985 House Report, note 311, at 967-68; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
341 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
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equal to the post-adjustment sum of the guideline level premiums. 342 In
these circumstances, the annual decline in the sum of the guideline level
premiums will require additional distributions in subsequent years. The
slow pace of required distributions may occur even where the policy-
holder paid only a single premium equal to the guideline single premium
on the date the policy was issued.
(2) Analysis of Adjustments Following Reductions in Benefits: Where
benefits are reduced, the adjustment rules work adequately if the implicit
constraints on investment orientation of life insurance contracts are
maintained. Following a reduction in benefits, the limitations established
when the contract was issued may prove unduly generous. Hindsight
may show that a policyholder accumulated excessive cash values in the
contract, and thereby earned excessive investment income.3 43 To deter-
mine whether the adjustment rules prevent a policyholder from enjoying
an inappropriate increase in the contract's investment orientation, it is
necessary to consider the following questions: (1) Is the post-adjustment
cash value of the policy (or the amount of premiums paid under the pol-
icy) excessive? (2) If so, what sanctions are properly imposed where ex-
cessive accumulations (or premium payments) occur?
Before answering these questions, standards are needed to assess
whether excessive cash value has accumulated or whether the policy-
holder has paid excessive premiums. The conceptual basis underlying
both the cash value accumulation test and the guideline premium/cash
value corridor test is that the cash value (or the premiums) cannot exceed
the amount necessary to pay for the future benefits specified under the
contract.344 The contract is not treated as life insurance if, given the
actuarial assumptions used in computing the applicable limitation, more
cash value is accumulated (or more premiums are paid) than is required
to pay for the future benefits. 345
342 In the example discussed in note 326, assume that the death benefit is reduced from
$100,000 to $60,000 when the insured reaches age 45. Before the death benefit was reduced,
the guideline single premium was $17,219. The sum of the original guideline level premiums
for the 10 years that the policy was in effect equals $15,900 (10 times $1,590).
After the death benefit is reduced, the adjustment rules require the computation of separate
guideline premiums for the eliminated benefits. Reflecting the fact that the insured is 45 years
old, the guideline single premium computed with respect to the $40,000 death benefit is
$12,042 and the guideline level premium for this benefit is $1,136.
Immediately following the adjustment, the guideline single premium is $5,177 ($17,219 less
$12,042) and the sum of the guideline level premiums is $14,764 ($15,900 less $1,136). If the
premiums paid exceed $14,764, then a distribution of cash to the policyholder is required.
343 The presence of less restrictive limitations will not necessarily lead to more investment-
oriented uses of life insurance in all cases. Frequently, the premiums paid are less than the
guideline premium limitation, and the cash values of the contracts are less than the tax net
single premium.
3" See notes 87-89 and 143-49 and the accompanying text.
345 IRC § 7702(g).
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Following a reduction in future benefits, it may become apparent that
a life insurance contract was used in a more investment-oriented fashion
than is consistent with the conceptual basis underlying the limitations. A
contract subject to the cash value accumulation test was overly invest-
ment oriented if the accumulated cash value exceeded the maximium
cash value that would have been accumulated if the tax net single pre-
mium had, at all times, reflected the reduced benefits actually provided
under the contract. Similarly, a contract subject to the guideline pre-
mium limitation was used in an overly investment-oriented fashion if the
premiums paid exceeded a hypothetical guideline premium limitation
computed with respect to the benefits actually provided under the con-
tract. If the cash value (or the premiums paid) exceeds these more re-
strictive hypothetical limitations, the contract has an excessive
investment component.34
6
Where the cash value (or premium payments) is excessive, it is neces-
sary to decide what sanctions are properly imposed. One possibility
would be to terminate the status of the policy as a life insurance contract.
If this were done, all interest income previously credited would be taxa-
ble to the policyholder at that time.3 47 In form, this approach is consis-
tent with the consequences of exceeding the limitations on a prospective
basis. Both the cash value accumulation test and the guideline premium
limitation, however, are intended to operate as in terrorem rules. To
avoid disqualification, life insurance companies can adopt safeguards that
prevent inadvertent violations of the limits and thereby assure that their
contracts remain in compliance on a prospective basis. 34
Disqualification of a policy is less appropriate if noncompliance with
the limitations is only determined in hindsight. Benefits are often re-
346 The cash value (or the premiums paid) is excessive if it exceeds the amount needed to
fund the actual benefits under the contract. This measure of investment orientation appears
most appropriate in light of the general limitations contained in § 7702. It is possible to devise
different measures of investment orientation. For example, one alternative measure focuses on
the extent to which insurance charges reduce the gross investment return under a policy.
Under this measure, a contract that experiences a reduction in benefits is not overly investment
oriented for periods prior to the reduction since the annual net investment return (i.e., the
interest credited reduced by the payment of the cost of current insurance protection) did not
exceed the annual net investment return on policies that provided a nondeclining pattern of
death benefits.
347 See IRC § 7702(g).
m4s See Comer, TEFRA's Conversion of Universal Life Into Flexible Premium Life Insur-
ance Contract, 3 J.L. & Com. 325, 339 (1983). To prevent inadvertant disqualification of
contracts subject to the cash value accumulation test, a company could incorporate into its
contracts a provision that automatically increases the death benefit whenever the contract
would otherwise violate the cash value limitation. Similarly, for contracts subject to the guide-
line premium limitation, the life insurance company could refuse to accept premiums in excess
of the guideline premium limitation. Alternatively, the company could incorporate a provision
into its contracts increasing the death benefit whenever a premium payment otherwise would
result in the violation of the guideline premium limitation.
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duced for reasons other than a desire to maximize the investment use of
life insurance. For example, a policyholder's financial condition may
change or family events may affect the policyholder's need for life insur-
ance. Terminating life insurance status in these changed circumstances
may be overkill.
Moreover, disqualification of a policy following certain reductions in
benefits would give inappropriate weight to formalistic differences. The
same insurance and investment benefits are obtainable either through the
ownership of several small contracts or a single large contract. The con-
sequences of reducing the benefits would differ, however, depending on
whether there was a single contract or multiple contracts in existence. In
the multiple contract situation, the policyholder could terminate some of
the separate contracts and thereby reduce the aggregate benefits pro-
vided. In this instance, the only amount includable in gross income is the
excess of the cash value of the terminated contracts over the premiums
paid for them.349 The interest credited under the terminated contracts
used to pay for the costs of current insurance protection, as well as all
interest credited under the nonterminated contracts, is not includable in
the policyholder's gross income.350 In comparison, if the reduction in
benefits under a single contract resulted in the disqualification of the con-
tract, the entire amount of interest credited under the policy is includable
in gross income.351
Although it is inappropriate to disqualify a contract following a reduc-
tion in benefits, remedial steps are justified. A reduction in benefits may
demonstrate that more cash was accumulated (and more investment in-
come was earned) than would have been accumulated (or earned) if the
contract specified the actual pattern of benefits. The failure to treat the
excess cash value as a taxable investment fund prior to the adjustment
was based on the mistaken premise that the entire cash value, and the
income generated therefrom, would pay for the future benefits under the
contract. When that premise is proven false, any arguable tax policy jus-
tification for permitting that entire fund to receive favorable tax treat-
ment ceases to exist. At that time, the economic benefits derived from
the mistaken assumptions should be eliminated, which can be accom-
plished in two remedial steps.
The first remedial step would mandate the distribution to the policy-
holder of amounts not needed to pay for the remaining future benefits.
Such a distribution would limit the remaining cash value (and, indirectly,
349 IRC § 72(e).
350 See notes 59-63 and the accompanying text. Alternatively, a policyholder could ex-
change an existing contract for a new contract that provides a smaller death benefit. Under
§ 1035, the amount includable in income is limited to the lesser of the boot received or the gain
realized on the exchange.
351 IRC § 7702(g).
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the tax favored investment income to be earned in the future) to the
amount needed to pay for the remaining benefits. This is accomplished
under the existing adjustment rules for contracts subject to the cash value
accumulation test.352 For these contracts, the excessive accumulation of
cash value is the excess of the cash value over the tax net single premium
for the remaining benefits. 353 Given the applicable actuarial assump-
tions,354 this amount is not needed to pay for future benefits. The ex-
isting adjustment rules require the distribution of this excess amount of
cash value to the policyholder.3
55
It is more difficult to determine the appropriate distribution for con-
tracts subject to the guideline premium limitation which, unlike the cash
value accumulation test, does not attempt to compare the cash value to
the amount currently needed to pay for the future contractual benefits. 356
Rather, the guideline premium limitation represents an estimate of the
premiums needed to create a fund sufficient to pay for the future benefits.
Most significantly, these estimates are computed when the contract is
issued, and are not adjusted to reflect actual experience under the con-
tract. In comparison, the tax net single premium constantly compares
the accumulated cash value to the estimated future benefit costs, and
thereby takes into account actual experience under the contract.
Because the guideline premiums do not reflect actual experience under
the contract, there are two reasons why the post-adjustment excessive
accumulation cannot be computed solely by reference to the premiums
paid. First, the timing of the premium payments may significantly im-
pact the accumulation of cash value under a policy,357 but is only a mi-
352 See notes 334-35 and the accompanying text (describing the required distribution for
contracts subject to the cash value accumulation test).
353 To the extent that further reductions in benefits scheduled to occur in subsequent years
are disregarded under § 7702(e)(1)(C), the tax net single premium is overstated. See notes 311-
12 and the accompanying text. In these circumstances, the excessive accumulation of cash
value exceeds the amount described in the text.
35 See IRC § 7702(b)(2).
355 See notes 334-35 and the accompanying text.
356 Although contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation must also comply with
the cash value corridor (IRC § 7702(a)(2)(B)), the cash value corridor does not measure the
amount needed to pay for the remaining benefits. See notes 167-69 and the accompanying text.
Rather, it operates as a backup to the guideline premium limitation, which is the primary
mechanism that limits the investment orientation of life insurance contracts. See Chiechi &
Adney, note 163, at 341.
357 Assume, for example, two separate contracts under both of which the guideline single
premium is $10,000 and the guideline level premium is S2,000. Under the first contract, a
S10,000 premium is paid on day 1. Because the guideline premium limitation for this contract
is $10,000 for the first five years, the policyholder cannot pay any additional premiums until
year 6. Under the second contract, a S2,000 premium is paid in year 1. An additional pre-
mium of $8,000 is paid at the end ofyear 5. Although the premiums paid are the same under
the two contracts, the cash value and the amount of interest credited to the first contract will
be substantially greater than the cash value and the interest credited to the second contract.
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nor factor in determining compliance with the guideline premium
limitation. Second, differences between the actuarial assumptions and
the actual experience under the contract do not affect the guideline pre-
miums. 358 These differences will affect contracts subject to the guideline
premium limitation only when the cash value is sufficiently large, relative
to the current death benefit, that the contract would not satisfy the re-
quirements of the cash value corridor.
359
It is impossible to determine on an a priori basis the overall net effect
of the uncertain timing of the premium payments and the differences be-
tween the actuarial assumptions and the experience under the contract.
It is likely that a contract's cash value would increase more rapidly than
it would if interest had been credited at the assumed rate, and the as-
sumed mortality and expense charges had been imposed. It is possible,
however, that differences between the actual pattern of premium pay-
ments and the patterns assumed in computing the guideline premiums
(i.e., a single premium and a schedule of level annual premiums) could
reduce the actual cash value to a level below the maximum assumed
levels.
To evaluate whether the distributions required to comply with the
guideline premium/cash value corridor test are appropriate, considera-
tion of these uncertain effects is necessary. As discussed above, the re-
quired distribution equals the excess of the premiums paid over the post-
adjustment guideline premium limitation.360 Whether this amount fairly
approximates the excessive cash value of the policy depends in large part
on the timing of both the premium payments and the adjustment. 36
The required distribution is likely to approximate the excessive cash
value if only a single premium was paid when the policy was issued and
the post-adjustment guideline premium limitation equals the post-adjust-
ment guideline single premium. 362 In many other situations, the exces-
358 The principal actuarial assumptions concern the rate of interest credited under the pol-
icy, the cost of insurance protection, and the expense charges. See notes 152-60 and the ac-
companying text. If interest is credited at rates in the range experienced during the latter part
of the 1970's and the 1980's, the rates of interest credited are likely to exceed the rates used in
computing the guideline premiums. Similarly, because the mortality and expense charges
specified in the contract are the maximum rates that can be charged, the actual charges will be
no greater than assumed and may be substantially less.
359 See IRC § 7702(a)(2)(B), (d).
360 See notes 338-42 and the accompanying text.
361 A distribution equal to the excess of the cash value over the tax net single premium for
the remaining benefits would closely approximate the excess cash value. If such a distribution
were required, it would become necessary to determine how the distribution would reduce the
premiums paid for purposes of establishing future compliance with the guideline premium
limitation.
362 The guideline single premium for the eliminated benefit reflects the attained age of the
insured. 1985 House Report, note 311, at 967; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989. As a
result, the adjustment-caused reduction in the guideline single premium reflects the assumed
rate of interest and charges for the period from the issuance of the policy to the date of the
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sive cash value will greatly exceed the required distribution. This will
occur frequently if the post-adjustment sum of the guideline level premi-
ums exceeds the post-adjustment guideline single premium.3 63 A reduc-
tion in benefits can affect the sum of the guideline level premiums in
either of two ways. First, the reduction may cause the post-adjustment
sum of the guideline level premiums to increase more slowly than it
would have increased in the absence of the adjustment.364 Second, the
post-adjustment sum of the guideline level premiums may decline in ab-
solute terms. 3
65
No post-adjustment distribution is required where the post-adjustment
sum of the guideline level premiums continues to increase, 366 and the
policy may retain any excessive cash value. Where the post-adjustment
sum 6f the guideline level premiums declines, it will do so slowly, over a
period of years. Consequently, distributions are required during that pe-
riod. The delayed distribution of the excessive cash value provides an
unwarranted benefit to the policyholder.
It can be concluded from this that the required distribution rules appli-
cable to contracts governed by the guideline premium test work imper-
fectly in many situations. Frequently, the distributions take place too
slowly. At worst, no distribution is required even where the cash value
of the contract exceeds the amount required to fund the future benefits.
An alternative to the existing required distribution rule could focus on
the hypothetical cash value that would exist if the actual pattern of bene-
fits provided under the contract were known when the policy was is-
sued.367 Under this alternative, the required distribution would equal the
excess of the actual cash value over this hypothetical amount.368 Use of
adjustment. Any difference between the required distribution and the excessive cash accumu-
lation is attributable to differences between actuarial assumptions and experience under the
contract.
363 The relative sizes of the guideline level premium and the guideline single premium de-
pend on the age of the insured at the time that the contract is issued. The longer the contract
remains in effect, the greater the likelihood that the sum of the guideline level premiums will
exceed the guideline single premium.
364 The sum of the guideline level premiums will increase if the original guideline level pre-
mium exceeds the guideline level premium computed for the eliminated benefits. See note 337.
In these circumstances, the guideline premium limitation increases each year following the
adjustment.
365 See note 337.
366 This conclusion assumes that following the adjustment the policy complies with the cash
value corridor.
367 Legislation would be needed to implement this alternative. Although the adjustment
rule enacted as part of the 1984 Act contained a broad grant of regulatory authority, this was
eliminated in the 1986 technical corrections to § 7702(f)(7). See 1985 House Report, note 311,
at 966-67; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 988.
368 This hypothetical cash value could be computed using either of two assumptions con-
cerning the timing and pattern of premium payments. The first assumption is that the maxi-
mum permissible amount of premiums were paid, or the maximum permissible cash value was
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this hypothetical set of facts would also determine whether compliance
with the post-adjustment guideline premium limitation has occurred.
The post-adjustment premiums paid could not exceed the amounts al-
lowable under the hypothetical guideline premium limitation.
3. Characterization of Distributions Required Following an Adjustment
Where a cash distribution to the policyholder is required following a
reduction in benefits, it is necessary to determine whether the distribution
is characterized as taxable gain in whole or in part, or as a tax-free return
of the policyholder's investment. Prior to the enactment of § 7702, the
Code contained different, and inconsistent, rules used to characterize the
receipt of cash in a transaction that does not involve the complete dispo-
sition of the policyholder's ownership rights with respect to the contract.
a. Alternative Characterization Rules
The first characterization rule applies to distributions under life insur-
ance contracts that were received other than "as an annuity." Under the
stacking rules generally applicable to life insurance contracts (other than
modified endowment contracts), distributions are treated first as a non-
taxable return of the premiums paid under the policy,369 in effect an "in-
come out last" characterization rule. Expressly included within the
scope of this provision were "amounts in the nature of dividends and
similar distributions, ' 370 and amounts paid on the surrender, redemp-
tion, or maturity of the contract. 371 The second method of taxing distri-
accumulated, and, consequently, the policyholder paid either a premium equal to the guideline
single premium or a premium sufficient to produce cash value equal to the tax net single pre-
mium. The investment return is based on rates of return and charges actually experienced
under the policy. Under the second set of assumptions, the investment return is based on the
cash value that would accumulate under the actual pattern of premium payments made under
the policy. To the extent that any premium payments would have caused the policy to violate
the guideline premium limitations, the premium payments are suspended. Any suspended pre-
mium payment is credited to the contract only if, and when, an increase in the applicable
limitation occurs that would allow the payment of additional premiums.
369 See notes 50-51 and the accompanying text. If any amount is paid under a life insur-
ance contract as an annuity, each payment is divided into taxable and nontaxable portions by
application of an exclusion ratio. See IRC § 72(b), (e)(5)(C). Under this procedure, a tax-
payer is treated as receiving her investment in the contract over the period that the annuity
payments are made. Prior to the 1986 Act, if the annuitant lived for a longer or shorter time
than her life expectancy, the total amount excluded from income would differ from the invest-
ment in contract. For taxpayers whose annuity starting dates are after December 31, 1986,
however, the amount excluded from gross income is limited to the taxpayer's investment in the
contract. 1986 Act § 1122(h)(2)(B). If annuity payments cease due to the death of the annui-
tant before the full amount invested in the contract is received, a deduction is allowed for the
unrecovered amount for the annuitant's last taxable year. IRC § 72(b)(3).
370 IRC § 72(e)(1), as in effect prior to amendment by TEFRA.
371 IRC § 72(e)(5)(C).
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butions applies to cash received incident to the exchange of one life
insurance contract for another. If, as part of this exchange, the policy-
holder only receives another life insurance contract, no gain is recog-
nized.372 If any property other than a like-kind contract is also received,
however, gain is recognized under the rules governing the receipt of boot
in like-kind exchanges. 373 Under these rules, the amount includable in
gross income is the lesser of the value of the nonlike-kind property re-
ceived or the total amount of gain realized on the exchange. 374 This is a
limited "income out first" method of taxation.
A third characterization rule would treat a distribution as income to
the extent of any excessive investment income earned prior to the reduc-
tion in benefits. Any additional distribution would be characterized as a
tax-free return of the policyholder's investment.
b. Statutory Characterization Rules
In fashioning a rule governing the receipt of cash incident to a reduc-
tion in benefits, it was possible to adopt any of the three alternative char-
acterization rules. In 1984, an "income out first" rule modeled after the
like-kind exchange provisions of § 1035 was enacted. 375 This rule treated
any reduction in future benefits as an exchange of the existing contract
for a new contract. 376 As a result, any cash that the policyholder re-
ceived was treated as boot and was taxed as ordinary income.3 "n
Critics challenged this rule as overly broad because it appeared to ap-
ply to any distribution paid upon surrender of paid-up additions, as a
policy loan, or as policyholder dividends.378 Given Congress' unwilling-
ness to change the stacking rules applicable to life insurance contracts
under § 72(e), this broad income out first rule was arguably
inappropriate. 3
79
372 IRC § 1035(a).
373 IRC §§ 1035(c)(1), 1031(b); see notes 57-58 and the accompanying text.
374 IRC § 1031(b); Reg. § 1.1031(b)-l. This characterization rule is similar to the stacking
rule applicable to distributions from annuity contracts. See IRC § 72(c)(1).
375 IRC § 7702 (f)(7)(B) (before amendment in 1986).
376 Id.
377 1983 House Report, note 4, at 149; 1984 Senate Report, note 4, at 578. The legislative
history indicates that § 7702(f)(7)(B) was intended to apply specifically to changes from a
"return of cash value" contract to a fixed death benefit contract even where the current death
benefit was not reduced. There is an indication, however, that this provision was not intended
to indirectly repeal the application of § 72(e) to life insurance contracts. See 1984 General
Explanation, note 80, at 654.
378 See Harman, Adney & McKeever, The Taxation of Life Insurance Companies and Their
Products-The Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986-Part H, 41 J. Am. Soc'y C.LU. 38, 38-39
(May 1987); Fitzgerald, Will Annuity Withdrawal Rules Be Applied to Life Insurance? 125
Tr. & Est. 35 (June 1986).
379 In 1983, the Treasury Department proposed extending the income out first stacking
rules to life insurance contracts. 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 38. This proposal was not included
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In response to this criticism, Congress enacted a new, more elaborate,
and much narrower rule governing lump sum distributions incident to an
adjustment.380 In general, a lump-sum payment is subject to the "income
out first" rule only where two conditions are satisfied.3 81 First, the ad-
justment must occur during the 15 year period beginning on the issue
date of the contract.382 Second, a cash distribution to the policyholder
must be required as a result of the reduction in benefits. 383 In addition,
where these conditions are satisfied, the full amount distributed to the
policyholder is not necessarily subject to the income out first rule, for the
maximum amount includable in income is limited to the recapture ceiling
applicable to the contract at the time of the adjustment.
384
The magnitude of the recapture ceiling depends on when the reduction
in benefits occurs. 385 In addition, for five years after the issuance of the
in the 1983 proposal of Representatives Stark and Moore concerning the tax treatment of life
insurance products. Id. at 498, 502-3.
380 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B)-(E).
381 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B). In addition to limiting the situations that are subject to
§ 7702(f)(7)(B), the 1986 Act also specifies that § 72 (other than subsection (e)(5)) applies to
the cash distribution. For contracts not eligible for the life insurance stacking rules of
§ 72(e)(5), a distribution is characterized according to an income out first rule. Under § 72,
the income is limited to the excess of the cash value of the policy over the investment in the
contract at that time. IRC § 72(e)(3). If the distribution were characterized under § 1035, a
larger portion could be treated as income because the fair market value of the policy may
exceed its cash value. See Rev. Rul. 54-264, 1954-2 C.B. 57.
Because all distributions from modified endowment contracts are subject to the income out
first distribution rules of § 72, § 7702(f)(7)(B) will not affect the taxation of adjustment caused
distributions from these contracts.
382 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B)(ii). The statute does not define the term "issue date of the con-
tract." Use of a literal definition of this term invites attempts to avoid the income characteri-
zation rule. For example, consider a contract issued in 1985. If the benefits are increased
tenfold in the year 2001, any subsequent distribution is not subject to the income out first rule
of § 7702(f)(7)(B). It is possible to interpret the phrase "issue date of the contract" as the date
that any substantial increase in benefits is made effective. The legislative history recognized
that making substantial changes to an existing contract may be tantamount to the issuance of a
new contract. See Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, Explanation of Technical Corrections
to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and Other Recent Tax Legislation 107 (Comm. Print 1987).
For this reason it indicated that in appropriate circumstances, a modified contract should be
treated as a new contract. Id.
383 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B)(iii).
394 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B). To illustrate, consider a contract in which the investment in the
contract is $700 and the contract's cash value is $1,000. If, as a result of a reduction in the
death benefit, $500 is distributed to the policyholder, the portion of this distribution subject to
the income out first rule is limited to the recapture ceiling. Thus, if the recapture ceiling is
$150, the policyholder includes that amount in gross income, with the remaining $350 treated
as a nontaxable return of premiums. Furthermore, if the recapture ceiling exceeds the income
in the contract, the amount included in gross income is limited to the lesser amount. Thus, if
the recapture ceiling is $350, the policyholder includes only $300 in gross income. IRC
§§ 72(e)(2)(B), 7702(f)(7)(B).
385 Different recapture ceilings apply for distributions made during the first five years that
the contract is in effect, (§ 7702(f)(7)(C)), and for distributions made after the contract has
been in effect for at least 5, but less than 15 years. IRC § 7702(f)(7)(D).
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contract, the recapture ceiling is computed differently for contracts sub-
ject to the cash value accumulation test than it is for contracts subject to
the guideline premium/cash value corridor test. For contracts subject to
the cash value accumulation test, the recapture ceiling is the minimum
cash distribution that is sufficient to bring the contract back into compli-
ance with that test (i.e., the excess of the cash value over the post-adjust-
ment tax net single premium).386 For contracts subject to the guideline
premium limitation test, the recapture ceiling is the greater of: (1) the
amount by which the total premiums paid prior to the adjustment ex-
ceeds the post-adjustment guideline premium limit; and (2) the amount
by which the cash value of the policy exceeds the maximum amount of
cash permitted after the adjustment under the cash value corridor.
387
During years 5 through 15, for all contracts the recapture ceiling is
simply the excess of the cash value over the maximum amount of cash
permitted after the adjustment under the cash value corridor. 388 Thus,
for contracts subject to the cash value accumulation test, the recapture
ceiling may be zero even where the cash value exceeds the tax net single
premium for the remaining benefits.
The statute also contains an anti-abuse rule designed to catch taxpay-
ers who withdraw cash before benefits under the contract are reduced.
38 9
A distribution made in anticipation of a reduction in future benefits is
treated as if made as a result of the subsequent reduction in the future
benefits under the contract. 390 For this purpose, any distribution occur-
ring within the two-year period prior to the reduction in benefits is pre-
sumed made in anticipation of the reduction in benefits.
39t
. Tax Policy Analysis of Characterization Rules
The revised characterization rules applicable to cash distributed inci-
dent to a reduction in benefits incorporates three distinct allocation rules
which correspond to the three models of taxing distributions discussed
above: (1) income out first, (2) income out last, and (3) a hybrid alloca-
tion. In evaluating these allocation rules, the justification for using each
of the three models in the context of an adjustment will be discussed.
(1) The First Five Years: Income Out First: During the first five years
following issuance of a policy, distributions required to assure post-ad-
justment compliance with the applicable limitation are subject to an in-
386 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(C)i).
387 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(C)(ii).
381 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(D).
389 See 1985 House Report, note 311, at 968; 1986 Senate Report, note 230, at 989.
390 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(E).
391 Id.
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come out first rule.392 Because the required distributions under the two
tests may differ, the amount included in gross income depends on the test
that governs the contract in question.
393
Although this characterization rule is inconsistent with the ordering
rule that has historically applied to distributions from life insurance con-
tracts,3 94 it can be defended on several grounds. As discussed above in
connection with the tax policy analysis of the stacking rules, it is argua-
ble that all distributions received under a life insurance policy should be
subject to an income out first rule. 395 Additional support is needed, how-
ever, to demonstrate that this rule should apply to cash received incident
to an adjustment, notwithstanding the fact that the traditional income
out last ordering rule is retained for other distributions.
396
Additional support for the use of the income out first rule for adjust-
ment caused distributions is found in the conceptual underpinnnings of
the limitations contained in § 7702. The tax net single premium and the
guideline premiums establish the maximum degree of investment orienta-
tion for a contract treated as life insurance for tax purposes. These limi-
tations are computed on the assumption that future benefits will not
change. 397 Use of these prospectively computed limitations may have al-
lowed the policyholder to accumulate cash value, or pay premiums, in
excess of the amounts needed to establish a sufficient fund to pay for the
actual benefits provided under the contract. Similarly, the investment
return attributable to any unneeded cash value (or unneeded premiums)
is not necessary to provide the actual benefits under the contract.
The generation of such unneeded investment income is inconsistent
with the purpose of the overall limitations. Under both the cash value
accumulation test and the guideline premium limitation, the maximum
permissible investment return is limited to the amount needed to pay for
the contractual benefits.398 It is appropriate to treat any investment in-
come earned in excess of these amounts as if it is derived from an invest-
ment other than a life insurance contract. 399 In computational terms,
392 See notes 385-87 and the accompanying text (discussing the application of
§ 7702(f)(7)B) during the contract's first 5 years).
393 See notes 334-42 and the accompanying text (describing the adjustments required under
each test).
394 See notes 50-51 and the accompanying text.
395 See notes 229-33 and the accompanying text.
396 The criticism of the original income out first rule of § 7702(f)(7)(B) was based, in large
part, on the inconsistency between the rules governing distributions generally and the rules
applicable to adjustments. See notes 378-79.
397 See IRC § 7702(e)(1)(C), discussed in notes 309-12 and the accompanying text.
398 See notes 90-92 and 145-49 and the accompanying text.
399 Even if this amount were included in gross income when the reduction in benefits occurs,
the policyholder still has enjoyed the benefit resulting from deferral of the payment of tax on
the excessive investment income. If any excessive investment income were subject to a surtax
reflecting the value of the deferral, this economic benefit would be reduced or eliminated. In
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the excess investment income is the excess of the actual investment in-
come earned over the hypothetical amount that would have been earned
under the policy if the tax net single premiums (or the guideline premi-
ums) had been computed with reference to the actual pattern and levels
of benefits provided under the contract.
4°°
Measured against this standard, the "income out first" rule applicable
during the first five years appears severe because, in many instances, the
dollar amount distributed will exceed the excessive investment income.
4° 1
This severity, however, is more apparent than real. The full amount sub-
ject to the income out first rule is not necessarily included in gross in-
come. Rather, the portion includable in gross income is limited to the
amount "allocable to income on the contract" under § 72,402 which, for
this purpose, is the excess of the predistribution cash value over the poli-
cyholder's unrecovered basis in the contract.
4 3
Limiting the amount includable in gross income to the excess of the
policy's cash value over its basis is likely to cause the taxable amount to
understate the interest credited under the contract. In computing the
amount allocable to income, the interest actually credited is offset by the
amounts charged as commissions and for current insurance protec-
other situations, a penalty is imposed in lieu of the actual value of deferral. See IRC
§ 72(o)(2), (q), (t), (v). Investment income determined to be excessive at the time that an
adjustment occurs should be subject to a comparable penalty.
4m If additional cash value is allowed due to the assumption that the death benefits would
not decline, the amount of current insurance protection provided under the contract declines.
As a result, the mortality charges under the policy also decline. Because the mortality charges
are reduced, the additional return attributable to the accumulation of the additional cash value
exceeds the nominal rate of interest credited.
401 The relative magnitudes of the excessive investment income and the required distribu-
tion depends on many variables, including: (1) the age of the insured, (2) timing of the pre-
mium payments, (3) the rate of interest credited, and (4) the level of expense and mortality
charges actually imposed under the contract compared to the charges assumed in computing
the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums.
The relationship between the excessive investment return and the required distribution is
illustrated through consideration of the contract discussed in note 316, which provided an
initial death benefit of $100,000 for a 35-year-old individual. Under the cash value accumula-
tion test, the maximum initial cash value is $27,074. Four years later, the maximum permitted
cash value is $30,826. If the contract's death benefit is reduced at that time to $60,000, the
maximum permitted cash value declines to $18,496. If the contract's cash value is equal to the
pre-adjustment maximum, then a distribution of $12,330 (i.e., $30,826 - S18,496) is required
to remain in compliance with the cash value acculumulation test.
If the initial tax net single premium had been based upon the actual pattern of future bene-
fits, the maximum initial cash value would have been limited to $16,732. Consequently, the
use of a nondeclining pattern of benefits in computing the tax net single premiums allows the
policyholder to generate an extra $10,342 in cash value at age 35 ($27,072 - $16,732). It is
likely that the investment return credited on this amount over a 4-year period is significantly
less than the $12,330 that is subject to the income out first rule.
402 IRC § 72(e)(2)(B)(i). Section 72 (other than subsection (e)(5)) applies to the portion of
any distribution incident to a reduction in benefits that satisfies the conditions of
§ 7702(f)(7)(B).
403 See IRC § 72(e)(3), (6).
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tion.4°4 The combined effect of these offsets is to reduce greatly, if not to
eliminate, the portion of an adjustment caused distribution that is includ-
able in gross income.4 -5
At best, the amount includable in income following an adjustment dur-
ing the first five years crudely estimates the excessive investment income
earned under the contract; the only way it Will fairly approximate the
excessive investment income is by the random offsetting of multiple er-
rors. In many instances, income will be significantly understated. Given
the justification for requiring that the entire amount of excessive invest-
ment income be included in gross income, the rationale for the existing
rule is unclear. A more sensible provision would focus more directly on
the excessive investment income earned under the contract, and would
require that this amount be included in gross income.
4°6
(2) Years Five to Fifteen: A Hybrid Approach: For policies that have
been in effect for between 5 and 15 years, a different characterization rule
applies to distributions required following a reduction in benefits. Again,
a portion of the distribution is characterized according to an income out
first rule. The maximum amount subject to this rule (the recapture ceil-
ing) is the excess of the pre-adjustment cash value over the maximum
post-adjustment cash value that is permitted without violating the cash
value corridor. 40 7 Although compliance with the cash value corridor is
only required for contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation,
404 See notes 59-63 and the accompanying text (discussing the understatement of income
under the § 72(e) withdrawal rules).
405 This effect is illustrated using the example discussed in note 401. In this example, the
policyholder accumulated excessive cash value of $10,342 at age 35. As a result of the reduc-
tion in the death benefit that occurred in year 4, a distribution of $12,330 was required. If a
commission (or other expense charge) equal to 10% of the premium had been charged, the
amount includable in income would be reduced to $739. This represents an annual rate of
return of less than 2% of the excessive cash value.
Under certain conditions, the amount includable in gross income may exceed the interest
allocable to excessive accumulations of cash value. This may occur where the increase in the
cash value reflects higher rates of interest credited, and lower charges imposed, under the
policy than are assumed in computing the tax net single premium and the guideline premiums.
406 An adjustment rule requiring that the excessive investment income be included in gross
income could impose substantial administrative burdens. Two factors tend to limit the burden
of this computation. First, the adjustment rules only apply to contracts issued after December
31, 1984. Second, computations would only be required in connection with contracts having a
substantial pre-adjustment cash value relative to the post-adjustment death benefit. For such
contracts, precise computations would be required. The availability of detailed computerized
records would also help.
407 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(D). The cash value corridor is defined in terms of the death benefit
and cash surrender value of the contract. IRC § 7702(d); notes 162-68 and the accompanying
text. For purposes of § 7702(f)(7)(D), the death benefit is limited to the amount payable on
the death of the primary insured. Although term insurance for family members is a qualified
additional benefit (§ 7702(f)(5)(iii)), only the charges for qualified additional benefits are
treated as future benefits under the contract. IRC § 7702(f)(5)(B). As a result the death bene-
fit payable under the family term coverage is not treated as a death benefit for purposes of the
cash value corridor. See IRC § 7702(f)(3), (4).
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this recapture ceiling also applies to contracts subject to the cash value
accumulation test. In almost all instances, the required distribution will
exceed this recapture ceiling. 408 Consequently, except in rare circum-
stances, the portion of an adjustment-caused distribution subject to the
income out first rule equals the lesser of the recapture ceiling and the
income on the contract.40 9
As with the income out first rule applicable during the first five years, a
proper evaluation of this rule compares the amount included in gross
income to the excessive investment income earned under the contract.410
The relative magnitude of these amounts depends on the interaction of
numerous factors,411 which makes it impossible to draw absolute conclu-
sions. Three general observations are, nonetheless, possible.
Observation 1: As was true with respect to adjustments taking place
during the first five years, the amount includable in gross income cannot
exceed the amount allocable to income on the contract during years 5
through 15. Again, the amount allocable to income on the contract un-
derstates the amount of interest credited under the policy. 412 As before,
this understatement occurs because the interest credited is offset by the
aggregate charges for commissions and current insurance protection.
The disparity between the interest credited and the amount allocable
to income increases over time because charges for current insurance pro-
tection are imposed every year. It is unclear, however, how the disparity
between the amount allocable to income and the excessive investment
income earned will change over time. The amount allocable to income is
408 Under § 7702(f)(7)(B), if the required distribution is less than the recapture ceiling, the
full amount of the distribution is subject to the income out first rule. In most situations, how-
ever, only a portion of the required distribution will be subject to the characterization rule.
For contracts governed by the cash value accumulation test, the required distribution equals
the excess of the cash value over the tax net single premimum for the remaining benefits. See
notes 334-35 and the accompanying text. For a given death benefit, the cash value allowed
under the cash value corridor generally exceeds the tax net single premium. See note 168 and
the accompanying text. The tax net single premium exceeds this cash value only where sub-
stantial qualified additional benefits are provided under the contract. These qualified addi-
tional benefits affect the tax net single premium, but do not affect the cash value corridor.
Consequently, the required distribution will exceed the recapture ceiling unless substantial
qualified additional benefits are provided for in the contract.
For contracts governed by the guideline premium limitation, the adjustment-caused re-
quired distribution is the greater of: (1) the amount by which the total premiums paid prior to
the adjustment exceed the post-adjustment guideline premium limit; and (2) the amount by
which the policy's cash value exceeds the maximum amount of cash permitted after the adjust-
ment under the cash value corridor. Because the required distribution is the greater of two
amounts, one of which is the recapture ceiling, for contracts in effect for between 5 and 15
years, the required distribution is never less than the recapture ceiling.
4m9 See notes 401-403 and the accompanying text.
410 See notes 397-400 and the accompanying text.
411 See note 401 (discussing the magnitude of excessive investment income during the fast
five years that a policy is in effect).
412 See notes 404-405 and the accompanying text.
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depressed during the initial years to the extent that the cash surrender
value is reduced to reflect the substantial first year commissions. 413 In
subsequent years, the amount allocable to income will increase by a
larger proportion of the interest credited. Whether the amount allocable
to income will overstate or understate the excessive investment income
earned under the contract is determinable only on a case-by-case
analysis.
4 14
Observation 2: The recapture ceiling applicable during the fifth
through the fifteenth years provides a cushion that may cause the amount
includable in gross income to understate the excessive investment in-
come. Consider, for example, a contract insuring the life of an individual
45 years of age for $100,000. The tax net single premium is slightly more
than $37,000.4 15 Even if the death benefit were reduced to $80,000, the
recapture ceiling would be zero,416 ensuring that no portion of any re-
quired distribution, including excessive investment income credited,
would be subject to the income out first rule. Where the death benefit is
reduced more substantially, the recapture ceiling is greater than zero.
The relative sizes of the recapture ceiling resulting from such a substan-
tial reduction in death benefits and the excessive investment income is
not determinable on an a priori basis.
Taxpayers seeking untaxed investment income can avoid application of
the income out first rule if they take maximum advantage of the cushion
incorporated in the recapture ceiling. If the post-adjustment death bene-
fit equals the cash value of the contract multiplied by the applicable per-
centage specified under the cash value corridor, 417 the recapture ceiling is
zero. The entire required distribution is treated as nontaxable return of
413 See K. Black and H. Skipper, note 8, at 527 (first year commissions constitute at least
50% of the premium on a level annual premium policy; subsequent commissions are much
smaller).
414 In the example discussed in note 401, the tax net single premium of $27,074 was com-
puted on the assumption that the death benefit would not decline. If the tax net single pre-
mium had been based on the assumption that the death benefit is reduced after 10 years to
$60,000, the maximum initial cash value would have been $17,447. Use of the nondeclining
pattern of death benefits in computing the tax net single premium permits an extra $9,627 of
cash value when the contract is issued.
Assuming that interest is credited at a 4% rate, over 10 years the extra cash value earns
$4,623 of interest. In this case, the amount allocable to income equals $10,132, which is the
excess of: (1) the contract's cash value (which, at the end of 10 years, will equal $37,206) over
(2) total premiums paid ($27,074). Of course, if the premiums paid included loading charges
not reflected in the initial cash value, § 72(e) reduces this amount accordingly.
415 The exact figure is $37,206. This calculation is computed using a 4% assumed rate of
interest and mortality charges equal to the amounts specified in the 1958 Commissioners' Stan-
dard Ordinary mortality table. No qualified additional benefits are provided under the
contract.
416 A contract will satisfy the requirements of the cash value corridor when the insured is 45
years of age if the death benefit is at least 215% of the cash value. See IRC § 7702(d).
417 See IRC § 7702(d)(2).
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capital, notwithstanding the presence of substantial excessive investment
income.
Observation 3: Flaws in the rules governing the required distributions
for certain contracts subject to the guideline premium limitation may
cause the amount includable in income to understate the excessive invest-
ment income earned in the contract.418 No post-adjustment distribution
is required where the post-adjustment sum of the guideline level premi-
ums continues to increase.419 Even where the post-adjustment sum of
the guideline level premiums declines, the required distributions are
made over a period of years.
The amount includable in gross income due to the reduction in benefits
cannot exceed the required distribution. Unless a distribution is re-
quired, the policyholder need not include any amount in gross income.
420
This may occur even where excessive investment income is earned under
the contract. If distributions are required, the inclusion in gross income
occurs only as the distributions take place. The delayed inclusion in gross
income of the excessive investment income provides an unwarranted ben-
efit to the policyholder.
In conclusion, the income out first characterization rule applicable
during years 5 through 15 is seriously flawed. As was true with respect
to the earlier years, the flaws are subtle. As a result of the interplay of
the statutory provisions, the amount subject to the income out first rule is
often significantly less than the excessive investment income earned
under the contract. For all contracts, the cushion incorporated into the
recapture ceiling effectively negates the income out first rule even when
the death benefits are significantly reduced. In addition, for contracts
subject to the guideline premium test, the method used to compute the
required distribution further limits the scope of the income out first rule.
(3) The Golden Years-Distributions After Year Fifteen: Income Out
Last: For policies that are in effect for more than 15 years, the traditional
"income out last" characterization rule applies to distributions required
as a result of a reduction in benefits.421 Under this approach, all distribu-
tions are treated as a tax-free return of basis until the policyholder re-
418 See notes 364-66 and the accompanying text.
419 Id. This conclusion assumes that the policy complies with the cash value corridor fol-
lowing the adjustment. No post-adjustment distribution may be required during the first 5
years if the guideline single premium less than 5 times as large as the guideline level premium.
See IRC § 7702(c). These conditions are satisfied primarily when the policy is issued to a
relatively elderly individual. See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 314-15.
420 IRC § 7702(f)(7)(B).
421 Section 7702(f)(7)(B) applies only to changes occuring during the 15 year period begin-
ning on the issue date of the contract. IRC § 7702(f)C7)(B)(ii). As a result, § 72(e)(5) applies
to distributions received under a policy after the 15-year period expires. In general, the distri-
bution is treated first as a tax-free return of premiums paid under the contract. See note 50.
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ceives an amount equal to the premiums paid in connection with the
contract.4
22
The retention of the income out last rule for contracts in their golden
years is difficult to justify on a tax policy basis. The longer the period
that a life insurance contract remains in force, the greater is the excessive
investment income earned. Admittedly, difficulties exist in distinguish-
ing the excessive investment income from the unneeded premium pay-
ments. This difficulty, however, does not justify subjecting all
distributions to an income out last rule after 15 years. The same diffi-
culty exists during the prior periods. In addition, as the amount of exces-
sive investment income increases, the likelihood of mischaracterization of
a distribution should decrease.
One possible rationale for the golden years rule is that it is easily ad-
ministered and applies to situations in which the likelihood of abuse is
remote. This justification would be premised on the assertion that any
adjustment occuring after 15 years would have a minor effect on the
guideline premiums and the tax net single premiums in the earlier years.
In other words, 15 years is asserted to be beyond the planning horizon of
abuse minded taxpayers. This assertion does not withstand critical
analysis.
It is an actuarial truism that temporally distant events have a much
smaller effect on present values than events occurring in the near fu-
ture.4 23 This truism, however, does not prove that adjustments occuring
after 15 years would have an insignificant effect on the tax net single
premiums and the guideline premiums. The magnitude of these items
will depend on the interaction of numerous variables.424 The significance
of adjustments occurring after 15 years is illustrated through considera-
tion of a contract issued to a 35-year-old individual with a $100,000 ini-
tial death benefit. The initial tax net single premium for this contract is
approximately $27,000.425 In comparison, the initial tax net single pre-
mium would be approxinately $18,100 if the tax net single premium had
reflected a reduction in the death benefit to $60,000 occurring after 15
years. The effect of the year 15 reduction in the death benefit on the tax
net single premium cannot be dismissed as insubstantial. In fact, the tax
net single premium for the actual pattern of death benefits is much closer
422 IRC § 72(e)(5).
423 See K. Black & H. Skipper, note 8, at 325-27.
424 The most significant factors in these calculations are the age of the insured, the amount
of current insurance protection, the charges imposed for the insurance protection at different
ages, and the rate of interest assumed in the computations. The 15-year period tends to reduce
the effect of any adjustment on the tax net single premiums and the guideline premiums. This
effect is offset, if not eliminated, as a result of the higher amounts charged for insurance protec-
tion at older ages.
425 See note 401.
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to the tax net single premium for a contract with a $60,000 death benefit
than it is to a $100,000 death benefit.
426
If a contract's permissible cash value increases as a result of the as-
sumption that the death benefits would not decline, the minimum
amount of current insurance protection provided under the contract de-
clines. As a result, mortality charges under the contract also decline.
Because the mortality charges are reduced, the additional return attribu-
table to the accumulation of the additional cash value exceeds the nomi-
nal rate of interest credited.
4. Adjustment Rules: Conclusions
The adjustment rules are intended to perform two important func-
tions: (1) to allow a degree of flexibility to be built into all policies, and
(2) to assure that undue tax benefits are not realized as a result of the
existence of high benefits in effect on the issuance date of the contract.
While these rules perform adequately in accommodating increases in
benefits under both the cash value accumulation test and the guideline
premium/cash value corridor test, they deal poorly with reductions in
benefits.
A reduction in benefits may indicate that unneeded cash value was
allowed to accumulate under the contract, and that excessive investment
income was earned. The provisions determining the size of required dis-
tributions apply in an uneven manner. For contracts subject to the cash
value accumulation test, the required distribution may fairly approxi-
mate the excess accumulation permitted to build up under the contract,
but for those subject to the guideline premium/cash value corridor test,
the required distribution is very likely to understate the excessive
accumulation.
The provisions governing characterization of the required distribution
are more seriously flawed. These characterization rules appear to tax
adjustment-caused distributions on an income out first basis. Notwith-
standing the appearances, excessive investment income is received in
many instances as a tax-free return of basis. In addition, where the con-
tract has been in effect for more than 15 years, no pretense is made of
applying an income out first characterization rule.
The flaws contained in the adjustment rules create an ineffective deter-
rent against strategies designed to inflate the tax net single premium (or
the guideline premiums) during the initial years of a contract. For exam-
426 The tax net single premium for an otherwise identical policy with a $60,000 death benefit
is $16,244. A similar relationship exists for the guideline single premiums: The guideline single
premium is $15,916 if the death benefit is $100,000. It is only $9,550, however, for a policy
with a $60,000 death benefit, and $11,145 for a policy with a S100,000 death benefit that is
reduced to $60,000 after 15 years.
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ple, the addition of qualified additional benefits (such as family term cov-
erage) to a contract causes the tax net single premium (and the guideline
premium) to increase. Similarly, using a return of cash value policy de-
sign causes the guideline level premium to increase.427 The policyholder
could eliminate these qualified additional benefits (or change to a level
death benefit policy design) at a time when, under the adjustment rules,
no amount would be included in the taxpayer's income. As is evident,
the adjustment rules invite, rather than discourage, creative strategies
that inflate the investment orientation of a life insurance contract.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
A. Conclusions Concerning Existing Law
Section 7702 represents a codification of existing practices, rather than
a systematic overhaul of the tax treatment of cash value life insurance.
Under § 7702, only contracts with insufficient insurance features are
treated as taxable investments. If a life insurance contract satisfies the
statutory definition of life insurance contained in § 7702, its owner enjoys
several tax benefits. Most significantly, the investment income credited
to the contract is not taxed currently and may never be taxed. Because a
life insurance company can deduct the amounts credited to its policy-
holders, this investment income entirely escapes taxation.
No convincing justification exists for taxing life insurance investments
more favorably than other financial investments. Supporters of the cur-
rent preferential tax treatment argue that it encourages the provision of
insurance protection and savings for retirement. A critical analysis dem-
onstrates that the existing tax provisions do not advance these policy
goals in a rational manner.
The tax treatment of life insurance creates an irrational set of incen-
tives to encourage taxpayers to provide increased insurance protection.
First, the tax benefits provided are inversely related to a taxpayer's insur-
ance needs. Paradoxically, the greatest tax benefits accrue to wealthy
taxpayers who purchase substantial single premium contracts, whereas
no benefit is made available to those with much greater insurance
needs.428 Second, and more significantly, the current tax provisions per-
versely encourage taxpayers to reduce their insurance protection. A tax-
payer who switches from term to cash value life insurance generally
decreases the amount of insurance protection.4 29 Similarly, a first-time
purchaser of life insurance obtains a modest amount of insurance protec-
427 See IRC § 7702(e)(2)(A); notes 292-98 and the accompanying text.
428 See notes 197-200 and the accompanying text.
429 See note 196 and the accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 43:
tion in the form of cash value life insurance, rather than a larger amount
of term insurance coverage. Thus, any shift in taxpayer behavior in re-
sponse to the tax incentives frustrates, rather than advances, the goal of
increased insurance protection.
Use of cash value life insurance as a source of post-retirement income
does not justify special tax treatment. A life insurance contract's cash
value does not differ materially from many forms of taxable savings. Un-
like qualified pension plans, IRAs, and deferred annuities, cash value life
insurance is not subject to any qualification requirements and limitations
on contributions.430 Moreover, the tax treatment of pre-retirement dis-
tributions from the other investment vehicles, including the imposition of
early withdrawal penalties, demonstrates that any arguable justification
for preferential tax treatment terminates when cash is received. 431 Prere-
tirement distributions from life insurance contracts (other than modified
endowment contracts) are not presumptively taxable.
Notwithstanding the lack of tax policy justification, the enactment of
§ 7702 was premised on retaining preferential tax treatment for life in-
surance investments. Congress recognized, however, that limitations on
investment orientation are needed. In general terms, § 7702 establishes a
maximum permissible degree of investment orientation that is equivalent
to that existing under a single premium contract. Much of the extraordi-
nary complexity of § 7702 results from attempts to prevent life insurers
from using actuarial techniques to increase investment orientation be-
yond that allowed under the single premium contract design.
The explicit statutory restrictions contained in § 7702 on the choice of
actuarial assumptions are quite lenient, in the case of the interest rate
assumptions, and, following the enactment of the Technical Corrections
Act of 1988, are somewhat vague in the case of the assumed levels of
mortality and expense charges.432 Use of inappropriate assumptions may
reduce the insurance component of a life insurance contract, contrary to
the intent of § 7702.
Effective adjustment rules are also needed to prevent taxpayers from
avoiding § 7702's implicit limitations on investment orientation. Both
the cash value accumulation test and the guideline premium limitation
are computed prospectively with reference to the contract's specified fu-
ture benefits. A contract that overstates the benefits may accumulate ex-
43o The qualification requirements and restrictions applicable to qualified plans, IRAs, and
deferred annuities are discussed in notes 201-13 and the accompanying text.
431 See notes 230-33 and the accompanying text.
432 Until regulations are issued, actuarial assumptions concerning mortality charges must be
both "reasonable" and not materially different from the charges expected to be imposed. 1988
Technical Corrections Act § 5011(a), (c)(2). In applying similar restrictions to the assump-
tions concerning expense charges, the company's experience is used to determine if the charges
are reasonably expected to be paid. IRC § 7702(c)((13B)(ii).
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cessive cash value, thereby allowing the policyholder to earn excessive
untaxed investment income.
Well-designed adjustment rules would eliminate any unjustified tax
benefits. An adjustment occurs when contractual benefits are
changed. 433 When a benefit is eliminated, the adjustment rules contained
in § 7702 may compel a cash distribution to the policyholder. Moreover,
§ 7702 characterizes certain distributions required incident to an adjust-
ment first as income, rather than as a nontaxable return of basis. Unfor-
tunately, these adjustment rules work poorly. Particularly for contracts
subject to the guideline premium limitation, the required distribution
often understates the excessive cash value accumulated. In addition,
many well advised policyholders can avoid the application of income out
first stacking rules. Only the unwary will get caught.
B. Recommendations for Legislative Change
In the absence of any convincing policy justification for special treat-
ment, the investment income credited to cash value life insurance con-
tracts should be taxed currently. It is unlikely that Congress would find
such a sweeping reform acceptable because the preferential tax treatment
of cash value life insurance is based more on politics than on tax policy
analysis.434 Even if preferential treatment of life insurance remains sac-
rosanct, two sets of lesser reforms deserve consideration.
1. Reform of Predeath Distributions
The first set of reforms would alter the taxation of predeath distribu-
tions from life insurance contracts in the following manner: (1) Policy-
holders would include predeath distributions in gross income to the
extent that the predistribution cash value exceeds the taxpayer's unrecov-
ered investment; (2) policy loans would be treated as a predeath distribu-
tion for these purposes; and (3) amounts included in income as a result of
this rule would be subject to an penalty tax comparable to that imposed
on premature withdrawals from IRAs, pension plans, deferred annuities,
and modified endowment contracts.
The appropriateness of the suggested changes is illustrated by consid-
ering a taxpayer who pays $10,000 to purchase a life insurance contract.
Investment income credited both pays for the cost of insurance protec-
tion provided and increases the contract's cash value to $11,000. Finally,
the taxpayer withdraws $1,000 from the contract, thereby reducing the
433 The events treated as adjustments are discussed in notes 318-27, 334-42 and the accom-
panying text.
434 See Hilder & Murrey, Life Insurers Battle "Inside Buildup" Plank of Reagan's Tax
Plan," Wall St. J., June 17, 1985, at 1.
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cash value to $10,000. How should the Code characterize this predeath
distribution? Because the predistribution cash value exceeds the tax-
payer's unrecovered investment,435 gross income should include the full
amount received. The $1,000 withdrawn clearly satisfies the general re-
quirements for including an item in gross income: The increase in the
contract's cash value represents an undeniable accession to wealth which,
when distributed to the policyholder, is clearly realized and over which
the taxpayer has complete dominion.436 Moreover, the ability to receive
predeath distributions on a tax-free basis may encourage policyholders to
use life insurance investments for purposes unrelated to the societal goals
that justified the preferential tax treatment.
437
Taxing distributions on the suggested income out first basis is subject
to two tax policy criticisms. First, some have claimed that taxpayers will
not purchase cash value life insurance unless they could withdraw their
investment without tax consequences. 438 This purported disincentive has
not proved compelling in connection with other tax preferred invest-
ments: Congress revised the preretirement distribution rules applicable to
annuities in 1982,439 and, in 1986, Congress modified the taxation of
preretirement distributions from IRAs and qualified pension plans." 0
Similarly, concerns about marketability of cash value life insurance do
not justify retaining basis recovery first distribution rules.
Second, it is arguable that a pro rata allocation rule, such as applies to
distributions from pension contracts, is preferable to an income out first
rule. The pro rata allocation rule represents the balance struck by Con-
gress between two competing concerns: (1) that pension plan and IRA
assets remain invested until retirement, and (2) that taxpayers be en-
435 One measure of the total increase in the taxpayer's net worth is the excess of the cash
value over the taxpayer's investment in the contract. It is arguable that this amount should be
increased to reflect the interest credited that was offset against the mortality and loading
charges in the computing the cash value. See notes 59-62 and the accompanying text. Increas-
ing the taxable gain by the amount of investment income applied for these purposes is some-
what inconsistent with the social policy goal of encouraging the provision of insurance
protection.
436 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
437 See 1986 General Explanation, note 203, at 721 (discussing the reasons for modifying the
treatment of preretirement distributions from qualified pension plans).
438 See 1983 Hearings, note 39, at 259-60 (statement of Mutual Companies Executive Com-
mittee), 523 (statement of Asst. Secretary Chapoton).
439 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-248, § 265(a), 96 Stat.
324, 546 (codified as IRC § 72(e)(2)-(3)). Prior to this change, all amounts received under an
annuity contract were treated first as a tax-free return of basis. Preretirement distributions
from annuity contracts are now included in income to the extent that the contract's cash value
exceeds the policyholder's investment in the contract.
440 IRC § 72(e)(8). The portion of the distribution from a qualified pension plan or an IRA
treated as a tax-free return of capital is determined by multiplying the amount received by the
ratio of the participant's basis to the participant's account balance. The remainder is included
in the participant's gross income. Id.
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couraged to participate in these retirement income programs.441 Given
the weak basis for preferential treatment, and the presence of nondis-
crimination rules designed to expand the coverage of pension plans, a
different balance should be struck in connection with cash value life
insurance.
For purposes of the proposed predeath distribution rules, a loan
should be treated in the same manner as other distributions. Increas-
ingly, Congress has characterized loans secured by tax favored invest-
ments as taxable distributions rather than as loans.442 Traditionally, the
receipt of loan proceeds is not taxable because the borrower's obligation
to pay interest and repay the principal offsets the receipt of cash.443
Loans secured by tax preferred financial assets, however, are properly
distinguishable from borrowing secured by property if one examines the
entire series of transactions, beginning with the purchase of the tax pre-
ferred asset and ending with the loan. The rationale for not taxing in-
come credited to the tax preferred asset when it is earned is that the
investment represents additional net savings set aside for purposes that
Congress deems worthy. If a taxpayer obtains a loan linked to a tax
preferred asset, no net additional savings have taken place. Without ad-
ditional savings, there is no justification for not taxing the investment
income credited. Consequently, the tax benefits previously enjoyed
should be recaptured.
441 See Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 851, 892-93 (1987).
A pro rata allocation also applies to amounts received in connection with installment sales
of property. See IRC § 453. The installment sales provisions respond to concerns about sub-
jecting a seller of property to a tax that exceeds the cash received at the time of the sale. Such
liquidity concerns do not apply to distributions from a life insurance contract because only the
amount received is included in gross income. Moreover, for many sellers of property the pro
rata allocation permitted under the installment method does not apply to the entire sales pro-
ceeds. A taxpayer who reports income from the sale of property on the installment method
must recognize all recapture income in the year of sale. IRC § 453(i). In addition, an interest
charge is imposed on the deferred tax liability for certain property sales. IRC § 453A.
442 Loans from (or secured by) nonqualified deferred annuities or IRAs are treated as taxa-
ble distributions. IRC §§ 72(e)(4)(A), 408(e)(3)-(4). See also IRC § 453A(d). A more com-
plex statutory provision applies to loans from qualified pension plans. Although pension loans
are generally treated as distributions, § 72(p) respects the loan form if the terms of the loan
require level amortization over a period that, in most instances, cannot exceed 5 years. IRC
§ 72(p)(2)(B) and (C). Even if these conditions are satisfied, loans are treated as distributions
to the extent that the cumulative amounts borrowed exceed certain specified limits. IRC
§ 72(p)(2)(A). In attempting to identify bona fide loans, this provision necessarily imposes
substantial administrative burdens on the plan administrators.
443 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983); Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). For a discussion of the arguments rejected in Wood-
sam Associates, see Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property for More Than Cost
Without Personal Liability (Contentions of Taxpayer's Counsel in a Pending Case), 6 Tax L.
Rev. 319 (1951).
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Finally, an additional tax should apply to amounts includable in gross
income on account of predeath distributions. Preretirement distributions
from qualified pension plans, IRAs, and nonqualified deferred annuities
are subject to an additional tax of 10%. 4 " Congress recognized that
these additional taxes both discourage nonretirement use of the retire-
ment savings vehicles and recapture the benefit of tax deferral that is
inappropriately received.445 The same rationale justifies the imposition
of an additional tax on distributions from life insurance contracts.
446
2. Reform of the Statutory Definition
The second set of reforms would revise and restructure the statutory
definition of life insurance to achieve two goals: First, the permissible
degree of investment orientation would be reduced to achieve a more
sensible balance between investment and insurance protection. Second,
the statutory design would be simplified to make § 7702 more compre-
hensible and to reduce the potential for abuse.
The single premium contract should not serve as the limiting model of
acceptable life insurance design because it permits an excessive degree of
investment orientation. Under most single premium contracts, the un-
taxed investment income far exceeds the cost of the insurance protection
provided.447 Assuming that preferential treatment is retained to en-
courage people to obtain insurance protection, the subsidy thereby pro-
vided is clearly disproportionate to the societal benefit produced.448
Several alternatives would generate a more appropriate balance be-
tween investment and insurance protection. Precise targeting of the tax
incentive would result if the exclusion from gross income were limited to
the interest income actually applied to pay the cost of term insurance
protection. To allow a limited degree of prefunding, the exclusion from
44 IRC § 72(q), (t).
445 See 1986 General Explanation, note 203, at 713-14.
446 The penalty tax does not apply to distributions from qualified pension plans, IRAs, and
nonqualified deferred annuities made: after the taxpayer attains age 59 1/2 (IRC § 72 (q(2)(A)
and (t)(2)(A)(i)); after the death of the primary beneficiary (IRC § 72(q)(2)(B) and
(t)(2)(A)Cfi)); after the taxpayer becomes disabled (IRC § 72(q)(2)(C) and (t)(2)(A)Ciii)); or in
certain other situations. Although a penalty tax applicable to distributions from life insurance
contracts should contain similar exceptions, the penalty tax should apply to postretirement
distributions because a life insurance contract's cash value is indistinguishable from many
other taxable financial assets that can be used for retirement savings. See notes 201-13 and the
accompanying text. If it is determined that cash value life insurance serves serves a distinct
role as a source of retirement savings, however, the penalty tax should also exempt distribu-
tions prior to retirement.
447 See notes 239-44 and the accompanying text.
448 The possible use of cash value life insurance as a source of retirement savings does not
justify the use of a more investment-oriented model. Unlike nonqualiflied deferred annuities,
§ 101 exempts the untaxed investment income accumulated in a life insurance contract if it is
not distributed prior to the death of the insured.
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gross income could extend to a specified additional amount of investment
income.449 Because this approach would focus exclusively on events oc-
curring during the taxable year, § 7702 could be greatly simplified: The
limitations on actuarial assumptions, the computational rules, and the
adjustment rules could be eliminated.
The major problem with this approach is political. Life insurance
agents and companies would argue that it would make marketing ex-
tremely difficult because a prospective purchaser could not be told that
all investment income earned would be exempt from taxation. In fact, a
portion of the amofints credited under many contract designs currently
marketed would be taxable under this proposal.450 The fact that this ap-
proach would apply so broadly demonstrates that undue tax subsidies are
granted currently, rather than representing a flaw in this proposal.
An alternative approach would revise § 7702's concept of the maxi-
mum investment-oriented policy design. For example, § 7702 could re-
place the current single-premium model with a model based on the level-
premium contract. The relative magnitude of the actual mortality
charges and investment income earned are roughly comparable under
level premium contracts, although the precise relationship depends on
many factors. For example, in the level premium contract illustrated in
Table 1, the mortality charges exceed the interest credited during the first
five years. In most later years, however, the interest credited is approxi-
mately 50% greater than the mortality charges. One should note that
this illustration is premised on the use of a 4% rate of interest; if higher
rates were used, the investment orientation would increase.
451
The principal advantage of this approach is that it would have a more
limited effect on the marketing of cash value life insurance because more
contract designs would remain nontaxable. One notable disadvantage is
that many of the actuarial complexities of § 7702 would still be needed.
A degree of simplification would result if a single test replaced the cash
value accumulation test and the guideline premium test.452 Additional
simplification would result if the actuarial based limitations were re-
449 For example, an additional exclusion from gross income of a specified dollar amount
could be allowed. Alternatively, the exclusion could equal a fixed percentage of the mortality
charges actually imposed.
450 For example, under the level premium policy illustrated in Appendix Table 1, interest
credited (at a 4% rate) exceeds the mortality charges after the fifth contract year. This excess
would be taxable unless the exclusion from gross income exceeded the level of mortality
charges imposed.
451 The relationship between mortality charges and investment income earned depends, in
part, on the age of the insured when the contract is issued. For example, under a level-pre-
mium contract issued to a 55-year-old the mortality charges significantly exceed the interest
credited (at a 4% rate) for many years. If an 8% rate were used, however, the investment
income credited would significantly exceed the mortality charges after the fifth contract year.
452 The questionable justification for two separate tests is discussed in notes 250.54 and the
accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 43:
LIFE INSURANCE
placed with a single statutory table specifying, for different ages, the min-
imum death benefit to cash value ratio.45 3
453 The ratios specified in the table would reflect actuarial assumptions concerning interest
rates, and mortality and expense charges. Use of a single set of actuarial assumptions would
limit the flexibility currently allowed to adjust actuarial assumptions to reflect differences in
the health of insured individuals. For example, higher mortality charges are imposed for indi-
viduals classified as substandard insurance risks. The seriousness of this problem depends on
the general limitation on investment orientation. If the single premium model reflected in
§ 7702 is retained, or if interest is credited at rates significantly in excess of 4%, many substan-
dard risk contracts could be marketed without difficulty. If a level-premium model were
adopted, and if interest were credited at very low rates, then certain substandard contracts
would terminate without cash value prior to age 95.





LEVEL PREMIUM CASH VALUE CONTRACT
Post- Cost of
Premium Current Closing
Cash Insurance Interest Cash
Age Premium Value Protection Earned Value
35 1,279 1,279 208 47 1,117
36 1,279 2,396 219 91 2,269
37 1,279 3,547 231 137 3,453
38 1,279 4,732 246 184 4,670
39 1,279 5,949 262 233 5,919
40 1,279 7,198 280 282 7,200
41 1,279 8,478 301 333 8,510
42 1,279 9,789 321 385 9,853
43 1,279 11,131 344 438 11,226
44 1,279 12,504 367 493 12,631
45 1,279 13,909 392 549 14,066
46 1,279 15,344 417 605 15,533
47 1,279 16,812 443 664 17,033
48 1,279 18,312 469 723 18,566
49 1,279 19,844 498 784 20,130
50 1,279 21,409 527 846 21,727
51 1,279 23,006 562 909 23,353
52 1,279 24,632 600 973 25,005
53 1,279 26,283 642 1,038 26,680
54 1,279 27,958 689 1,105 28,374
55 1,279 29,653 737 1,171 30,088
56 1,279 31,366 787 1,239 31,819
57 1,279 33,097 836 1,307 33,569
58 1,279 34,847 885 1,376 35,338
59 1,279 36,617 936 1,446 37,126
60 1,279 38,405 990 1,516 38,931
61 1,279 40,210 1,049 1,587 40,748
62 1,279 42,027 1,113 1,659 42,573
63 1,279 43,852 1,182 1,730 44,400
64 1,279 45,678 1,257 1,802 46,223
65 1,279 47,502 1,335 1,873 48,041
66 1,279 49,319 1,411 1,945 49,852
67 1,279 51,131 1,488 2,015 51,659
68 1,279 52,937 1,562 2,086 53,462
69 1,279 54,740 1,637 2,157 55,260





Cash Insurance Interest Cash
Age Premium Value Protection Earned Value
70 1,279 56,539 1,717 2,227 57,049
71 1,279 58,327 1,804 2,297 58,820
72 1,279 60,098 1,901 2,366 60,563
73 1,279 61,841 2,009 2,433 62,266
74 1,279 63,545 2,121 2,499 63,923
75 1,279 65,201 2,234 2,563 65,531
76 1,279 66,810 2,341 2,626 67,094
77 1,279 68,373 2,439 2,686 68,620
78 1,279 69,898 2,526 2,745 70,118
79 1,279 71,397 2,604 2,804 71,596
80 1,279 72,875 2,681 2,861 73,055
81 1,279 74,334 2,759 2,918 74,494
82 1,279 75,772 2,841 2,974 75,905
83 1,279 77,184 2,926 3,029 77,286
84 1,279 78,565 3,006 3,082 78,641
85 1,279 79,920 3,071 3,135 79,984
86 1,279 81,262 3,112 3,188 81,339
87 1,279 82,617 3,121 3,242 82,738
88 1,279 84,017 3,089 3,299 84,227
89 1,279 85,505 3,005 3,360 85,861
90 1,279 87,139 2,852 3,429 87,716
91 1,279 88,994 2,608 3,508 89,894
92 1,279 91,173 2,237 3,602 92,537
93 1,279 93,816 1,683 3,719 95,852
94 1,279 97,131 999 3,868 100,000
TABLE 2
SINGLE PREMIUM CASH VALUE CONTRACT
Post- Cost of
Premium Current Closing
Cash Insurance Interest Cash
Age Premium Value Protection Earned Value
35 25,188 25,188 158 1,004 26,034
36 0 26,034 166 1,038 26,906
37 0 26,906 175 1,073 27,804
38 0 27,804 186 1,108 28,726














































































































































































































































































































































Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
Age
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
Closing
Cash
Value
78,281
79,395
80,493
81,575
82,634
83,668
84,678
85,675
86,675
87,701
88,785
89,965
91,294
92,841
94,704
97,022
100,000
19881
